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ARTICLES
A Broker-Dealer's Civil Liability to Investors
for Fraud: An Implied Private Right of Action
Under Section 15(c)(1) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934
CHAIT SCOTT*
"The proper definition of an average investor is a bankrupt
investor ... "
-A witness during the 1934
Senate hearings on the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.1
INTRODUCTION
An individual investor's right to sue his stockbroker for fraud under section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 is well established.' Less well
recognized is the possibility of a private right of action under section 15(c)(1)
* Assistant Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. J.D., 1979, Harvard
University; B.A., 1973, Stanford University.
1. Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings on S. Res. 84 (72d Cong.) and S. Res. 56 and S. Res.
97 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 7157 (1934).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982) (referred to throughout this Article as the 1934 Act or the
Exchange Act).
3. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975);
Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). Section
10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987), enacted pursuant to § 10(b), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
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or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
4. The first three clauses of § 15(c) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (1982), provide:
(c)(1) No broker or dealer shall make use of the mails or any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce to effect any transaction in, or to induce or
attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any security (other than commercial
paper, bankers' acceptances, or commercial bills) otherwise than on a national
securities exchange of which it is a member by means of any manipulative, deceptive,
or other fraudulent device or contrivance, and no municipal securities dealer shall
make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce to
effect any transaction in, or to induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of,
any municipal security by means of any manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent
device or contrivance. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this paragraph,
by rules and regulations define such devices or contrivances as are manipulative,
deceptive, or otherwise fraudulent.
(2) No broker or dealer shall make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality
of interstate commerce to effect any transaction in, or to induce or attempt to
induce the purchase or sale of, any security (other than an exempted security or
commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, or commercial bills) otherwise than on a
national securities exchange of which it is a member, in connection with which such
broker or dealer engages in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act or practice,
or makes any fictitious quotation, and no municipal securities dealer shall make use
of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce to effect any
transaction in, or to induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any
municipal security in connection with which such municipal securities dealer engages
in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act or practice, or makes any fictitious
quotation. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this paragraph, by rules and
regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts
and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative and such quotations as
are fictitious.
(3) No broker or dealer shall make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality
of interstate commerce to effect any transaction in, or to induce or attempt to
induce the purchase or sale of, any security (other than an exempted security or
commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, or commercial bills) in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission shall prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors to provide
safeguards with respect to the financial responsibility and related practices of brokers
and dealers including, but not limited to, the acceptance of custody and use of
customers' securities and the carrying and use of customers' deposits or credit
balances. Such rules and regulations shall (A) require the maintenance of reserves
with respect to customers' deposits or credit balances, and (B) no later than September
1, 1975, establish minimum financial responsibility requirements for all brokers and
dealers.
Rule 15cl-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-2 (1987), provides:
(a) The term "manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance",
as used in section 15(c)(1) of the Act (section 2, 52 Stat. 1075; 15 U.S.C. 78o(c)(1)
[sic], is hereby defined to include any act, practice, or course of business which
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brought under section 15(c)(1), there is no consensus among the circuits as to
whether to imply a private right of action under this provision.5 In all the on-
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
(b) The term "manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance",
as used in section 15(c)(1) of the Act, is hereby defined to include any untrue
statement of a material fact and any omission to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they are made, not misleading, which statement or omission is made with knowledge
or reasonable grounds to believe that it is untrue or misleading.
(c) The scope of this section shall not be limited by any specific definitions of
the term "manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance"
contained in other rules adopted pursuant to section 15(c)(1) of the act.
This Article does not directly analyze the possibility of implication of private rights under
§ 15(c)(2) and § 15(c)(3), but rather focuses on an implied private right of action under § 15(c)(1).
An argument could be advanced for implying private rights of action for damages (but not for
rescission) under clauses (c)(2) and (c)(3) of § 15. See infra note 219.
5. The federal courts have split on the issue. By and large, the older cases support the
implication of a private right of action under § 15(c)(1), while more of the recent cases decline to
imply a private right. For a discussion of the significance of the older precedent, see infra notes
254-65 and accompanying text.
(a) Some courts have found-by way of holding or dictum or by assuming sub silentio-that
there is an implied private right of action under § 15(c)(1). See, e.g.:
First Cirtuit: Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365, 368 n.1 (1st Cir.) ("Churning
may give rise to a civil cause of action under either § 10(b) or § 15(c) . . . ."), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1002 (1973); Gilman v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 492, 496 (D.N.H.
1983) (court refused to dismiss claim alleging violations of § 15(c)(1) and § 15(c)(2)).
Second Circuit: Beres v. Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc., [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 93,395, at 97,069 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (plaintiff bringing private action under § 15(c)(1)
must allege facts showing compliance with limitations period of § 29(b)); In re Gas Reclamation,
Inc. Sec. Litig., 659 F. Supp. 493, 509-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("Second Circuit unequivocally has
held that a private right of action exists under section 15(c)(1)."); Darvin v. Bache Halsey Stuart
Shields, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 460, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (same scienter standard applies to § 10(b)
and § 15(c) in private action against brokerage firm); Resnick v. Touche Ross & Co., 470 F.
Supp. 1020, 1023 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (claim alleging violations df § 15(c) brought by investors
in brokerage firm dismissed because private right of action under § 15(c) runs in favor of customers
of broker-dealer); Koch v. Moseley, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,283,
at 92,810 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (private claims brought under § 15(c) held time-barred under statute of
limitations embodied in § 29(b)); Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946, 956 n.12
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (claim in private action under § 15(c) requires proof of scienter comparable to
that which must be shown under Rule lOb-5); Handeiman v. Weiss, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,749, at 96,483 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (plaintiffs stated cause of action.
under § 15(c)(1)); Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 365 F. Supp. 1364, 1371-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(private cause of action predicated on § 15(c)(1) held time-barred under section 29(b)); Smachlo
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Feuner & Smith, Inc., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 93,148, at 91,137 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (private action under § 15(c)(1) assumed permissible
but count under that section dismissed because no allegation that defendant induced the purchase
or sale of any security by plaintiffs); Franklin Nat'l Bank v. L.B. Meadows & Co., 318 F. Supp.
1339, 1341-43 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (private right of action exists under § 15(c)(2)); Maher v. J.R.
Williston & Beane, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 133, 137-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (private causes of action based
on § 15(c)(1) held time-barred by- limitations period under § 29(b)); Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp.,
250 F. Supp. 668, 673 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966) (plaintiff correctly brought
private lawsuit under § 10(b) and § 15(c)(1)); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 222 F. Supp. 798, 803
(S.D.N.Y. 1963) (plaintiff would have been entitled to bring private lawsuit under § 15(c)(1));
Howard v. Furst, 140 F. Supp. 507, 510-11 (S.D.N.Y.) (private right of action has been found
19881
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going legal excitement over section 10(b), few legal scholars have considered
for violations of § 15(c)), aff'd, 238 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937 (1957);
Coburn v. Warner, 110 F. Supp. 850, 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (private action based on alleged
violation of Rule 15c1-4 permitted to proceed); Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869, 878
(S.D.N.Y. 1949) (private actions for violation of § 15(c) are specifically provided for in § 29(b)).
Third Circuit: Hill v. Equitable Trust Co., 562 F. Supp. 1324, 1346 (D. Del. 1983) (private
claims under § 15(c) and §-15(b) were dismissed because defendants were banks, not brokers or
dealers within the meaning of the 1934 Act); Hill v. Der, 521 F. Supp. 1370, 1388-89 (D. Del.
1981) (plaintiff bringing private claim under § 15(c)(1) must allege due diligence in seeking to
discover securities violation or be time-barred under § 29(b)); Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine,
288 F. Supp. 836, 843, 845-46 (E.D. Va. 1968) (private right of action based on § 10(b) and
§ 15(c)(1) against brokerage firm for churning permitted). See also Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F.
Supp. 724, 734 (E.D. Pa. 1966) ("Without deciding the question, it may be that the plaintiffs
could have brought their action against [defendants] under Section 15(c)(1) .... ).
Fourth Circuit: Blomquist v. Churchill, 633 F. Supp. 131, 132 (D.S.C. 1985) (private claim
under § 15(c)(1) survived motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration (arbitration aspect of decision
may be affected by Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987), see
infra note 7); accord Levendag v. Churchill, 623 F. Supp. 620, 621 (D.S.C. 1985); Mid-Carolina
Oil, Inc. v. Klippel, 526 F. Supp. 694, 696 (D.S.C. 1981) (§ 15 held inapplicable in private lawsuit
where defendants were not alleged or shown to be broker-dealers), aff'd, 673 F.2d 1313 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1107 (1982); Gilbert v. Bagley, 492 F. Supp. 714, 732-13 (M.D.N.C. 1980)
(count under § 15(c)(1) in private action permitted in part and dismissed in part).
Fifth Circuit: Vigman v. Community Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 635 F.2d 455, 460 n.12 (5th Cir.
1981) (limitations period of § 29(b) applies to actions under § 15(c)(1)); Kasner v. H. Hentz &
Co., 475 F.2d 119, 121 (5th Cir.) (directed verdict in defendant's favor was inappropriate where
investor alleged, inter alia, violations of §§ 15(c)(1) and (2)), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 823 (1973);
Goldenberg v. Bache & Co., 270 F.2d 675, 680-81 (5th Cir. 1959) (private action under section
15(c) must be brought within the limitations period of section 29(b)).
Sixth Circuit: Davis v. Avco Corp., 371 F. Supp. 782, 789 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (allegation in
private lawsuit of use of deceptive devices by unregistered broker or dealer states a valid claim
under § 15(c)). Some courts have declined to reach the issue of whether a private right of action
exists under § 15(c)(1)). See, e.g., Smith v. Oppenheimer & Co., 635 F. Supp. 936, 941 (W.D.
Mich. 1985); Kirkland v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 564 F. Supp. 427, 440 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
Seventh Circuit: Jordan Bldg. Corp. v. Doyle, O'Connor & Co., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,256, at 92,226-27 (7th Cir. 1968) (private action may be maintained
under both § 10(b) and § 15(c)(1)); Doporcyk v. Weber, [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 98,635, at 93,144 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (claim in private lawsuit alleging violation of § 15(c)(1)
survived motion to strike); Sennett v. Oppenheimer & Co., 502 F. Supp. 939, 942 (N.D. IMI. 1980)
(plaintiff stated cause of action under, inter alia, §§ 15(c)(1) and (2)).
Eighth Circuit: Buder v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 56, 57
(E.D. Mo. 1980) (time limitations of § 29(b) apply to private claims under §§ 15(c)(1) and (2)),
aff'd, 644 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1981).
Ninth Circuit: Badart v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 797 F.2d 775, 777 (9th
Cir. 1986) (private claims under § 15 held not arbitrable), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 3204 (1987), for
reconsideration in light of Shearson/Amercan Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987),
see infra note 7); Watson v. Roberts, Scott & Co., 466 F.2d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1972) (judgment
in state breach of contract action might not collaterally estop plaintiffs from bringing subsequent
private action against securities brokers for alleged violation of § 15(c)(1)); Speck v. Oppenheimer
& Co., [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,461, at 98,311 (W.D. Mo.
1984) (private right of action may be implied from § 15(cXl)); Amunrud v. Taurus Drilling Ltd.,
[1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,649, at 97,595-96 (D. Mont. 1983)
(express remedy under § 15(c) excludes implied remedy under § 10(b)).
Tenth Circuit: Valley Bank of Nev. v. Foster & Marshall, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 1351, 1352 (D.
Utah 1984) (time limitations of § 29(b) applicable to private action for churning under § 15(c)(1));
Coronado Credit Union, Inc. v. Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Inc., [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed.
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the possibility of employing section 15(c)(1) as an alternative remedy.6 Curl-
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,715, at 97,883 n.8, 97,884-85 (D.N.M. 1983) (court had jurisdiction over
private action brought under, inter alia, § 15, but claim under § 15(c)(1) failed for lack of proof
of fraud).
Eleventh Circuit: Sigvartsen v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., No. 84-540-Civ-T-15,
screens 2-3 (M.D. Fla. July 31, 1984, Order Sept. 11, 1986) (WESTLAW, Fsec-cs database)
(assuming private action lies under § 15, it was time-barred under § 29(b)). See also supra Fifth
Circuit cases for pre-1982 authority; Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir.
1981).
D.C. Circuit: Moholt v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 451, 452-53 (D.D.C. 1979)
(court denied availability of in pari delicto defense in private suit under, inter alia, § 15(c)).
(b) Other courts have found-by way of holding or dictum or assumption-that there is no
implied private right of action under § 15(c)(1). See, e.g.:
First Circuit: Prestera v. Shearson Lehman Bros., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 92,884, at 94,290 (D. Mass. 1986) (§ 15(c)(1) and § 15(c)(3) provide no private right
of action); Roberts v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 653 F. Supp. 406, 413-15 (D. Mass.
1986) (§ 15(c)(1) does not authorize a private right of action).
Second Circuit: Baum v. Phillips, Appel & Walden, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1518, 1529 (S.D.N.Y.
1986).
Third Circuit: Walck v. American Stock Exch., Inc., 565 F. Supp. 1051, 1059 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
(no implied right of action for money damages under § 15), aff'd, 687 F.2d 778 (3rd Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 942 (1983); accord Pennington v. Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc., Civ.
Action No. 86-3672 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
Fourth Circuit: Shotto v. Laub, 632 F. Supp. 516, 518 n.2 (D. Md. 1986); Chapman v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
99,419, at 96,409 (D. Md. 1983).
Seventh Circuit: Wagman v. FSC Sec. Corp., [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 92,445, at 92,716 (N.D. IlI. 1985) (no private right of action exists under § 15(c)(1));
Hughes v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., No. 81 C 5075, screens 4-5 (N.D. Ill. June
25, 1984) (WESTLAW, Fsec-cs database); Berk v. Oppenheimer & Co., [1983-1984 Transfer
Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,603, at 97,371 (N.D. Il. 1983); Pierson v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 497, 502-03 (C.D. 111. 1982) (no congressional intent to imply a
private right of action under § 15(c)(1)).
Eighth Circuit: Brannan v. Eisenstein, 804 F.2d 1041, 1043 n.1 (8th Cir. 1986) (affirming district
court's dismissal of § 15(c) claim on ground that section confers no private right of action);
Corbey v. Grace, 605 F. Supp. 247, 250-51 (D. Minn. 1985) (no private right of action exists
under § 15(c)(1)).
Ninth Circuit: Berner v. Lazzaro, 730 F.2d 1319, 1320 n.1 (9th Cir. 1984), affd on other
grounds sub nom. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299 (1985); SEC v.
Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1313-14 (9th Cir. 1982); Rhoades v. Powell, 644 F. Supp. 645,
661 (E.D. Cal. 1986) (no private right of action exists under § 15(c)).
Tenth Circuit: O'Crowley v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Civ. Action No. 83-2114-S, slip op., screens
3-4 (D. Kan. May 14, 1986) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Courts file) (private cause of action does
not exist for violation of § 15).
Eleventh Circuit: Olsen v. Paine Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 17, 18 (M.D.
Fla. 1985).
6. This author has found no law review article or other scholarly work devoted to this subject.
A few commentators have in passing suggested that an implied private right of action exists for
violations of § 15(c)(1). See, e.g., 3B H. BLoomE'rgfau, Sncun AND -Fnm. CoaPoRATE LAW
9-161 (rev. 1987) ("[lIt should be difficult to deny an implied remedy with respect to an action
based on Section 15(c)."); 3 A. BROmBERGO & L. LowENFEIs, SacuRnrms FRAUD AND CoMMoDmITsS
FRAuD § 8.4(450-59), § 8.5(450) (1986) (assuming implied civil liability under § 15(c)(1) and Rule
15cl-2); L. Loss, Fu NDAam rAs oF SEcuRrrims REGUATiON 988 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter L. Loss
(1988)] (observing that cases go "both ways" on the question of an implied right of action under
§ 15(c)(1)); 3 L. Loss, SEcuRrrTs REGU ATON 1760 n.253 (2d. ed 1961) [hereinafter L. Loss
1988]
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ously, section 15(c)(1) has long been overlooked as a means for combatting
securities fraud by brokers and dealers. The objective of this Article is to
demonstrate that Congress has nonetheless intended that a private right of
action be available under section 15(c)(1), and to suggest how such an action
would differ from a civil action for fraud under section 10(b). 7
Section 15(c)(1) and section 10(b) are similar in that both are general
antifraud provisions, and both proscribe the effectuation of a securities trans-
action by means of any "manipulative" or "deceptive" "device or contri-
vance." In some respects, section 15(c)(1) is a narrower provision than section
10(b). Unlike section 10(b) which applies to "any person," section 15(c)(1)
applies only to brokers and dealers.8 Also, unlike section 10(b) which applies
to any purchase or sale of securities, section 15(c)(1) covers only securities
transactions in the over-the-counter (OTC) market and on exchanges of which
(1961)] ("The legislative history of the 1938 amendments ... reflects a recognition that a private
right of action might be maintained under § 29(b) for violation of § 15(c)."); Gruenbaum &
Steinberg, Section 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A Viable Remedy Awakened, 48
GEo. WAsH. L. Ray. 1, 45-50 (1979) (discussing the application of § 29(b) to violations of
§ 15(c)(1)); Note, The Prospects for Rule X-JOB-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Investors,
59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1134 (1950). In that Note, the author stated:
In 1938, Congress passed an amendment to Section 29(b) imposing a short statute
of limitations on actions brought for violations of Commission rules under Section
15(c)(1). Since Section 15(c)(1), like Section 10(b), does not specifically provide for
a private action, the implication of the amendment was that Congress had always
assumed that private actions under those and similar provisions were available.
Id. (citation omitted).
To this author's knowledge, no commentator has analyzed this topic in light of the jurisprudence
on implied private rights of action that has been developed over the last decade by the Supreme
Court since Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
7. An investor who has signed a customer agreement providing for arbitration of any
controversies with his brokerage firm may find that his right to sue in federal court under the
provisions of the 1934 Act has been curtailed. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,
107 S. Ct. 2332, 2343 (1987) (claims under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act were held arbitrable under
predispute arbitration agreements between broker and customers). In light of McMahon, the SEC
predicts that the number of arbitration cases may double over the next year. N.Y. Times, Sept.
11, 1987, at D14, col. 1. Whether McMahon, which involved § 10(b) claims, will be extended to
§ 15(c)(1) claims is, of course, an open question. Certainly the dissent strongly disagreed with the
majority's position: "[The Court] approves the abandonment of the judiciary's role in the resolution
of claims under the Exchange Act ... at a time when the industry's abuses towards investors are
more apparent than ever." McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2346 (Blackmun, J., disssenting in part and
concurring in part). In any event, even assuming McMahon's holding is extended, if no arbitration
agreement applies, or if one exists and it is otherwise unenforceable, or if judicial review is
obtainable of an arbitrator's decision under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982),
then it is the position of this Article that a private investor is entitled to sue for fraud directly
under § 15(c)(1) and Rule 15c-2 of the Exchange Act. See also Casenote, The Arbitrability of
Federal Securities Claims: Wilko's Swan Song, 42 U. MtAW L. Ray. 203 (1987).
8. "Although [§ 15(c)(1) and (2) and the rules thereunder] are limited to brokers and dealers,
presumably an employee or other person may violate them as an accessory and hence become a
principal under the federal aider and abettor statute. 18 U.S.C. § 2." L. Loss (1988), supra note
6, at 811 n.2.
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the broker-dealers are not members. 9 Moreover, a shorter statute of limitations
arguably applies to some private actions brought under section 15(c)(1).10
Within these clear confines, however, section 15(c)(1) may be interpreted as
a more flexible antifraud proscription than section 10(b). Over the past decade,
the Supreme Court has, to the dismay of some of its members,1' narrowed
the scope of section 10(b). The Court began its restrictions by requiring the
plaintiff in a private action under section 10(b) to be an actual purchaser or
seller of securities in order to have standing to sue. 2 The Court then required
proof of scienter in private actions for damages 3 and later in enforcement
actions brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Com-
mission). 14 The Court has interpreted the word "manipulative" as a term of
art,'5 and has found that a claim of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty states
a cause of action under section 10(b) only if the conduct can be viewed as
"manipulative or deceptive. ' 16 This author believes that, whatever their merits
under a section 10(b) claim, these limitations are inapplicable to a section
9. Specifically, § 15(c)(1) applies to a securities transaction by a broker or dealer "otherwise
than on a national securities exchange of which it is a member." See supra note 4. A securities
transaction not executed on a stock exchange is said to be executed in the OTC market. Poser,
Restructuring the Stock Markets: A Critical Look at the SEC'S National Market System, 56
N.Y.U. L. REv. 883, 894 (1981). The stock of approximately 90% of the publicly-traded
corporations is traded over the counter. Shivangi v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 825 F.2d 885,
886 n.1 (5th Cir. 1987). While a stock exchange functions much like a centralized auction for
buying and selling securities, the OTC market:
is a decentralized market in which transactions are hegotiated among broker-dealers
and between broker-dealers and their customers.... [U]nlike the stock exchanges,
the OTC market provides no way for the orders of a buying customer and a selling
customer to meet directly; in virtually every OTC transaction, there is a professional
dealer who participates by buying or selling for his own account. The OTC market
is therefore known as a "dealer" market.
Poser, supra, at 895.
10. Section 29(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1982), provides that no contract may
be voided in any action involving a purchase or sale of a security allegedly in violation of § 15(c)(1)
unless such action is brought within one year after the discovery of the violation and within three
years after such violation. For the full text of § 29(b), see infra note 134. In a case involving an
alleged violation of § 10(b), however, the federal court "borrows" the most appropriate statute
of limitations from the forum state. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210
n.29 (1976); Osterneck v. E.T. Barwick Indus., 825 F.2d 1521, 1532 (11th Cir. 1987), petition for
cert. filed, (Jan. 15, 1988). See also T. HAzEN, THE LAw oF Sacuarrms REGuLAION 476-77 (1985)
(noting that the limitations period under Rule lOb-5 litigation can vary from two years, if the
blue-sky limitations period is used, to six years based on a common-law fraud limitations period).
Because § 29(b) refers only to declaring contracts "void," arguably only private suits for rescission
for violation of § 15(c)(1) would be subject to the 1 year/3 year limitations period of § 29(b),
while suits for damages would be subject to the applicable state statute of limitations. See infra
note 218. See also Gruenbaum & Steinberg, supra note 6, at 47-48.
11. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 246 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
12. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730-31 (1975).
13. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
14. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980).
15. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 199.
16. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977). Note that § 15(c)(1), but not
§ 10(b), directly proscribes "fraudulent" conduct. See infra note 309.
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15(c)(1) claim. The reasons supporting this contention are taken up in Part II
of this Article. 17
The primary task and the principal focus of this Article, however, is to
demonstrate why a private right of action should be implied under section
15(c)(1) in light of the Supreme Court's recent decisions in implied-rights
jurisprudence, beginning with Cort v. Ash."8 To this end, Part I traces briefly
the evolution of the Supreme Court's doctrine of implied private rights of
action under federal statutes, especially the securities statutes.19 Part I then
delves into an extensive analysis of the language and legislative history of
section 15(c)(1) and its relation to other provisions of the 1934 Act, especially
section 29(b).20 Based on what this author discerns to be the Supreme Court's
approach to implied-rights jurisprudence, the author concludes that a private
right of action should be implied under section 15(c)(1).
For the reader unfamiliar with broker-dealer litigation in general, or with
section 15(c)(1) litigation in particular, a few introductory words may be
helpful. What follows is a brief overview of the general law governing the
relationship between the broker-dealer and his customer, and an outline of
the nature of the litigation that has been brought under section 15(c)(1) both
by private litigants and by the SEC.
Although often embodied in a single individual or firm, a broker-dealer
serves two different, potentially conflicting functions. As a "broker," he acts
as an agent in the purchase and sale of securities for his customer's account.2'
As a "dealer," he acts as a principal who buys and sells for his own account.?
Both the SEC and the courts" have tended to extend to brokers and dealers
similar general legal principles despite the different roles that they may have
played in particular circumstances. The two main jurisprudential concepts
which apply to the professional conduct of broker-dealers are the laws of
fiduciary obligation and the so-called "shingle theory."
The fiduciary duties imposed on brokers and dealers arise from general
agency concepts. In an early case, Judge Learned Hand stated that a "broker
is indeed an agent, and as such a fiduciary.' '2 The relationship between a
17. See infra notes 310-400, 430-48 and accompanying text.
18. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). For an overview of Cort v. Ash, see notes 55-61 and accompanying
text.
19. See infra notes 47-82, 102-29, 266-80, 295-301 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 93-99, 132-251 and accompanying text. Section 29(b) of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1982), is set out infra note 134.
21. Section 3(a)(4) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1982), provides: "The term 'broker'
means any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account
of others, but does not include a bank."
22. Section 3(a)(5) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5) (1982), provides:
The term "dealer" means any person engaged in the business of bhying and selling
securities for his own account, through a broker or otherwise, but does not include
a bank, or any person insofar as he buys or sells securities for his own account,
either individually or in some fiduciary capacity, but not as part of a regular business.
23. McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377, 378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 684 (1937).
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dealer and his customers has been described by the SEC as "one of special
trust and confidence, approaching and perhaps even equaling that of a
fiduciary." 24 In numerous cases under the securities laws, the relationship
between a broker and his customer has been characterized as a fiduciary one,
creating higher duties of care, good faith, and fair dealing.2
A separate doctrine, independent of agency theory but related in practical
effect, is the so-called "shingle theory." This theory states "that even a dealer
at arm's length impliedly represents when he hangs out his shingle that he
will deal fairly with the public." 26 Although Professor Louis Loss is credited
with coining the phrase," the analysis on which the shingle theory is based
was first formulated by the SEC in In re Duker & Duker.2s In Duker, the
SEC revoked a broker-dealer's registration for selling securities at a price not
reasonably related to the prevailing market price. In holding such a practice
to violate section 15(c)(1) as well as section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, the SEC
observed:
Inherent in the relationship between a dealer and his customer is the vital
representation that the customer will be dealt with fairly, and in accordance
with the standards of the profession. It is neither fair dealing, nor in
accordance with such standards, to exploit trust and ignorance for profits
far higher than might be realized from an informed customer.
Under the shingle theory, when a dealer engages in a securities transaction
with or for a member of the public, he implicitly represents that he will deal
with his customer fairly and in accordance with the standards of the securities
profession.A0 This implied representation arises simply and solely because the
24. In re Alexander Smith, 22 S.E.C. 13, 17 (1946) (quoting In re William J. Stelmack Corp.,
11 S.E.C. 601, 623 (1942)).
25. See, e.g., Magnum Corp. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 794 F.2d 198, 200 (5th Cir.
1986); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1026 (6th Cir. 1979); Rolf v. Blyth,
Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 45 (2d Cir.), cert. denie, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Moholt v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 451, 453 (D.D.C. 1979); Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor &
Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 847 (E.D. Va. 1968); Opper v. Hancock, 250 F. Supp. 668, 676
(S.D.N.Y.) (duties of a securities broker are, if anything, more stringent than those imposed by
general agency law), aff'd, 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966); Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969, 975 (D.C.
Cir. 1949), aff'g In re Arleen W. Hughes, 27 S.E.C. 629 (1948). Cf. Shearson Hayden Stone,
Inc. v. Leach, 583 F.2d 367, 371-72 (7th Cir. 1978) (no fiduciary relationship where plaintiff was
a sophisticated investor who did not rely on his broker for advice); Fey v. Walston & Co., 493
F.2d 1036, 1049 (7th Cir. 1974) (mere existence of a broker-customer relationship is not proof of
its fiduciary character).
26. L. Loss (1988), supra note 6, at 813; 3 L. Loss (1961), supra note 6, at 1483.
27. 1 S. Gowanno, FRAUDuLNT BROKER-DEAlER PRAcnCES 8-43 (1978).
28. 6 S.E.C. 386 (1939).
29. Id. at 388-89 (footnote omitted).
30. University Hill Found. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 422 F. Supp. 879, 898 n.17 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); Vernon J. Rockier & Co., v. Graphic Enters., 52 F.R.D. 335, 342 n.12 (D. Minn 1971);
Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 702, 707 (N.D. Ind. 1968), aff'd, 417
F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970); Harvey H. Shields, Jr., 39 S.E.C.
608, 609 (1959); In re Lewis H. Ankeny, 29 S.E.C. 514, 516 (1949); In re Charles Hughes & Co.,
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dealer does business in securities, that is, simply because he "hangs out his
shingle." 3' The shingle theory has been adopted by the SEC in enforcement
proceedings and by courts in suits brought by private investors against their
broker-dealers. 32
As an agent, a broker always owes a fiduciary duty to his customers. The
extent to which fiduciary obligations, independent of the shingle theory,
apply to a dealer may depend on the closeness of his professional relationship
with his customers. 33 The sorts of activity for which brokers and dealers
may be held liable to their customers under these fiduciary concepts and
under the shingle theory are varied and numerous.3 4 For example, broker-
dealers may be found liable for churning, 35 imposing unreasonable
13 S.E.C. 676, 679, aff'd, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1943); In re
Lawrence R. Leeby, 13 S.E.C. 499, 505 (1943); In re Scott McIntyre & Co., 11 S.E.C. 442, 445-
46 (1942); In re Jack Goldberg, 10 S.E.C. 975, 980 (1942); In re Allender Co., 9 S.E.C. 1043,
1055 (1941). See also Kahn v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1961) (Clark, J., concurring)
("The essence of [the shingle] theory is that in certain circumstances one who sells securities to
the public-who hangs out his shingle-implicitly warrants the soundness of statements of stock
value, estimates of a firm's earnings potential, and the like."). The breadth of Judge Clark's
characterization has been criticized. See R. JNNImncs & H. MAsH, SEcuarrms REGULATION: CAsEs
AND MATRmALs 553 (5th ed. 1982); L. Loss (1988), supra note 6, at 814; 6 L. Loss (1961), supra
note 6, at 3712.
31. Rockler and Co. v. Graphic Enters., 52 F.R.D. 335, 342 n.12 (D. Minn. 1971).
32. See supra cases collected at note 30. For a more in-depth review of the shingle theory and
the law of fiduciary duty as applied to broker-dealers, the reader is invited to consult I S.
GoLam, supra note 27, at Ch. 8; 5B A. JAcoBs, LITIGATION ANM PRACTICE UNDER RUn 101-
5 § 210.03 (rev. 1984); S. JAFFE, BROKER-DEALERS AND SEcturms MAiumr: A GUIDE To TEE
REGULATORY PRocEss § 7.09, at 145-48 (1977); L. Loss (1988), supra note 6, at 811-43; 3 L. Loss
(1961), supra note 6, at 1482-1508; E. WEiss, REGISTRATION AND REGULATION OF BROKERS AND
DEALERS 104-11, 171-83 (1965); N. WOLFSON, R. PHILUs, & T. Russo, REGULATION OF BROKERS,
DE.ALaEs AND Sactuirrms MAR 2.03, 2.09 to .11 (1977) [hereinafter N. WoLSmN]; Cohen
& Rabin, Broker-Dealer Selling Practice Standards: The Importance of Administrative Adjudication
in Their Development, 29 LAw & CoNmen. Paoss. 691, 702-05 (1964); Hibbard, Private Suits
Against Broker-Dealers: A Proposal to Limit the Availability of Rescissory Relief for Misrepre-
sentations Implied by the Shingle Theory, 13 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 1 (1975); Note, Broker Dealers,
Market Makers and Fiduciary Duties, 9 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 746 (1978); Comment, Differential
Commissions as a Material Fact, 34 EMORY L.J. 508, 523-31 (1985); Karmel, Revisiting the Shingle,
Fiduciary-Duty Theories, N.Y.L:J., Oct. 16, 1986, at 1, col. 1. The shingle theory has been
characterized as a legal fiction, see 5B A. JACOBS, supra, § 210.03, at 9-18, but nonetheless a
useful fiction, see L. Loss (1988), supra note 6, at 814 (" 'happily'-the shingle theory not only
is unchallenged but has been considerably refined").
33. 5B A. JAcoBs, supra note 32, § 210.02, at 9-6, § 210.03, at 9-14 to 9-15, § 211.01[a], at
9-27 to 9-28; L. Loss (1988), supra note 6, at 826-29.
34. For detailed discussions of the sorts of misconduct by broker-dealers proscribed under
these theories in particular and under the antifraud provisions of securities acts in general, see 2
A. BRtosmao & L. LowENLs, supra note 6, § 5.7; 5B A. JACOBS, supra note 32, §§ 210-213;
S. JAFFE, supra note 32, §§ 7.01 to 7.06, at 127-38; 3 L. Loss (1961), supra note 6, at 1482-1508;
N. Wo soN, supra note 32, 12.09 to 2.11; Hibbard, supra note 32, at 4-7.
35. Hotmar v. Lowell H. Listrom & Co., 808 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir. 1987) ("Churning
is defined as 'excessive trading by a broker disproportionate to the size of the account involved
in order to generate commissions .... .' "); Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361, 1367-
68 (7th Cir. 1983); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 90-91 (2d Cir. 1983); Miley v. Oppenheimer
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mark-ups, 6 recommending a security without an adequate or reasonable basis
for such recommendation, 37 engaging in high-pressure sales techniques or so-
called "boiler room" tactics, 38 failing to disclose material information to a
customer,3 9 and many other activities.
Whether, as a legal matter, the fiduciary principles of agency law or the
shingle theory are imposed to find misconduct, the practical effect is to hold
the broker-dealer to a higher standard of professional responsibility than would
pertain to a nonfiduciary in an impersonal or otherwise arm's length trans-
action40 This difference in legal liability forms a basis for distinguishing an
implied right of action under section 15(c)(1), a provision devoted exclusively
to the conduct of brokers and dealers, from an implied right of action under
section 10(b), which governs conduct by "any person." This distinction is
taken up in Part II of this Article.4'
In light of the Supreme Court's recent shifts in jurisprudential attitude
toward implied rights of action,42 some of the lower courts that have considered
the issue in the last decade have declined to imply a private right under section
& Co., 637 F.2d 318, 324 (5th Cir. 1981); Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 820-21
(9th Cir. 1980); Siegel v. Tucker, Anthony & R.L. Day, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 550, 553-54 (S.D.N.Y.
1987); Rhoades v. Powell, 644 F. Supp. 645, 665-66 (E.D. Cal. 1986); Hecht v. Harris, Upham
& Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 432-33 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970). See
also Rule 15cl-7(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-7(a) (1987); 2 A. BRoMBERO & L. LowENms, supra
note 6, § 5.7, at 300-10; Note, Customer Sophistication and a Plaintiff's Duty of Due Diligence:
Proposed Framework for Churning Actions in Nondiscretionary Accounts Under SEC Rule 10b-
5, 54 FoRDHAm L. Rnv. 1101 (1986); Note, Churning by Securities Dealers, 80 HARv. L. Ray.
869 (1967); Comment, Churning and the Death of Low Risk Larceny: Calculating Damages to
Redress the Churning Client's Loss in Portfolio Value, 21 CAL. W. L. REv. 149 (1984).
36. Barnett v. United States, 319 F.2d 340, 344 (8th Cir. 1963); Charles Hughes & Co. v.
SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 436-37 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1943); Krome v. Merrill Lynch
& Co., 637 F. Supp. 910, 916 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated in part, 110 F.R.D. 693 (1986). See also
cases cited supra note 30.
37. Nassar & Co. v. SEC, 566 F.2d 790, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Hiller v. SEC, 429 F.2d 856,
858 (2d Cir. 1970); SEC v. North Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 424 F.2d 63, 84 (2d Cir. 1970);
Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596-97 (2d Cir. 1969); Quincy Co-op Bank v. A.G. Edwards &
Sons, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 78, 86 (D. Mass. 1986); Seller v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 584 F. Supp. 607,
612 (D.N.J. 1984); Canizaro v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 370 F. Supp. 282, 288-89 (E.D. La. 1974),
aff'd, 512 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1975). See also 5B A. JACOBS, supra note 32, cases cited at § 211.01.
38. Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 597 n.14 (2d Cir. 1969); Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137, 139
n.3 (2d Cir. 1963); SEC v. MV Sec., Inc., [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
99,677, at 97,724-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); SEC v. R. J. Allen & Assocs., Inc., 386 F. Supp. 866,
874 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
39. Vucinich v. Paine,.Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 803 F.2d 454, 460 (9th Cir. 1986);
Alton Box Bd. Co. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 560 F.2d 916, 920-22 (8th Cir. 1977); Chasins v.
Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1172 (2d Cir. 1970); Jaksich v. Thomson McKinnon Sec.,
Inc., 582 F. Supp. 485, 493-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
40. See N. WOLFSON, supra note 32, 2.03, at 2-15; Cohen & Rabin, supra note 32, at 703-
04 (fiduciary and shingle theories are different ways of characterizing the obligation imposed on
broker-dealers under the securities acts); Note, supra note 32, at 755-56.
41. See infra notes 307-33 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 69-82, 100-29, 267-80 and accompanying text.
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15(c)(1). 43 Very few of these cases, however, have analyzed the issue within
the context of Cort v. Ash. 4 Those that have undertaken such an analysis
have done so cursorily and without, apparently, the benefit of the legislative
history of this section,45 which contemplates civil liability thereunder. 46 It is
this author's contention that recent jurisprudence and consistency with original
legislative intent strongly favor the implication of a private right of action
under section 15(c)(1).
I. IMPLICATION OF A PRIVATE RIGiT OF ACTION
UNDER SECTION 15(c)(1)
A. The Supreme Court and the Implication of
Private Rights of Action
If somebody violates a federal statute, and in doing so he injures somebody
else, can the victim sue the violator for his damages in federal court? In other
words, may the court imply a private right of action under the statute?47 This
seemingly simple question has proven elusive of a simple answer. It has taken
up a significant portion of the Supreme Court's docket in recent years and
has presented the Court with more difficulty than most substantive questions
43. See supra note 5.
44. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). For an overview of Cort v. Ash, see notes 55-61 and accompanying
text.
45. See, e.g., Corbey v. Grace, 605 F. Supp. 247, 250-51 (D. Minn. 1985); Pierson v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 497, 502-03 (C.D. Ill. 1982).
46. See infra notes 156-251 (see especially notes 194-219) and accompanying text.
47. In implication cases, the Supreme Court frequently uses, interchangeably, the terms "private
cause of action," "private claim for relief," and "private remedy," see, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 68, 78 (1975), as well as "private rights of action," see, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage
Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15 (1979). Although the interchangeability of these terms
has been criticized, see, e.g., Schneider, Implying Private Rights and Remedies Under the Federal
Securities Acts, 62 N.C.L. Rnv. 853, 858-59 (1984), in this Article the author uses them all to
refer to "the right of a private party to seek judicial relief from injuries caused by another's
violation of a" federal statute. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730 n.1 (1979)
(Powell, J., dissenting). This Article is organized on the premise that "the question whether a
litigant has a 'cause of action' is analytically distinct and prior to the question of what relief, if
any, a litigant may be entitled to receive." Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 (1979). Thus,
Part I of this Article analyzes the right of the private investor to bring a lawsuit at all in federal
court for violation of § 15(c)(1). Part II then addresses the particular nature of the remedy (i.e.,
legal or equitable relief) that a court may afford the plaintiff, assuming his right to be heard
there in the first instance.
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that come before it.48 The answer to the question depends on which federal
statute has been violated, and even within the same statute, which particular
48. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 22-23
(1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The issue of implied private rights
of action has been repeatedly presented to the Court in a multitude of cases over the last decade.
See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. 513 (1988) (Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of
1980 does not create implied private right of action to determine the validity of two conflicting
state custody decrees); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985) (beneficiary
has no implied right of action for extra-contractual damages under § 409(a) of Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974); Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299 (1985)
(implied private damages action under Rule lob-5 will not automatically be barred by in pari
delicto defense); Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523 (1984) (investment company has
no implied right of action under § 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940); Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983) (recognizing an implied private right of action under
§ 10(b) of the 1934 Act); Jackson Transit Auth. v. Local Div. 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union,
457 U.S. 15 (1982) (no implied federal cause of action under § 13(c) of Urban Mass Transportation
Act of 1964); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982)
(recognizing an implied private right of action for damages under the Commodity Exchange Act);
Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981) (no implied right to contribution
under § 1 of Sherman Act and § 4 of Clayton Act); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287
(1981) (no implied right of action under § 10 of Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899);
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77 (1981) (no implied
right of action for contribution under Equal Pay Act of 1963 or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964); Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981) (no implied right of action
for back wages under § I of the Davis-Bacon Act); Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom
of the Press, 445 U.S. 136 (1980) (no implied private right of action under the Federal Records
Act of 1950); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (no implied
private cause of action for damages under § 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940); Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (no implied right of action under § 17(a) of the
1934 Act); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (recognizing an implied right
of action under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441
U.S. 281 (1979) (no implied right of action under the Freedom of Information Act or the Trade
Secrets Act); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (no implied right of action
under § 1302 of Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977)
(no implied right of action under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act absent allegation that conduct involved
"manipulation" or "deception"); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (no implied right
of action under § 14(e) of 1934 Act for unsuccessful tender offerors).
For a related line of cases discussing the extent to which private rights of action may exist
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of other federal statutes by state agents, see Wright v. City
of Roanoke Redevelopment and Hous. Auth., 107 S. Ct. 766 (1987) (permitting private § 1983
action by tenants for violation of the Brooke Amendment to the Housing Act of 1937); Middlesex
County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) (no private agtion
under § 1983 for violation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act or Marine Protection,
Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972); Penhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451
U.S. 1 (1981) (remand to determine whether private action permissible under § 1983 for violation,
if any, of § 6011(a) and § 6063(b)(5)(C) of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (§ 1983 provides a private cause of action for
state deprivations of rights secured by federal laws). See also Wartelle & Louden, Private
Enforcement of Federal Statutes: The Role of the Section 1983 Remedy, 9 HAsrs CoNsT. L.Q.
487 (1982).
For cases discussing implication of private rights of action under the Federal Constitution, see
Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) (first amendment); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980)
(eighth amendment); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (fifth amendment); Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (fourth amendment);
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) (fourth and fifth amendments). See also Note, Two Approaches
to Determine Whether an Implied Cause of Action Under the Constitution Is Necessary: The
Changing Scope of the Bivens Action, 19 GA. L. REv. 683 (1985).
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provision has been violated. The 1934 Act is a good example. The Supreme
Court has found implied private rights of action for violations of sections
10(b)49 and 14(a),50 but has declined to find them for violations of sections
14(e)"' and 17(a).5 2 The lower courts are split on whether private rights of
action may be implied under sections 611 and 13(d). 54
Cort v. Ash5 5 is the centerpiece in the development of the Supreme Court's
analysis of implied rights of action. In that unanimous decision, the Supreme
Court brought together four threads of analysis that had been used, at one
time or another, throughout its decisions on this issue. Since that decision in
1975, however, the threads have started to unravel again, and recent Supreme
Court decisions in the area of implied rights have been marked by internal
dissension among members of the Court. 6 Moreover, the lower courts have
49. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983). See also supra note 3.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982). See J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982). See also Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 42 (1977)
(defeated tender offeror has no implied cause of action for damages under § 14(e)). In his dissent,
however, Justice Stevens argued that "[n]o one seriously questions the premise that Congress
implicitly created a private right of action when it enacted § 14(e) in 1968." Id. at 55. Instead,
"the question presented [here] is who may invoke that remedy." Id. at n.4 (emphasis in original).
For discussions of an implied private right of action under § 14(e), see Note, Private Causes of
Action Under SEC Rule 14e-3, 51 GEo. WASH. L. Rnv. 290 (1983); Note, Securities Law: Implied
Causes of Action Under Section 14(e) of the Williams Act, 66 MINN. L. REv. 865 (1982);
Comment, Critical Survey of Target Company Disclosure Obligations Under the Williams Act, 59
TEmP. L.Q. 1189, 1195-12b2 (1986).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1982). See also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 576
(1979).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1982). Compare Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.) (implying
private right of action under § 6(b)), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944) with Walck v. American
Stock Exch., Inc., 687 F.2d 778, 786 (3d Cir. 1982) (no implied right of action under § 6), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 942 (1983). See generally Dropkin, National Securities Exchange Liability to
Public Investors: Time to Overcome Inertia?, 56 NoTRE D vE LAW. 419 (1981); Note, Implied
Private Rights of Action Under Section 6(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 39 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 1047 (1982).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982). See Florida Commercial Banks v. Culverhouse, 772 F.2d 1513
(11th Cir. 1985); Gearhart Indus. v. Smith Int'l, 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984). See also Rondeau
v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 62-65 (1975) (the availability of a "so-called implied private
right of action" under § 13(d) was not questioned by the parties and therefore the Court did not
address the issue directly); Note, An Implied Right of Action for Issuers Under Section 13(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 61 B.U.L. REv. 933 (1981); Note, Private Rights of Action
for Damages Under Section 13(d), 32 SrTAr. L. REv. 581 (1980).
55. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
56. Justice Powell opposed the Cort analysis and urged that it be abandoned; he would have
created a presumption against "the implication of any private action from a federal statute absent
the most compelling evidence that Congress in fact intended such an action to exist." Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 742, 749 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). Recently insisting
that Cori has been "effectively overnuled," Justice Scalia has sharply disagreed with Justice
Marshall's Cont style formulation of the Court's approach to implied rights of action. Thompson
v. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. 513, 521 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring). Reminiscent of Justice Powell's
attitude toward implied rights jurisprudence, Justice Scalia believes that "[i]f a change is to be
made, we should get out of the business of implied private rights of action altogether." Id. at
523. Justice Rehnquist is likewise inclined to apply a "stricter standard" to the issue of implied
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been unable to apply Cort with any degree of consistency. A rueful Justice
Rehnquist has remarked that judicial application of the Cort analysis has
failed to lend "predictability" in implied-rights-of-action jurisprudence, and
that the only uniformity that seems to have ensued after Cort is the regularity
with which the Supreme Court reverses lower federal courts' decisions on this
issueA7
Cort v. Ash raised the question of whether a private cause of action for
damages against corporate directors should be implied in favor of a stockholder
under a federal criminal statute prohibiting corporations from making certain
election campaign contributions. 8 In analyzing that question, the Court an-
nounced its now-famous "four factor" approach:
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not
expressly providing one, several factors are relevant. First, is the plaintiff
"one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,"
...- that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff?
Second, is there any, indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit,
either to create such a remedy or to deny one? ... Third, is it consistent
with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a
remedy for the plaintiff? ... And finally, is the cause of action one
traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the
States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based
solely on federal law?19
As the author will discuss below,60 none of these so-called "factors"
represented an entirely new approach to the question of when the judiciary
may allow a private party to sue for violation of a federal statute. Each
"factor" had solid historical antecedents in numerous cases before Cort.
Rather than being a revolutionary opinion, Cort can be viewed as a consensus
among all justices as to the traditional tools which should be used when a
federal court decides whether to imply a private right of action under a federal
statute. The only particularly new aspect in the Cort decision was the conscious
rights. See, e.g., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 302-03 (1981); Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979). Justice Stevens persistently has attempted to put the issue
of implied private remedies into broad historical perspective based on the Court's traditional
approach to the issue, and while in some cases, if "writing on a clean slate," he might have
followed the court's original common-law presumption in favor of implied private remedies, see
infra notes 69-82 and accompanying text, he now feels compelled to "adhere to the analytical
approach the Court has adopted" since Cort v. Ash, see Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 299-301. See
also Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 373-80 (1983); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 374-78 (1982); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 22-26 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For a
discussion of the implied-rights opinions of individual justices and an attempt to discern their
individual positions and allegiances on the implication question in general, see Note, Howard v.
Pierce: Implied Causes of Action and the On-Going Vitality of Cort v. Ash, 80 Nw. U.L. REv.
722, 735-42, 744-47 (1985).
57. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 302-03 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
58. Cort, 422 U.S. at 68.
59. Id. at 78 (citations omitted).
60. See infra notes 67-82, 102-19, 266-80, 295-301 and accompanying text.
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decision to bring together in one opinion the various principles of analysis
that had been employed to date. 61
It was, however, in the very bringing together of distinct lines of analysis
that the foundation was laid for the future disagreements among the justices.
Principal among the disagreements is the relative importance of each of the
factors.62 The relative weight that different justices may give to a factor seems
to reflect, at bottom, marked differences in philosophical and jurisprudential
attitudes toward the issue of implied rights of action.63
61. Even this consolidation of analytical tools was not particularly new. In numerous prior
cases, the Court had used a multi-factor approach in deciding whether to imply a private right of
action. See, e.g., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975); National
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of RR. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974); J. I. Case Co.
v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84
(1962); T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959). Professor Ashford argues that the
four-factor approach can be traced back to Texas & Pac. R.R. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
See Ashford, Implied Causes of Action Under Federal Laws: Calling the Court Back to Borak,
79 Nw. U.L. REv. 227, 247-58 (1984). That the Cort four-factor approach was not a conceptually
new approach is illustrated by two contemporary student comments published just prior to Cort
in which the same factors are unremarkably set forth as the traditional tools to use in implication
cases. See Note, The Phenomenon of Implied Private Actions Under Federal Statutes: Judicial
Insight, Legislative Oversight or Legislation by the Judiciary?, 43 FORDHAm L. REv. 441 (1974);
Comment, Private Rights of Action Under Amtrak and Ash. Some Implications for Implication,
123 U. PA. L. REv. 1392, 1408-36 (1975). For the proposition that Cort itself did not adopt a
fundamentally new approach in implication cases, see also Brown, Of Activism and Erie--The
Implication Doctrine's Implications for the Nature and Role of the Federal Courts, 69 IowA L.
Ray. 617, 629-30 (1984); Creswell, The Separation of Powers Implications of Implied Rights of
Action, 34 MEncER L. REv. 973, 981-82 (1983). For a view that Cort did adopt a new approach
to implied private rights of action, see infra note 114.
62. For example, the majority opinions in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,
444 U.S. 11, 23-24 (1979), and Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979),
held that the issue of whether to imply a private cause of action could be disposed of after
consideration of only the first two factors, without consideration of the others. The dissenting
justices in these opinions believed that all four factors should have been considered. Transamerica,
444 U.S. at 26-36 (White, J., dissenting); Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 580-83 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Similarly, the Court in California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 297-98 (1981), found consideration
of the first two Cort factors dispositive of the implied rights issue and found it unnecessary to
consider the last two factors in reaching its decision. See also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 388 (1982); Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451
U.S. 630, 639-40 (1981) (consideration of legislative history "makes examination of other factors
unnecessary'); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 94
n.31 (1981) ("In a case in which neither the statute nor the legislative history reveals a congressional
intent to create a private right of action for the benefit of the plaintiff, we need not carry the
Cart v. Ash inquiry further."); Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S.
136, 148-50 (1980) (though the Court does not refer to the Cort factors, its decision to deny an
implied remedy under the Federal Records Act of 1950 appears to be supported by consideration
of the first two factors only). In Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 145-
48 (1985), the Court acknowledged that the plaintiff had squarely met the first and fourth Cort
factors, but held that he had no implied cause of action because the second and third factors had
not been met.
63. For example, Justice Powell viewed the judicial implication of private remedies under
federal statutes as an encroachment on the legislative function, and treated the implication issue
as one fundamentally involving the constitutional separation of powers. Jackson Transit Auth. v.
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In this Article, the author does not attempt to cover ground that has been
more extensively reviewed by other commentators tracing the development of
implied rights of action." Rather, the author's purpose is primarily to identify
the criteria that the Supreme Court continues to deem relevant to the judicial
implication of private rights of action, and to demonstrate that even under
the "stricter standard 6s sometimes applied in cases subsequent to Cort, a
private right of action should be implied under section 15(c)(1) of the 1934
Act.
The author is mindful that the Court has suggested that it is not necessary
to "trudge through all four of the factors" 66 when the disposition of certain
factors seems to conclude the analysis. Nevertheless, inasmuch as Cort v. Ash
remains good law and the Court appears unsettled as to the relative weight it
places on each factor from case to case, prudence would seem to dictate
Local Div. 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15, 29-30 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring);
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 408 (1982) (Powell, J.,
dissenting); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-32, 742-49 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens and other members of the Court have disputed the applicability of the
separation-of-powers doctrine to the issue of implied rights of action. Curran, 456 U.S. at 375-
76.
64. See, e.g., Foy, Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and Implied Private Actions
in the State and Federal Courts, 71 CoP.Na L. Rnv. 501 (1986); Frankel, Implied Rights of
Action, 67 VA. L. REv. 553 (1981); Greene, Judicial Implication of Remedies for Federal Statutory
Violations: The Separation of Powers Concerns, 53 Tm.p. L.Q. 469 (1980); Hazen, Implied Private
Remedies Under Federal Statutes: Neither a Death Knell Nor a Moratorium-Civil Rights, Securities
Regulation, and Beyond, 33 VArD. L. REv. 1333 (1980); Maher, Implied Private Rights of Action
and the Federal Securities Laws: A Historical Perspective, 37 WAwS. & LzE L. REv. 783 (1980);
Maher & Maher, Statutorily Implied Federal Causes of Action After Merrill Lynch. How Sad It
Is; How Simple It Could Be, 88 DIcK. L. Rnv. 593 (1984); Mezey, Judicial Interpretation of
Legislative Intent: The Role of the Supreme Court in the Implication of Private Rights of Action,
36 Ru rc3ms L. REv. 53 (1983); Noyes, Implied Rights of Action and the Use and Mause of
Precedent, 56 U. CiNN. L. Rv. 145 (1987); Schneider, Implying Private Rights and Remedies
Under the Federal Securities Acts, 62 N.C.L. Ray. 853 (1984); Steinberg, Implied Private Rights
of Action Under Federal Law, 55 NoTRE D Am LAw. 33 (1979); Stewart & Sunstein, Public
Programs and Private Rights, 95 HAMW. L. R . 1195 (1982); Note, Implied Private Rights of
Action: The Courts Search for Limitations in a Confused Area of the Law, 13 CUMB. L. Ray.
569 (1983); Note, Third Party Beneficiary and Implied Right of Action Analysis: The Fiction of
One Governmental Intent, 94 YAm L.J. 875 (1985); Comment, Implied Causes of Action: A
Product of Statutory Construction or the Federal Common Law Power?, 5I U. Coo. L. Rv.
355 (1980). See also law review articles cited supra note 61.
65. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979). The genesis of the "stricter"
standard can be seen in the shift away from an inquiry into congressional intent to create a
substantive private right and toward an examination of congressional intent to create a private
remedy. See infra notes 102-29 and accompanying text. See also Cannon v. University of Chicago,
441 U.S. 677, 698 (1979) ("We, of course, adhere to the strict approach followed in our recent
cases . . ").
66. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 388 (1982) (quoting
California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 302 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)). In a separate
opinion, Justice Scalia has recently gone even further and declared that Cort has been "effectively
overruled." Thompson v. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. 513, 521 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment). The Court itself has never overruled Cort, and most recently employed the four-factor
Cort analysis in the majority opinion in Thompson. Id. at 516.
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consideration of all four factors when deciding whether to imply a private
right under section 15(c)(1).
B. Plaintiffs Membership in the Benefitted Class:
Creation of a Federal Right
The first Cort factor is whether the plaintiff is "one of the class for whose
especial benefit the statute was enacted." 67 The purpose of this test, according
to the Court, is to determine whether the statute creates a "federal right in
favor of the plaintiff." 6s
This factor can be traced to Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Rigsby,61
sometimes cited as the first case in which the Supreme Court implied a private
right of action under a federal statute.70 The Supreme Court in that case took
what was the prevailing common-law approach to the implication question:
ubi jus, ibi remedium ("where there is a right, there is a remedy"). 7' The
Rigsby common-law approach to implication was simple and straightforward:
"[W]here [the violation of a statute] results in damage to one of the class for
whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover the damages
from the party in default is implied, according to the doctrine of the common
law." 7 2 Under this common-law approach, all the plaintiff needed to prove
was that a statute was enacted to protect or benefit him and others like him-
that is, to give him a substantive "right" under federal law. If the plaintiff
could show he had such a right under federal law, then under the common-
law approach, the courts were empowered to create automatically a remedy
to protect that substantive right. 73 The remedy, of course, was the implication
67. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
68. Id.
69. 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916).
70. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 26 (1979) (White, J.,
dissenting); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 689 (1979). Whether Rigsby was in
fact the first Supreme Court case to imply a private remedy under a federal statute has been
questioned. See Ashford, supra note 61, at 229 n.2; Noyes, supra note 64, at 149.
71. Rigsby, 241 U.S. at 39-40. The pertinent language in Rigsby provides:
A disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it results
in damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,
the right to recover the damages from the party in default is implied, according to
a doctrine of the common law expressed ... in these words: "So, in every case,
where a statute enacts, or prohibits a thing for the benefit of a person, he shall
have a remedy upon the same statute for the thing enacted for his advantage, or
for the recompense of a wrong done to him contrary to the said law." ... This is
but an application of the maxim, Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Id. (citations omitted).
72. Id.
73. Justice Stevens in Curran indicated that this common-law presumption had been recognized
long before Rigsby, citing, among other cases, Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803) ("
'[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal
remedy by suit, or action at law whenever that right is invaded.' " (quoting 3 W. BLACKrsONE,
CommaNTARss 23)). Curran, 456 U.S. at 375 n.54.
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of a private cause of action for damages or other relief which the plaintiff
could bring in federal court.
Until recently, this common-law approach, which is reflected in tort doc-
trine,74 dominated the federal courts' approach to the implication of private
remedies under federal statutes.75 In particular, it was followed in the landmark
decision of Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,7 6 the "seminal" caseF holding
that a private cause of action existed under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.
Citing the Restatement of Torts, the Kardon court ruled that anyone who
violates a statute is liable to another person who is injured by such violation
if "(a) the intent of the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect an
interest of the other as an individual; and (b) the interest invaded is one which
the enactment is designed to protect."78 The court went on to cite Rigsby for
74. Justice Stevens in Curran cited T. COOLEY, LAW OF ToRTs 790 (2d ed. 1888) for a
description of the common-law approach for breach of a statutory duty: "[Wihen the duty imposed
by statute is manifestly intended for the protection and benefit of individuals, the common law,
when an individual is injured by breach of the duty, will supply a remedy, if the statute gives
none." Curran, 456 U.S. at 375 n.53. The so-called negligence per se approach is set forth in the
§ 286 of the Second Restatement of Torts. The Restatement provides:
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the require-
ments of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose purpose is
found to be exclusively or in part
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded,
and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and
(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm
results.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoro) OF ToRis § 286 (1965). See also infra note 277. Professor Hazen has
suggested that these statutory tort principles should continue to be applied to federal statutes which
predate Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), on the ground that Congress, aware of these
principles, knew its legislation would affect the most analogous federal common-law remedy. See
Hazen, supra note 64, at 1336-81. Similarly, Professor Loss observed that "the fact remains that
the skilled draftsmen of the Securities Exchange Act were presumably quite familiar with the
[Restatement's statutory tort] doctrine even if the members of Congress were not." 2 L. Loss
(1961), supra note 6, at 942. For a discussion distinguishing the negligence per se approach from
the "where there is a right, there is a remedy" approach, see Noyes, supra note 64, at 166-69.
75. Foy, supra note 64, at 548-57. For additional cases under the securities laws citing the
Restatement approach to implication of private rights of action, see Deaktor v. L. D. Schreiber
& Co., 479 F.2d 529, 533-34 (7th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 414 U.S. 113 (1973); Greater
Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783, 789-90 (8th Cir. 1967); Dann v. Studebaker-Packard
Corp., 288 F.2d 201, 208-09 (6th Cir. 1961); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787
(2d Cir. 1951); Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 245 (2d Cir.) (Clark, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 737 (1944); Kerber v. Kakos, 383 F. Supp. 625, 627 (N.D. 111. 1974); Goodman v. H.
Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440, 447 (N.D. III. 1967); Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp.
1014, 1017 (D. Mass. 1949). See also L. Loss (1988), supra note 6, at 938 ("The statutory tort
doctrine, more or less expounded in the Restatement, is now an accepted part of American law."
(footnote omitted)); 2 L. Loss (1961), supra note 6, at 942.
76. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
77. Blue Chip Stamps v. "Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975).
78. Kardon, 69 F. Supp. at 513.
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the proposition that "[this is but an application of the maxim, Ubi jus ibi
remedium. "79
Congressional intent, later to become the crucible of implication cases,-
was also important under the Rigsby common-law approach. The key differ-
ence, however, was that under the common-law approach, the congressional
intent to be deciphered was the intent to protect the class of persons of which
the plaintiff was a member. Upon a finding of such intent, the courts
presumptively implied a private right of action in favor of the plaintiff in
order to vindicate that statutory protection.81 This common-law presumption
in favor of implication (once the court determined that Congress intended the
statute to protect persons like the plaintiff) could be overcome only by a
showing of a deliberate congressional intent to deny such persons a federal
remedy. As the Kardon court observed:
Of course, the legislature may withhold from parties injured the right to
recover damages arising by reason of violation of a statute but the right
is so fundamental and so deeply ingrained in the law that where it is not
expressly denied the intention to withhold it should appear very clearly
and plainly.82
Under this common-law approach-the first Cort factor-it is easy to
conclude that a private right of action under section 15(c)(1) should be implied.
That an investor injured by broker-dealer fraud was intended to be given
protection under the federal securities laws is more than amply supported by
the cases and the legislative history.
79. Id.
80. See infra notes 102-29 and accompanying text.
81. For Supreme Court cases applying this Rigsby approach, see, e.g., Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 239 (1969) ("The existence of a statutory right implies the
existence of all necessary and appropriate remedies."); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S.
544, 557 (1969) ("We have previously held that a federal statute passed to protect a class of
citizens, although not specifically authorizing members of the protected class to institute suit,
nevertheless implied a private right of action.... A similar analysis is applicable here." (citations
omitted)); Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 202 (1967); Bell v. Hood, 327
U.S. 678, 684 (1946) ("Moreover, where federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been
the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the
necessary relief." (citing at n.6 Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137, 162, 163)); Tunstall v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210, 213 (1944); Steele v. Louisville
& Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 207 (1944); Texas & New Orleans R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry.
& S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 567-70 (1930) ("The absence of penalty is not controlling.... Many
rights are enforced for which no statutory penalties are provided.... The right is created and
the remedy exists. Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137, 162, 163."). See also Montana-Dakota
Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 261 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Justice Frankfurter stated:
[Courts] do not require explicit statutory authorization for familiar remedies to
enforce statutory obligations.... A duty declared by Congress does not evaporate
for want of a formulated sanction.... If civil liability is approprfate to effectuate
the purposes of a statute, courts are not denied this traditional remedy because it is
not specifically authorized.
Id. at 261.
82. Kardon, 69 F. Supp. at 514.
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The Supreme Court has repeatedly announced that "[d]efrauded investors
are among the very individuals Congress sought to protect in the securities
laws. 83 Some thirty-five other sections in the 1934 Act make reference to the
Act's goal to protect investors.84 The legislative history of the 1934 Act
illustrates that one primary form such protection was to take was protection
of investors from fraud by those through whom investors bought and sold
their securities, namely, brokers and dealers.85 As the very title of the Securities
Exchange Acts suggests, the focus of the Act is on the regulation of the stock
exchanges and their members. It was clear, however, that regulating the
exchanges and their members would not suffice to regulate the broker-dealers
who traded in the OTC market. It was openly recognized that failing to
regulate securities transactions in the OTC market would have left an enormous
gap in the regulatory machinery. The regulation of the exchanges required,
"as a corollary,"87 the regulation of the OTC market. As an oft-cited
contemporary report of the Twentieth Century Fund, Inc. on stock market
regulation observed:
The benefits that would accrue as the result of raising the standards of
security exchanges might be nullified if the over-the-counter markets were
left unregulated and uncontrolled. They are of vast proportions and they
would serve as a refuge for any business that might seek to escape the
discipline of the exchanges; and the more exacting that discipline, the
greater the temptation to escape from it. Over-the-counter markets offer
facilities that are useful under certain conditions, but they should not be
83. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 (1983). In a message to Congress
urging enactment of legislation that was to become the 1934 Act, President Franklin D. Roosevelt
expressly recommended such legislation "for the protection of investors, for the safeguarding of
values, and, so far as it may be possible, for the elimination of unnecessary, unwise, and destructive
speculation." 78 CoNG. Rac. 2264 (1934). Even Congressional representatives opposed to the
specific provisions of the bill fully endorsed these general purposes of the 1934 Act. See, e.g., 78
Cosa. REc. 7937 (1934) (statement of Rep. Bakewell) ("With regard to this general purpose
[referring to the President's message] there is no disagreement whatsoever amongst us. We are all
in favor of that.").
84. For a list of these provisions, see Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 244 n.4 (2d Cir.)
(Clark, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
85. As originally drafted, § 15 prohibited "any person" from effecting a security transaction
in the OTC market without complying with the rules and regulations of the SEC. There was
objection that as so phrased, the proscription was too broad and possibly unconstitutional. Stock
Exchange Practices: Hearings on S. Res. 84 (72d Cong.) and S. Res,. 56 and 97 Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6547-50, 6598-99, 6636-37 (1934)
[hereinafter Senate Hearings on S. Res. 84]. See also Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearings on
H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 225, 669 (1934) [hereinafter House Hearings on HR. 7852]. It was conceded that
the primary aim was to protect investors from fraudulent conduct of professional broker-dealers
and was not to regulate informal sales of securities by an individual seller not in the business of
selling securities. Senate Hearings on S. Res. 84, supra, at 6550-55. The language of § 15 was
ultimately changed to limit its proscriptions to broker-dealers.
86. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1982).
87. H.R. RaP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1934). See also S. Rm. No. 792, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934).
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permitted to expand beyond their proper sphere and compete with the
exchanges for business that, from the point of view of public interest,
should be confined to the organized markets. This constitutes the sanction
for Federal regulation of over-the-counter dealers and brokers. To leave
the over-the-counter markets out of a regulatory system would be to
destroy the effects of regulating the organized exchanges."
The reasons for concern about leaving the OTC market unregulated while
regulating the exchanges were numerous. To begin with, it was felt in some
quarters that the opportunities for fraudulent and unscrupulous practices in
the OTC market were at least as great as, if not greater than, such opportunities
on the exchanges. 9 More particularly, many people feared that if only the
exchanges and their members were regulated, a mass exodus from the exchanges
would result: corporations whose securities were traded on the exchanges
would delist in order to avoid regulation, and would allow their securities to
be traded over-the-counter in "bootleg" markets. 90 Others feared that failure
to regulate the OTC market would also leave the exchanges open to unfair
competition. 9'
Thus, it was clear to legislators in 1934 that regulation of the OTC market,
and of the broker-dealers who traded securities in that market, was an essential
corollary to regulation of the exchanges. It was correspondingly unclear,
however, how to go about regulating the unorganized OTC market. Mr.
Thomas Gardiner Corcoran, a principal drafter of the proposed legislation,
captured the uncertainty of the times:
Just how [regulation of the OTC market] will be worked out, nobody
knows. Neither the Dickinson report, nor the Twentieth Century Fund,
nor this bill has any specific ideas as to how you would reach the over-
the-counter market, but certainly there is some way it can be reached.-
88. H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 87, at 16. See also 78 CONG. REc. 7868 (1934). The
Twentieth Century Fund, Inc. prepared an extensive and influential report on the securities markets
which formed a basis for much of the subsequent draft legislation and ensuing debate. TwENr=
CENTURY FUND, INC., STOCK MARKET CONTROL: A SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SECURITY MAKETS SuRvEy STAFF OF THE TWENTIET CENTURY FUND
(Clark, Dewhurst, Bemnheim, & Schneider eds. 1934) [hereinafter TwENrrH CENTURY FUND
REPORT]. See also House Hearings on H.R. 7852, supra note 85, at 83-84; Stock Exchange
Regulation: Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 773-87 (1934) [hereinafter House Hearings on H.R. 8720]
(testimony of Evans Clark on behalf of the Twentieth Century Fund).
89. Senate Hearings on S. Res. 84, supra note 85, at 7078.
90. Id. at 6495-96, 6540, 6714-15, 6996-97, 7486; S. REP. No. 792, supra note 87, at 6.
91. Senate Hearings on S. Res. 84, supra note 85, at 6547.
92. Id. at 6541, 6551, 6554-55; House Hearings on H.R. 7852, supra note 85, at 26 ("[T]he
Roper Report concludes by saying that something ought to be done about regulating over-the-
counter transactions, but it has not yet thought out an effective way of regulation. I think [§ 15]
tells the Commission to think out an effective way of regulating 'over-the-counter' transactions."
(statement of Commissioner Landis)). For a discussion of the various drafters of the 1934 legislation,
see id. at 82-83; Senate Hearings on S. Res. 84, supra note 85, at 6463, 6500.
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Resisting recommendations to postpone or eliminate all OTC regulation
until a clearer understanding emerged of what form that regulation should
take,9 Congress took one small step in 1934 toward such regulation by enacting
section 15. As originally enacted, section 15 was a single brief provision that,
in effect, left the entire matter of OTC regulation in the hands of the
Commission. 94 The section was necessarily drafted broadly to allow the Com-
mission considerable flexibility to study and work out a reasonable program
of regulation. 95
Section 15 expressly authorized the Commission to determine what form
such regulation should take, and it was empowered to do so along the following
three lines: (1) regulation of all transactions by OTC broker-dealers; (2)
registration with the Commission of all such broker-dealers; and (3) registration
with the Commission of securities traded in the OTC market. The only
guideline the Commission had to follow in deciding what rules and regulations
it should promulgate-apart from their being "necessary or appropriate in the
public interest"-was that the OTC regulation should be designed "to insure
to investors protection comparable to that which is accorded in the case of
registered exchanges."9' Thus, it was expressly mandated from the outset that
investors in the OTC market were to be given protection at least equal to that
given investors on the exchanges.
This mandate was reaffirmed in 1938, when section 15 was amended.9 A
Senate committee report identified the goals sought to be achieved by amend-
ments to section 15 as follows:
93. Senate Hearings on S. Res. 84, supra note 85, at 6746-47, 7074-75, 7586; Hearings on
H.R. 7852, supra note 85, at 262, 425, 500-01, 618-19. One of the first formal studies of exchange
regulation-variously called the "Roper Report" after Secretary of Commerce Daniel Roper who
appointed the Committee at the direction of President Roosevelt in 1933, or the "Dickinson
Report" after the Chairman of the Committee, John Dickinson--concluded that the "problem of
the 'over-the-counter' markets cannot be satisfactorily dealt with by Federal governmental action"
and declined to recommend any regulation of OTC markets without further study and analysis.
STocK ExcHANGE RE ounLAoN: Lmrmnn FRoM THE PRoEsIDENT OF THE UNT=D STATEs TO THE
CHAIuRAN oF THE CouamTra oN BANING AND CuRRENcy wITH AN ACCoMPANYING REPORT
RELATrvE TO STOCK EXCHANGE REGULATiON, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (Senate Comm. Print 1934)
[hereinafter RoPnn REPORT] (John Dickinson, Chairman). Beyond these efforts to postpone OTC
regulation, there appears to have been little opposition to § 15. See 78 CoNG. REc. 8036 (1934)
(statement of Rep. Sam Rayburn, Chairman of House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce who presided over the House hearings on the legislation, before defeat of a proposed
amendment to § 15 [§ 14 in the bill]) ("I did not know that there was any objection to this
section.").
94. See infra note 156 for original enactment of § 15 in 1934.
95. Senate Hearings on S. Res. 84, supra note 85, at 6547, 6551, 6554-55. See also S. REP.
No. 1455, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 4 (1938):
The brevity and generality of this treatment [in the 1934 enactment of § 15] arose
from a realistic recognition of the great difficulties of working out in any detail a
suitable plan of regulation at that time, in view of the fact that so little was then
known concerning these markets.
Id. See also H.R. REP. No. 2307, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 5 (1938).
96. S. REP. No. 792, supra note 87, at 20; H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 87, at 24.
97. Regulation of Over-the-Counter Markets: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking
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The problem of regulation of the over-the-counter markets has three
aspects: First, to protect the investor and the honest dealer alike from
dishonest and unfair practices by the submarginal element in the industry;
second, to cope with those methods of doing business which, while
technically outside the area of definite illegality, are nevertheless unfair
both to customer and to decent competitor, and are seriously damaging to
the mechanism of the free and open market; and third, to afford to the
investor an economic service the efficiency of which will be commensurate
with its economic importance, so that the machinery of the nation's markets
will operate to avoid the misdirection of the nation's savings, which
contributes powerfully toward economic depressions and breeds distrust of
our financial processes.91
That Congress specifically intended that section 15 would protect the in-
vesting public from "dishonest and unfair" practices by broker-dealers is
beyond debate. As will be discussed later, the method of assuring such
protection developed slowly over time, but the congressional intent to afford
protection to this class of persons has been manifest with every amendment
to section 15.9 Without a doubt, Congress intended to protect investors from
broker-dealer fraud under section 15(c)(1). Thus, the first Cort factor is met.
Today, however, whether Congress intended to protect private investors
from broker-dealer fraud is treated as analytically distinct from whether
Congress intended investors to be able to sue for such fraud in federal court.
Under the common-law approach, as shown above, the lines of analysis were
merged, and a finding of the intent to protect the investor under section
15(c)(1) automatically would have entailed-absent compelling evidence of
congressional intent to the contrary-the implication of a private remedy to
effectuate such protection. Cort v. Ash relegated this common-law approach,
decisive in its time and important in Cort itself, 100 to a single factor among
several. Indeed, in some later decisions, it seems to have been given little or
no weight at all.' °
C. Legislative Intent: Creation of a Federal Remedy
The second Cort factor in determining whether to imply a private remedy
under a federal statute is to ascertain evidence of a legislative intent "either
and Currency on S. 3255, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20, 52 (1938) [hereinafter Senate Hearings on
S. 3255] ("The purpose of the bill is to assure the single investor here and there who wants to
know that he can rely upon those with whom he deals." (statement of Sen. Adams)); S. REP.
No. 1455, supra note 95, at 4; H.R. REP. No. 2307, supra note 95, at 5.
98. S. Rm. No. 1455, supra note 95, at 3. See also H.R. REP. No. 2307, supra note 95, at
4.
99. See infra notes 175-251 and accompanying text.
100. 422 U.S. at 80-82.
101. See, e.g., Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 145, 148 (1985);
Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 771-72 (1981); Transamerica Mortgage
Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979).
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to create such a remedy or to deny one. ' 12' This factor also originally derived
from the common-law approach, with one key distinction. Under the common-
law approach, the courts acknowledged that the presumption in favor of an
implied federal remedy could be overcome by proof of congressional intent
to deny the remedy.0 3 Cases after Cort have redefined the judicial obligation
as one to ascertain congressional intent to create the remedy.1°4 This change
in focus in effect obliterated the common-law presumption in favor of implied
rights of action, and it justified the shift in the Supreme Court's approach to
an implicit presumption against implied private rights.
Under the common-law approach (the first Cort factor), the inquiry into
congressional intent regarding the private remedy was subsidiary to the principal
inquiry into congressional intent regarding the substantive federal right. Positive
proof of the legislature's intent to deny a remedy served simply as a qualifi-
cation on the judiciary's authority to imply one, where a federal statute had
been violated and the plaintiff was a member of the class protected by the
statute. Under the common-law approach, the plaintiff was not required to
offer affirmative proof of legislative intent to create a private remedy; it
sufficed to show that Congress intended to create a substantive federal right
in the plaintiff. The judiciary would then automatically imply a judicial remedy
to vindicate that right absent contrary congressional intent concerning a private
remedy.0e However, the almost sub silentio introduction in Cort of an inquiry
into congressional intent to create a private remedy resulted in a substantial
shift in judicial treatment of implication cases.
This shift was not immediately felt. Cori v. Ash itself did not justify such
a shift, for the Supreme Court in Cort, just like the federal district court
earlier in Kardon, acknowledged the common-law presumption in favor of
permitting a private remedy absent proof of congressional intent to deny one.
As the Court observed, "in situations in which it is clear that federal law has
granted a class of persons certain rights, it is not necessary to show an
102. 422 U.S. at 78.
103. See supra text accompanying note 82.
104. See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S.
1, 13 (1981) ("recurring question whether Congress intended to create a private right of action
under a federal statute"); California v. Sierra Club, 451 .S. 287, 297 (1981) ("As recently
emphasized, the focus of the inquiry is on whether Congreintended to create a remedy ....");
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 91 (1981) ("The
ultimate question in cases such as this is whether Congress intended to create the private remedy");
Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 770 (1981) ("In order to determine whether
Congress intended to create the private right of action asserted here, we consider three factors set
forth in Cort v. Ash ... ."). See also infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
105. "[ln those situations in which we have inferred a federal private cause of action not
expressly provided, there has generally been a clearly articulated federal right in the plaintiff, ...
or a pervasive legislative scheme governing the relationship between the plaintiff class and the
defendant class in a particular regard." Cort, 422 U.S. at 82.
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intention to create a private cause of action, although an explicit purpose to
deny such cause of action would be controlling."' 1 6
Even though Cort and its common-law predecessors had not required proof
of congressional intent to create a private remedy, within a few years after
Cort the Court began to require such an affirmative showing. In Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington,' 7 Justice Rehnquist writing for the majority flatly stated:
"[O]ur task is limited solely to determining whether Congress intended to
create the private right of action asserted."' °8 Similarly, Justice Stewart writing
for the majority in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis09 stated:
"[W]hat must ultimately be determined is whether Congress intended to create
the private remedy asserted."""0 These two cases, arguably far more than Cort,
have represented a shift in the Supreme Court's treatment of implied rights
of action.
This shift to focus on congressional intent to create, rather than to deny,
a private right of action is not the only transformation which the second Cort
factor has undergone. In a variety of cases after Touche Ross and Transa-
merica, the Court has elevated the inquiry into the congressional intent to
create a private remedy to the status of the "ultimate question," to which the
other Cort factors are subsidiarily "relevant."'1 Although the Court as a
whole has never expressly adopted a presumption against implied private rights
of action," 2 this elevation of the second Cort factor seems to have created,
de facto, such a presumption. As a practical matter, in the vast majority of
its cases since Touche Ross and Transamerica, the Court has not implied a
private remedy under a federal statute." 3 Certainly at least some of the justices
themselves perceive a new, less receptive attitude on the part of the Court,
even if they do not characterize it as a presumption against implied remedies." 4
106. Id. at 82 (emphasis in original); accord Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,
694 (1979).
107. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
108. Id. at 568.
109. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
110. Id. at 15-16. In the strong 4-member dissent in Transamerica, however, the inquiry is
phrased in terms of whether there is evidence of legislative intent to "negate" or "foreclose" the
claimed private rights of action. Id. at 28 (White, J., dissenting). For other cases calling for a
determination of an intent to "create" a private cause of action, see cases cited supra note 104.
111. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 91 (1981). See
also Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 535-36 (1984); Middlesex County Sewerage
Auth. v. National Sea Clanmers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13 (1981); Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials,
Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293 (1981); Universities
Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 770 (1981).
112. Cf. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 373 (1983) (the Supreme Court's prior cases have
unequivocally rejected the "premise that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction whose
remedial powers do not extend beyond the granting of relief expressly authorized by Congress.").
113. See cases cited supra note 48.
114. Justice Stevens in particular has repeatedly contended that Cort marked a new direction
in the Supreme Court's approach to implied private rights of action. See Merrell Dow Pharma-
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Finally, some members have urged the Court to adopt a formal presumption
against implication." 5
The creation of a de facto presumption against implication is best evidenced
by the Court's repeated resurrections of the legal argument expressed by the
maxim of statutory construction: expressio unius est exciusio alterius16 Since
Transamerica, the Court has frequently reiterated in implied-fights cases that
"it is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a statute
expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of
reading others into it. 'When a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular
mode, it includes the negative of any other mode.' "117 Once the Court decided
ceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 106 S. Ct. 3229, 3234 (1986) ("The development of our framework
for determining whether a private cause of action exists has proceeded only in the last 11 years,
and its inception represented a significant change in our approach to congressional silence on the
provision of federal remedies."); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S.
353, 377 (1982) ("In 1975 the Court unanimously decided to modify its approach to the question
whether a federal statute includes a private right of action." (footnote omitted)); Middlesex County
Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 25 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("In 1975, in Cort v. Ash, the Court cut back on the simple
common-law presumption by fashioning a four-factor formula that led to the denial of relief in
that case." (footnote omitted)).
115. Former Justice Powell urged that no private right of action should be implied from a
federal statute "absent the most compelling evidence that Congress in fact intended such an action
to exist." Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 408 (1982)
(Powell, J., dissenting) (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 749 (1979) (Powell,
J., dissenting)). Along this line, Justice Scalia has suggested that any change in the Court's
development of implied-rights jurisprudence should be in the direction "away from our current
congressional intent test to the categorical position that federal private rights of action will not be
implied." Thompson v. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. 513, 522 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment). Justice Rehnquist similarly seems inclined to favor a presumption against implied rights
and has admonished Congress to make clear its intentions with respect to private remedies. See,
e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 579 (1979) ("But if Congress intends those
customers to have such a federal right of action, it is well aware of how it may effectuate that
intent."); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 718 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
In Cannon, Justice Rehnquist, in a concurrence, stated:
It seems to me that the factors to which I have here briefly adverted apprise the
lawmaking branch of the Federal Government that the bali, so as to speak, may
well now be in its court. Not only is it "far better" for Congress to so specify
when it intends private litigants to have a cause of action, but for this very reason
this Court in the future should be extremely reluctant to imply a cause of action
absent such specificity on the part of the Legislative Branch.
Id.
116. "The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another."
117. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19-20 (1979) (quoting Botany
Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929)). See also Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147 (1985); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1981); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of Am.,
451 U.S. 77, 94 n.30 (1981); Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 773 n.24 (1981);
Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 149 (1980).
The use of this "strict constructionist" approach to the implication issue was foreshadowed in
a few pre-Cort decisions, which evidence the beginning of a presumption against implication,
absent clear congressional intent to create an implied private remedy. See Securities Investor
Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 419 (1975); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National
Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974).
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to characterize the implication issue as "basically a matter of statutory
construction,""' it was logically free to apply the philosophy expressed in such
a maxim of statutory construction, despite repeated discrediting of the maxim,
even in Cort itself." 9
The application of the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius creates,
as a practical matter, a presumption against implied remedies in any statutory
scheme where Congress has provided at least one express remedy. Unlike
Rigsby and Kardon where the plaintiff was presumed to have a right of action
if he was a member of the benefitted class, absent evidence appearing "very
clearly and plainly"'12 that Congress intended to deny him one, after Tran-
sametica the plaintiff appears to be presumed not to have an implied private
remedy if the statute contains another express remedy, absent compelling
evidence of congressional intent to create one. If the statute creates an express
remedy somewhere, then "[in the absence of strong indicia of a contrary
congressional intent [that is, to create another private remedy], we are com-
pelled to conclude that Congress provided precisely the remedies it considered
appropriate."' 21
The substantial departure from the common-law approach-an almost 180
degree reversal in presumptions concerning implied private rights of actionln-
has been criticized both by academic commentators'23 and by Congress.1u The
reasons given for it have been varied,'71 but whatever the justifications for the
118. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15 (1979).
119. See id. at 29 n.6 (White, J., dissenting) ("This application of the oft-criticized maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius ignores our rejection of it in Cort v. Ash .... ). See also
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 n.23 (1983) ("We also reject application
of the maxim of statutory construction, expresslo unius est exclusio alterius."); Cannon v. University
of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 711 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82-83 n.14 (1975); SEC v. C.
M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943). In C. M. Joiner, the Court stated:
However well these rules [the "ejusdem generis rule" and the maxim "expreao
unius est exclusio alterius"] may serve at times to aid in deciphering legislative intent,
they long have been subordinated to the doctrine that courts will construe the details
of an act in conformity with its dominating general purpose, will read text in the
light- of context and will interpret the text so far as the meaning of the words fairly
permits so as to carry out in particular cases the generally expressed legislative policy.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
120. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
121. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 15 (1981).
122. Logically, the maxim ubi jus ibi remediwn creates a presumption directly opposite to that
created by the maxim expresso unius est exclusio alterius. See REsrATmENT (SEcoND) oF TORTs
§ 874A comment c (1979).
123. See, e.g., Foy, supra note 64, at 581-85.
124. Professor Ashford contends that portions of -the legislative history of the Small Business
Investment Incentive Act of 1980 represent congressional disapproval of the shift represented by
Touche Ross and Transamerica, and congressional approval of a three-factor test essentially like
that in Cort v. Ash as the proper test for implying private causes of action under the Small
Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, and arguably under other federal statutes as well.
Ashford, supra note 61, at 290-341.
125. Justice Powell believed that the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers justified a
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departure, it has created an uphill battle for plaintiffs trying to convince the
courts to recognize a private remedy. 26 This second Cort factor has become
the hardest factor to meet, largely because the clues for discerning congressional
intent are so often ambiguous or nonexistent. The Court has suggested that
the clues can be found in the statute's specific language, its legislative history,
and overall purpose.12 The language will almost naturally be inconclusive,
because the issue regarding an implied remedy under a particular statute or
provision of a statute arises only when no express remedy exists under that
statute or provision. Likely as not, the legislative history will similarly be
totally silent on the subject.2' As a practical matter, the legislature may not
have intended anything with respect to implied remedies, or may have intended
for the judiciary to decide the issueYm
In the face of such ambiguous evidence, the criticid question in implied-
rights jurisprudence becomes whether the Supreme Court will continue to
apply an implicit presumption against implied remedies, or will reassess the
Rigsby common-law presumption in their favor. This Article argues that even
under the most stringent application of this second Cort factor, a private
remedy under section 15(c)(1) should be implied.
1. The Language of Section 15(c)(1)
Although the language of section 15(c)(1) does not expressly create a private
remedy for violation of its provisions, the language does afford a basis for
judicial presumption against implied rights absent compelling evidence of legislative intent to the
contrary. See supra note 63. Justice Stevens has suggested that the Court's increasing reluctance
to imply private remedies under federal statutes stems from its being "properly concerned about
the burdens imposed upon the federal judiciary, the quality of the work product of Congress,
and the sheer bulk of new federal legislation .... Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National
Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). See also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 374, 377
(1982).
126. Indeed, the test itself tends to suggest a negative response, for it requires the plaintiff to
prove that Congress affirmatively intended to "create" something which historically had been
"implied" by the judiciary. See Foy, supra note 64, at 556 (The Court "ultimately accepted the
paradoxical proposition that implied private rights of action existed in the federal system only
where Congress had actually intended to create them.").
127. Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 770 (1981); Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979).
128. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694 (1979) ("We must recognize,
however, that the legislative history of a statute that does not expressly create or deny a private
remedy will typically be equally silent or ambiguous on the question."); Middlesex County Sewerage
Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 25 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("Because legislative history is unlikely to reveal affirmative evidence of a
congressional intent to authorize a specific procedure that the statute itself fails to mention, that
touchstone will further restrict the availability of private remedies." (footnote omitted)).
129. See L. Loss (1988), supra note 6, at 938 ("Consequently, if the silence of the statute does
not justify the conclusion that the legislature affirmatively 'intended' that there should be a private
remedy, neither does it justify the conclusion that Congress had the contrary 'intention.' "); 2 L.
Loss (1961), supra note 6, at 942.
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implying one. In numerous cases where the Supreme Court has found an
implied private remedy, the statute in question expressly either "prohibited
certain conduct or created federal rights in favor of private parties."' 3 As the
Court in Cannon v. University of Chicago observed, "[n]ot surprisingly, the
right- or duty-creating language of the statute has generally been the most
accurate indicator of the propriety of implication of a cause of action.''3
Section 15(c)(1) expressly "prohibit[s] certain conduct" and does contain
"duty-creating language." The section states that "[n]o broker or dealer shall
... effect any transaction in ... any security ... otherwise than on a
national security exchange ... by means of any manipulative, deceptive, or
other fraudulent device or contrivance. ' 132 This "duty" is clearly imposed on
brokers and dealers in the OTC market. Arguably, the statute does not specify
the class of persons in whom the correlative "right" to be free from fraudulent
conduct by brokers and dealers is placed. Nonetheless, it is clear that at a
minimum this class must include investors. 33
That the duty created under section 15(c)(1) was intended to be enforced
by private litigation is evidenced by the language of another provision of the
1934 Act, section 29(b).134 Section 29(b) generally renders void any contract
made or performed in violation of any provision of the 1934 Act, and
specifically provides for a limitations period for actions brought to avoid
contracts made in violation of section 15(c)(1). Although strictly speaking
130. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 569 and cases cited therein. Cf. Securities
Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 424 (1975) ("Unlike the Securities Exchange
Act, the SIPA contains no standards of conduct that a private action could help to enforce
131. 441 U.S. 677, 690 n.13 (1979).
132. See supra note 4.
133. See supra notes 83-99 and accompanying text.
134. Section 29(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1982), provides:
(b) Every contract made in violation of any provision of this chapter or of any
rule or regulation thereunder, and every contract (including any contract for listing
a security on an exchange) heretofore or hereafter made, the performance of which
involves the violation of, or the continuance of any relationship or practice in
violation of, any provision of this chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder, shall
be void (1) as regards the rights of any person who, in violation of any such
provision, rule, or regulation, shall have made or engaged in the performance of
any such contract, and (2) as regards the rights of any person who, not being a
party to such contract, shall have acquired any right thereunder with actual knowledge
of the facts by reason of which the making or performance of such contract was
in violation of any such provision, rule, or regulation: Provided, (A) That no
contract shall be void by reason of this subsection because of any violation of any
rule or regulation prescribed pursuant to paragraph (2) or (3) of subsection (c) of
section [15] of this title, and (B) that no contract shall be deemed to be void by
reason of this subsection in any action maintained in reliance upon this subsection,
by any person to or for whom any broker or dealer sells, or from or for whom
any broker or dealer purchases, a security in violation of any rule or regulation
prescribed pursuant to paragraph (1) of subsection (c) of section [15] of this title,
unless such action is brought within one year after the discovery that such sale or
purchase involves such violation and within three years after such violation.
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section 29(b) does not expressly state that private suits may be brought for
violation of section 15(c)(1), it comes as close as possible to doing so. Indeed,
the limitations period provided in section 29(b) makes no sense unless it
presupposes a private right to sue under section 15(c)(1) that is being limited
by this express limitations period.
In Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v Lewis,'35 the Court interpreted
analogous language in two provisions of the Investment Advisers Act of
1940.136 Section 15(c)(1) is analogous to section 206 of the 1940 Act, which
broadly proscribes fraudulent practices by investment advisers, and makes it
unlawful for any investment adviser to "employ any device, scheme or artifice
to defraud any client or to engage in any act, practice, or course of
business which is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative."'1 7 Section 29(b) is
analogous to section 215 of the 1940 Act, which provides that contracts whose
formation or performance would violate the 1940 Act "shall be void "9138
135. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
136. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (1982).
137 Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1982) [hereinafter
1940 Act], provides:
It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser by use of the mails or any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective
client;
(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates
as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client;
(3) acting as principal for his own account, knowingly to sell any security to or
purchase any security from a client, or acting as broker for a person other than
such client, knowingly to effect any sale or purchase of any security for the account
of such client, without disclosing to such client in writing before the completion of
such transaction the capacity in which he is acting and obtaining the consent of the
client to such transaction. The prohibitions of this paragraph shall not apply to any
transaction with a customer of a broker or dealer if such broker or dealer is not
acting as an investment adviser in relation to such transaction.
(4) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is fraudulent,
deceptive, or mampulative. The Commssion shall, for the purposes of this paragraph
(4) by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to
prevent, such acts, practices, and courses of business as are fraudulent, deceptive,
or mampulative.
Clause (4) appears to have been patterned on § 15(c)(2), supra note 4. See SEC Legislation:
Hearings on S. 1178-1182 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. 137 (1959) (statement of SEC Commissioner Philip A. Loorms).
138. Section 215 of the 1940 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1982), provides in pertinent part:
(b) Every contract made in violation of any provision of this subchapter and
every contract heretofore or hereafter made, the performance of which involves the
violation of, or the continuance of any relationship or practice in violation of any
provision of this subchapter, or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder, shall be
void (1) as regards the rights of any person who, in violation of any such provision,
rule, regulation, or order, shall have made or engaged in the performance of any
such contract, and (2) as regards the rights of any person who, not being a party
to such contract, shall have acquired any right thereunder with actual knowledge of
the facts by reason of which the making or performance of such contract was in
violation of any such provision.
Compare § 29(b) of the Exchange Act, supra note 134.
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The Court concluded that a private right of action might be implied from the
language of section 215, reasoning that "[b]y declaring certain contracts void,
§ 215 by its terms necessarily contemplates that the issue of voidness under
its criteria may be litigated somewhere."' 139 The majority in Transamerica
concluded that "when Congress declared in § 215 that certain contracts are
void, it intended that the customary legal incidents of voidness would follow,
including the availability of a [private] suit for rescission... and for resti-
tution."' 140 By analogy, the language of section 29(b) of the 1934 Act would
at a minimum suggest the availability of a private suit for rescission and
restitution for violation of section 15(c)(1).
But where should the private right be implied: under section 15(c)(1) or
under section 29(b)? The Transamerica majority found that a private right of
action for rescission could be implied under section 215 of the 1940 Act, the
analog to section 29(b) of the 1934 Act, and found that no private right of
action for damages could be implied under section 206 of the 1940 Act, the
analog to section 15(c)(1).' 41 A literal extension of the Transamerica analogy
to limit an implied remedy under section 29(b) to rescission, and to deny a
private right of action for damages under section 15(c)(1), would superficially
seem to accord with the majority's reasoning in Transamerica. As the dissent
points out, however, that reasoning is flawed.' m Moreover, a conclusion that
the private right of action arises under section 29(b), rather than under section
15(c)(1), would not comport with the historical development of implied rights
of action under the 1934 Act, nor would it be supported by the language of
those provisions and their legislative histories.
Despite the broad language of section 29(b) declaring void all contracts
made in violation of "any" provision of the 1934 Act, the Supreme Court
has never before considered section 29(b) itself to create an implied remedy
for violation of the Act. For example, the Supreme Court has found the
private right of action for violation of section 10(b) to be implied under that
section, not under section 29(b).'41 On the contrary, the Supreme Court
suggested that the language in section 29(b) making a contract "voidable at
the option of the deceived party" was one reason for implying a private right
of action under section 10(b).144 Although'the Supreme Court in J I. Case
Co. v. Borakl4' originally found a private right of action for violation of
139. Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 18.
140. Id. at 19.
141. Id. at 18-24.
142. Id. at 25-26, 28-30 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White was joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens in his strong dissent characterizing the majority's position as "anomalous."
Id. at 26.
143. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983); Superintendent of Ins. of
N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
144. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 735 (1975).
145. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
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section 14(a) of the Exchange Act to be implied under section 27,14 the Court
in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington'47 subsequently questioned the propriety
of finding an implied private remedy under the Act by such reliance on some
other provision outside the specific provision alleged to have been violated.
As the Court has stated, "[section 27] creates no cause of action of its own
force and effect; it imposes no liabilities. The source of plaintiffs' rights must
be found, if at all, in the substantive provisions of the 1934 Act which they
seek to enforce, not in the jurisdictional provision."'14 The Touche Ross Court
went on to observe that in Borak it had "'found a private cause of action
implicit in § 14(a)."' 49 Moreover, when the Court has declined to imply private
remedies for violations of the 1934 Act, it has done so under the provisions
that were allegedly violated, without any reference to section 29(b). 10°
Some lower courts have nonetheless concluded that a private right of action
may be implied under section 29(b). 51 However, reliance on section 29(b)
"confuses the question whether a cause of action exists with the question of
the nature of relief available in such an action."'1 As both the majority and
dissent in Transamerica recognized, a provision like section 29(b) which renders
void contracts made in violation of the Act "clearly contemplates the existence
of private rights under the Act." 53 But in the words of the dissent, such a
provision " 'creates no cause of action of its own force and effect; it imposes
no liabilities.' ... [It] merely specifies one consequence of a violation of the
substantive prohibitions of"' ' 4 another section of the Act which proscribes
fraudulent conduct. Moreover, rather than creating the private right of action
for violation of section 15(c)(1), section 29(b) specifically restricts it with a
limitations provision. 15
146. Id. at 430-31.
147. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
148. Id. at 577.
149. Id.
150. See, ,,g., id. at 576 (no implied right under § 17(a) of the 1934 Act); Piper v. Chris-Craft
Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 42 (1977) (no implied right for defeated tender offeror under § 14(e)). See
also supra note 51.
151. Western Fed. Corp. v. Erickson, 739 F.2d 1439, 1443 n.5 (9th Cir. 1984); Regional
Properties, Inc. v. Financial & Real Estate Consulting Co., 678 F.2d 552, 558 (5th Cir. 1982),
after remand, 752 F.2d 178, 182 (5th Cir. 1985); Eastside Church of Christ v. National Plan,
Inc., 391 F.2d 357, 362 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 913 (1968); Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142
F.2d 422, 427 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944); Rhoades v. Powell, 644 F. Supp. 645,
661-64 (E.D. Cal. 1986); Warshow v. H. Hentz & Co., 199 F. Supp. 581, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)
(permitting private claim for rescission under § 29(b) and private claim for damages under § 7(c));
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (separate causes of action
under § 10(b) and § 29(b)); Geismar v. Bond & Goodwin, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 876, 878 (S.D.N.Y.
1941). See generally Gruenbaum & Steinberg, supra note 6.
152. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 30 (White, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 29 (White, J., dissenting).
154. Id (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577 (1979)).
155. See supra note 134. See also infra notes 417-26 and accompanying text.
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Logically, either all the private rights of action under the 1934 Act should
arise under the substantive provisions of the Act that allegedly have been
violated, or they should all arise under section 29(b), which broadly applies
to "any" provision of the 1934 Act. It would be anomalous, at this late date,
to hold that a private right for violation of section 15(c)(1) arises, not under
itself as do other implied remedies in the 1934 Act, but under the separate
provisions of section 29(b). Furthermore, the legislative histories of these two
sections support the conclusion that the implied remedy should be found under
section 15(c)(1) rather than section 29(b).
2. The Legislative History of Section 15(c)(1)
a. Introduction
The history of the amendments to section 15 reflects the evolution of
government regulation of the OTC market and of the brokers and dealers in
that market. From its small beginning as a single-paragraph provision with a
broad grant of authority to the Commission,' section 15 now spans several
156. As originally enacted in 1934, § 15 provided:
SEc. 15. It shall be unlawful, in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest and
to insure to investors protection comparable to that provided by and under authority
of this title in the case of national securities exchanges, (1) for any broker or dealer,
singly or with any other person or persons, to make use of the mails or any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce for the purpose of making or creating, or
enabling another to make or create, a market, otherwise than on a national securities
exchange, for both the purchase and sale of any security (other than an exempted
security or commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, or commercial bills, or unregis-
tered securities the market in which is predominantly intrastate and which have not
previously been registered or listed), or (2) for any broker or dealer to use any
facility of any such market. Such rules and regulations may provide for the regulation
of all transactions by brokers and dealers on any such market, for the registration
with the Commission of dealers and/or brokers making or creating such a market,
and for the registration of the securities for which they make or create a market
and may make special provision with respect to securities or specified classes thereof
listed, or entitled to unlisted trading privileges, upon any exchange on the date of
the enactment of this title, which securities are not registered under the provisions
of section 12 of this title.
Pub. L. No. 291, Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881, 895-96 (1934). As originally enacted in 1934, § 29(b)
provided:
SEc. 29(b) Every contract made in violation of any provision of this title or of
any rule or regulation thereunder, and every contract (including any contract for
listing a security on an exchange) heretofore or hereafter made the performance of
which involves the violation of, or the continuance of any relationship or practice
in violation of, any provision of this title or any rule or regulation thereunder, shall
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pages of text, and sections 15A, 157 15B, 158 and 15C 159 are even longer. As
originally enacted in 1934, section 15 broadly set forth Congress's regulatory
goals in this field by defining the areas in which such regulation should take
place, namely: (1) regulation of conduct by OTC broker-dealers, (2) registration
of OTC broker-dealers with the SEC, and (3) registration of securities traded
in the OTC market.
These goals have remained unchanged since 19 3 4.11 All of the amendments
to section 15, including sections 15A, 15B, and 15C, represent continuing
legislative efforts to achieve these goals appropriately and effectively by a
combination of self-regulation and direct governmental regulation of brokers
and dealers. Indeed, the history of these amendments can be seen as a history
of the tension between, and the (mostly) cooperative efforts by, the SEC and
the so-called self-regulatory organizations as each attempts to regulate the
activities of brokers and dealers.
Section 15(c)(1) was enacted amidst this evolving regulation of brokers and
dealers in the securities industry. At only one point in the history of the
amendments to section 15(c)(1)-in 1938-is civil liability under the section
discussed directly, and those legislative discussions rather pointedly demonstrate
congressional recognition of private litigation under section 15(c)(1). 161 Since
1938, section 15(c)(1) has been amended only once, in a fashion that did not
address directly the implication of a private remedy.'6 It is nonetheless useful
to review the legislative amendments to other provisions of section 15, both
to demonstrate that there has been no congressional reconsideration of civil
liability under section 15(c)(1) and to understand how civil lawsuits play a
supporting role in the regulatory scheme in which, unquestionably, the SEC
and the self-regulatory organizations were cast in the leading parts.les
be void (1) as regards the rights of any person who, in violation of any such
provision, rule, or regulation, shall have made or engaged in the performance of
any such contract, and (2) as regards the rights of any person who, not being a
party to such contract, shall have acquired any right thereunder with actual knowledge
of the facts by reason of which the making or performance of such contract was
in violation of any such provision, rule or regulation.
Pub. L. No. 291, Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881, 903 (1934).
157. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
158. 15 U.S.C. § 780-4 (1982 & Supp. IV 1985).
159. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-5 (West Supp. 1987).
160. The 1938 amendments to § 15 were among the most important of the amendments to this
section, see infra notes 181-219 and accompanying text, yet Congress acknowledged adherence to
the original legislative goals. of this section:
In the judgment of the committee this bill, like the amendment of section 15 enacted
in May 1936, does not enlarge the objectives or the outline of regulatory functions
initially set forth in the original section 15. On the contrary, it represents the essential
process of filling in and implementing the original outline in order to make possible
the realization of the original objectives.
S. REP. No. 1455, supra note 95, at 4; H.R. REP. No. 2307, supra note 95, at 5.
161. See infra notes 194-214 and accompanying text.
162. See infra notes 247-48 and accompanying text.
163. The role of civil litigation as a supplement to the enforcement efforts of the SEC and the
self-regulatory organizations is examined in connection with the third Cort factor, see infra notes
283-94 and accompanying text.
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The provisions of the 1934 Act governing the regulation of brokers and
dealers on the exchanges and in the OTC market have been substantially
amended and expanded over the years as the federal government better
understood the nature and necessity of regulation of this group of professionals
and responded to specific crises in the securities markets that arose over the
last 50 years. This portion of the Article delineates the way in which these
pieces of legislation have been patched together.
b. 1934-Original Enactment of Section 15
Federal regulation of brokers and dealers began in 1934 with a focus on
the regulation of the stock exchanges. Until the 1934 Act was enacted, stock
exchanges were "subject to regulation by no governmental authority and ...
exercised unrestricted dominion over the activities of their members."'1 After
a thorough investigation begun in 1932 into the role of the stock exchanges
in the stock market crisis, a Senate Committee on Banking and Currency
stated that the "exposures before the subcommittee of the evils and abuses
which flourished on the exchanges, and their disastrous effects upon the entire
Nation, finally compelled the conclusion, even among partisan advocates of
the exchanges themselves, that Federal regulation was necessary and desira-
ble.'165
Although there was general agreement on the need to regulate the exchanges
and their broker-dealer members, there were differing views over the form
such regulation should take. On the one hand was the report of a Committee
on Stock Exchange Regulation, often referred to as the "Roper Report." The
Roper Report recommended that latitude be given to the exchanges to regulate
their members with some governmental oversight to ensure they performed
such self-regulation.'6 "In the report of the Roper committee,, ... the
regulatory functions of this governmental agency [ultimately to be the SEC]
were held in reserve and were employed only to supplement and supervise
what in the first instance was self-regulation of the exchanges."'16 As Roper
164. S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1934) (so-called "Fletcher Report").
165. Id. at 81.
166. RoPas. REPORT, supra note 93, at 8-10. The Roper Report recommended that the stock
exchanges themselves rather than the federal government take primary responsibility for regulating
the conduct of their broker-dealer members:
At the same time, it must be recognized that a Government agency operating in this
field, and endowed with wide powers to license or close exchanges, coupled with a
reserve power to license individual brokers as more fully discussed hereafter, and to
make rules and regulations concerning a delicate mechanism like the stock exchange
must be in the highest degree effective, nonpolitical, able to act rapidly, and at the
same time so constituted as to place responsibility to the fullest extent possible on
the private bodies now handling the work of security exchanges.
Id. at 7.
167. House Hearings on H.R. 7852, supra note 85, at 513 (statement of John Dickinson).
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Committee Chairman John Dickinson explained in the legislative hearings:
The Roper committee report went on the theory that if governmental
regulation attempts to do too much directly and to control and intervene
directly in the first instance over the whole field which it covers, it is in
danger of breaking down and proving ineffective....
No doubt the exchanges will frequently fail to do a good job of regulating
their members, but even so, it seemed to the Roper committee during its
deliberations likely that Government regulation was likely to be more
effective and less unwieldy it [sic] it was applied to the exchanges in an
effort to make them do their own job and to come down on them like a
ton of bricks if they did not do their job, rather than for the Government
itself to take over from them that job of direct regulation and attempt to
perform it from the very beginning and in the first instance by governmental
policing methods.16
On the other hand was the initial legislative proposal, the Fletcher-Raybum
bill, which:
provided for far more direct governmental regulation of the exchanges and
the industry than the Roper Committee had recommended.... The Fletcher-
Raybum bill... gave to a federal Commission extensive direct powers to
establish standards for broker-dealer and exchange activity. The legislation
which finally became the Exchange Act represented a compromise between
the two approaches.' 69
A member of the House Committee observed: "I understand that the fun-
damental principle.., is this-that exchanges should be permitted or required
to regulate themselves; but there should be Federal authority holding the power
which in a previous administration would have been referred to as 'a big
stick.' "170 The final House report summed up the concept of self-regulation
as it was to be applied to broker-dealer members of the exchanges:
Although a wide measure of initiative and responsibility is left with the
exchanges, reserved control is in the Commission if the exchanges do not
meet their responsibility. It is hoped that the effect of the bill will be to
give to the well-managed exchanges that power necessary to enable them
to effect themselves needed reforms and that the occasion for direct action
by the Commission will not arise."'
This concept of self-regulation by the industry coupled with "reserved
control" by the federal government became the foundation supporting future
regulation of all brokers and dealers both on the exchanges and in the OTC
168. Id. at 513-14.
169. SEc traras ImusiRY STuDY, REPoRT oF TH SuBcomm. ON SEcuRmEs: Comm . oN BAwmNo,
HOusING AND URBAN Arsums, 93D CONG., lST Sss. 139-40 (Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter
SEcurrms IbmusmRy STuDY]. A good discussion of this aspect of the history of the 1934 Act is
found in this Committee Print at pages 137-43. See also House Hearings on H.R. 7852, supra
note 85, at 26-27.
170. House Hearings on H.R. 7852, supra note 85, at 544.
171. H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 87, at 15.
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market. Indeed, Congress had reached the same conclusion on the need to
regulate trading in the OTC markets that it had reached with respect to the
exchanges:
It has been deemed advisable to authorize the Commission to subject such
activities [trading on the OTC markets] to regulation similar to that
prescri'bed for transactions on organized exchanges. This power is vitally
necessary to forestall the widespread evasion of stock exchange regulation
by the withdrawal of securities from listing on exchanges, and by trans-
ferring trading therein to "over-the-counter" markets where manipulative
evils could continue to flourish, unchecked by any regulatory authority.'7
In 1934, however, no self-regulatory organization existed in the OTC market
that was comparable to the exchanges, and Congress had little understanding
of the nature of the OTC market itself. 73 Consequently, the original enactment
of section 15 was intended as a broad congressional directive that "[told] the
Commission to think out an effective way of regulating 'over-the-counter'
transactions,"' 174 and was a simple recognition of the need to begin investigation
into how to regulate the unorganized OTC market and the brokers and dealers
who traded in it.
c. 1936 Amendments
In 1936, Congress amended section 15 to provide four subsections.17 These
subsections reflected the progress the SEC had made toward achieving the
172. S. REP. No. 792, supra note 87, at 6.
173. The Roper committee was at a complete loss as to how to begin to formulate a federal
regulatory policy governing the OTC market:
On the basis of the consideration which it has been able to give to this subject,
your committee has come to the conclusion that the problem of the "over-the-
counter" markets cannot be satisfactorily dealt with by Federal governmental action.
It has not yet found any method of controlling such markets which it considers
feasible or which could be applied without building up a Federal policing agency on
such a scale as to be impracticable.
RoPER REPORT, supra note 93, at 20.
174. House Hearings on H.R. 7852, supra note 85, at 26.
175. The 1936 amendment to § 15 renumbered that section as § 15(c):
(c) No broker or dealer shall make use of the mails or of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce to effect any transaction in, or to induce the
purchase or sale of, any security (other than commercial paper, bankers' acceptances,
or commercial bills) otherwise than on a national securities exchange, by means of
any manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance. The Com-
mission shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and regulations deftne
such devices or contrivances as are manipulative, deceptive, or otherwise fraudulent.
Pub. L. No. 621, Ch. 462, 49 Stat. 1375, 1378 (1936). No change was made to § 29(b). Sections
15(a), (b), and (d) were completely new additions; section 15(c) largely adopted the 1934 version
of section 15. Subsections (a), (b), and (c) incorporated into statutory law the rules and regulations
that had been adopted by the SEC up to that time pursuant to its authority under the original
1934 enactment of § 15. S. REP. No. 1739, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1936); H.R. REP. No.
2601, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1936).
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three goals of the original enactment. 76 Since 1934, the SEC had progressed
toward the second goal by adopting rules and regulations governing the
registration of OTC brokers and dealers. Sections 15(a) and (b) incorporated
this regulatory scheme into statutory law.77 Congress also added section 15(d)
in an effort to realize the third goal: the gradual process of registering OTC
securities. 178 It was the lot of section 15(c) to become the principal tool in
achieving the first goal identified in the original section 15, that is, the
regulation of broker-dealer conduct.' 79
The new section 15(c) basically incorporated the original section 15, with
two distinctions. First, section 15(c) expressly became an antifraud statute.
Whereas the 1934 version had broadly prohibited conduct in violation of SEC
rules governing OTC transactions, the 1936 amendment specifically prohibited
the effectuation of OTC transactions "by means of any manipulative, decep-
tive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance." Second, the 1936 amendment
changed the standard of inclusion. After amendment, the standard was based
upon" the use of mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce
"to effect any transaction in, or to induce the purchase or sale of" an OTC
security, rather than upon the use of such facilities for "making or creating
... a market" for such securities. 1w
The thrust of the 1936 amendments to section 15 was to incorporate into
the statute the regulations the SEC had adopted up to that time to govern
brokers and dealers in the OTC market and corporations whose securities
were traded over-the-counter. However, nothing in the legislative history to
the 1936 amendment suggests that Congress considered, one way or the other,
the issue of a private right of action under section 15(c).
d. 1938 Amendments-The Maloney Act
The 1938 amendments"" to the Exchange Act represented a continuation of
efforts by the SEC and Congress to effect a comprehensive regulation of the
176. See supra text accompanying notes 156-63.
177. Unlisted Securities: Hearings on S. 4023 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1936) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 4023].
178. Hearings on S. 4023, supra note 177, at 10-11; S. REP. No. 1739, supra note 175, at 4;
H.R. RP. No. 2601, supra note 175, at 4-5.
179. Hearings on S. 4023, supra note 177, at 11-12.
180. The only reason given for this change in the standard of inclusion was simply that it was
"[i]n the interest of clarity and ease of administration." S. REP. No. 1739, supra note 175, at 3-
4; H.R. REP. No. 2601, supra note 175, at 4. Particularly noteworthy about the change is that
§ 15(c) thereby introduced a distinction between, on the one hand, "any transaction" in an OTC
security effectuated by fraud, and, on the other hand, a "purchase or sale" of an OTC security
effectuated by fraud. That § 15(c) thus applied not only when a broker-dealer induced a "purchase
or sale" of an OTC security but also when he effected "any transaction" involving an OTC
security by means of a fraudulent device or contrivance suggests that § 15(c) was not intended to
require an actual purchase or sale. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that in 1975 § 15(c)
was further amended to apply to a broker-dealer's "attempt to induce" a purchase or sale. See
infra notes 247-48, 387-94 and accompanying text.
181. Pub. L. No. 719, Ch. 677, 52 Stat. 1070, 1070 (1938). As amended in 1938, § 15(c)
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brokers and dealers in the OTC market. The preamble to the Maloney Act
(as these 1938 amendments were called) stated that it was an Act to "provide
for the establishment of a mechanism of regulation among over-the-counter
brokers and dealers ... [and] to prevent acts and practices inconsistent with
just and equitable principles of trade." 1 The "mechanism" of regulation was
to be two-fold: first, to provide for one or more voluntary self-regulatory
associations of OTC broker-dealers, and second, to give the SEC direct rule-
making power over all broker-dealers, whether they joined such voluntary
associations or not."" The first aspect was accomplished by the addition of
provided:
(c)(1) No broker or dealer shall make use of the mails or of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce to effect any transaction in, or to induce the
purchase or sale of, any security (other than commercial paper, bankers' acceptances,
or commercial bills) otherwise than on a national securities exchange, by means of
any manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance. The Com-
mission shall, for the purposes of the subsection, by rules and regulations define
such devices or contrivances as are manipulative, deceptive, or otherwise fraudulent.
(2) No broker or dealer shall make use of the mails or of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce to effect any transaction in, or to induce or
attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any security (other than an exempted
security or commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, or commercial bills) otherwise
than on a national securities exchange, in connection with which such broker or
dealer engages in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act or practice, or
makes any fictitious quotation. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this
paragraph, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed
to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative and
such quotations as are fictitious.
(3) No broker or dealer shall make use of the mails or of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce to effect any transaction in, or to induce or
attempt to induce the purchase or'sale of any security (other than an exempted
security or commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, or commercial bills) otherwise
than on a national securities exchange, in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors to provide safeguards with respect to the financial
responsibility of brokers and dealers.
Id. at 1075.
As amended in 1938 and as it remains today, § 29(b) was identical to the 1934 enactment,
except that it added the following proviso at the end:
Provided, (A) That no contract shall be void by reason of this subsection because
of any violation of any rule or regulation prescribed pursuant to paragraph (2) or
(3) of subsection (c) of section 15 of this title, and (B) that no contract shall be
deemed to be void by reason of this subsection in any action maintained in reliance
upon this subsection, by any person to or for whom any broker or dealer sells, or
from or for whom any broker or dealer purchases, a security in violation of any
rule or regulation prescribed pursuant to paragraph (1) of subsection (c) of Section
15 of this title, unless such action is brought within one year after the discovery
that such sale or purchase involves such violation and within three years after such
violation.
Id. at 1076. Section 29(b) has not been amended since 1938. See supra note 134 for complete
text.
182. 52 Stat. at 1070.
183. Senate Hearings on S. 3255, supra note 97, at 17-18 (statement of SEC Commissioner
George C. Mathews).
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an entirely new section 15A.'" The second was contained in the amendments
to section 15(c).185
By adding section 15A, Congress was adopting a program of self-regulation
of OTC broker-dealers closely modelled on the framework created under the
1934 Act for the stock exchanges.s The witnesses in the 1938 hearings and
the reports of the committees recognized that direct governmental regulation
by the SEC of each individual broker-dealer in the OTC market could not be
as practical, efficient, or comprehensive a program of policing that a voluntary
self-regulatory association of broker-dealers could be.'17 Just as in 1934 Con-
gress was faced with a choice between self-regulation by the stock exchanges
and direct governmental control of the brokerage industry, so Congress in
1938 faced the same two alternatives in the OTC market and-effected a similar
compromise between self-regulation and governmental control.ss The intent
of the new section 15A was to establish a program of "cooperative regulation ''1
184. 5 U.S.C. § 780-3 (1982).
185. S. REP. No. 1455, supra note 95, at 1; H.R. REP. No. 2307, supra note 95, at 2.
186. Senate Hearings on S. 3255, supra note 97, at 18-20 (statement of Commissioner Mathews);
Regulation of Over-the-Counter Markets: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S. 3255 and H.R. 9634, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 17 (1938)
[hereinafter House Hearings on S. 3255] (statement of Commissioner Mathews). See also S. REP.
No. 1455, supra note 95, at 4; H.R. REP. No. 2307, supra note 95, at 5.
187. Senate Hearings on S. 3255, supra note 97, at 7-11, 16; S. REP. No. 1455, supra note 95,
at 3-4; H.R. REP. No. 2307, supra note 95, at 4-5.
188. A Senate report observed:
The committee believes that there are two alternative programs by which this
problem [how to regulate the OTC marketl could be met. The first would involve
a pronounced expansion of the organization of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission; the multiplication of branch offices; a large increase in the expenditure of
public funds; an increase in the problem of avoiding the evils of bureaucracy; and
a minute, detailed, and rigid regulation of business conduct by law. It might very
well mean expanding the present process of registration of brokers and dealers with
the Commission to include the proscription not only of the dishonest, but also of
those unwilling or unable to conform to rigid standards of financial responsibility,
professional conduct, and technical proficiency. The second of these alternative
programs, which the committee believes distinctly preferable to the first, is embodied
in S. 3255. Thiq program is based upon cooperative regulation, in which the task
will be largely performed by representative organizations of investment bankers,
dealers, and brokers, with the Government exercising appropriate supervision in the
public interest, and exercising supplementary powers of direct regulation. In the
concept of a really well organized and well-conducted stock exchange, under the
supervision provided by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, one may perceive
something of the possibilities of such a program.
S. REP. No. 1455, supra note 95, at 3-4; H.R. REP. No. 2307, supra note 95, at 4-5. See also
House Hearings on S. 3255, supra note 186, at 67.
189. On the nature of "cooperative regulation":
The framework of the Maloney bill is an effort to foster self-discipline within the
law and the confines of the National Constitution, to permit self-regulation subject
to a tolerant Government supervision designed to help set the general course and
not permit private interests to overcome the public interest. It is an effort to create
a legal framework for cooperation between your Government and your business. It
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in which one or more professional associations of broker-dealers would
substantially shoulder the job of regulation and disciplining its members, while
the SEC exercised a surveillance and supervisory role over the associations.
As a result of this legislation, the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) was born.190
Under the Maloney Act, the national association was not to have plenary
or exclusive power over broker-dealers in the OTC market. Just as in the case
of the stock exchanges, the SEC itself was to have the power to adopt rules
and regulations designed "to prevent conduct inconsistent with just and
equitable principles of trade and to assure to investors in the over-the-counter
markets protection comparable to that provided under the Exchange Act with
respect to exchanges. ' 19l The amendments to section 15(c) provided some of
this power. The prior section 15(c) was renumbered and in its entirety reenacted
as section 15(c)(1); new sections 15(c)(2) and 15(c)(3) were added. 192 All three
is not enough to say that we favor cooperation between business and Government.
It is necessary to work out the mechanics and tools for that cooperation. One way
to cooperate is for business and Government to sit down together and try to devise
intelligent laws and then for business associations to insist upon its members obeying
those laws.
Extension of Remarks of Senator Maloney in Appendix to the Congressional Record, Address of
Robert E. Healy, Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission, at the Annual Dinner of
the New York Security Dealers' Association, March 10, 1938, 83 CONG. REc. 978 (1938).
190. Although the Maloney Act did not limit the number of these broker-dealer associations,
the SEC and industry representatives ultimately agreed that a single national association would be
the most appropriate way to implement section 15A. In 1939, the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD) was formed, and no other broker-dealer organization has ever registered under
this provision of the Act. H.R. REP. No. 1519, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1972).
191. Senate Hearings on S. 3255, supra note 97, at 26.
192. The most complete congressional statement of the 1938 amendments to § 15(c) is contained
in H.R. REP. No. 2307, supra note 95, at 10-11. The House Report states:
[Section 15(c)] relates to the direct powers of the Commission to adopt rules generally
applicable to over-the-counter brokers and dealers.
As has been explained, paragraph (1) of the proposed new subsection (c) is
identical with the present subsection (c), under which the Commission has adopted
rules and regulations which have withstood the test of experience and have met with
the approval of representative groups of brokers and dealers subject thereto. It is
contemplated that rules of similar character and additional appropriate rules will be
adopted under paragraph (1) of the proposed new subsection (c).
Paragraph (2) of the proposed new subsection (c), which does not apply to
transactions in exempted securities, clarifies and broadens the power of the Com-
mission by rules and regulations to prevent fraudulent, manipulative, and deceptive
acts and practices and fictitious quotations.
Paragraph (3) of the proposed new subsection (c), which likewise does not apply
to transactions in exempted securities, empowers the Commission by rule and
regulation to take action against certain other abuses and to promote orderly and
efficient business practices in connection with specified subjects.
The need of these additional powers has been demonstrated by the administrative
experience of the Commission. Thus, paragraphs (2) and (3) represent a necessary
step forward toward realizing the original objectives and implementing the original
standards of regulation set forth in section 15 of the Exchange Act in its original
form.
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subsections gave the SEC the power to adopt regulations aimed directly at
fraudulent practices by brokers and dealers. The retention (in the case of
section 15(c)(1)) and enactment (in the cases of sections 15(c)(2) and 15(c)(3))
of direct rule-making power was designed, in large part, to ensure that broker-
dealers who declined to join the voluntary association Ywould not escape
regulation altogether or be subject to less stringent regulation than fellow
broker-dealers who did join it.193
Thus, Congress intended to subject OTC brokers and dealers to regulation
by both the SEC and the new voluntary professional association. But what
about the private investor-did Congress contemplate that he would have a
role in policing broker-dealer unfair trade practices? The hearings and reports
suggest affirmatively that he was to have a such role.
In an early draft of the 1938 amendments, SEC rule-making power under
section 15(c) was directed at five categories of broker-dealer conduct: (1)
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices; (2) fictitious quota-
tions; (3) financial responsibility; (4) manner, method, and place of soliciting
business; and (5) time and method of making settlements, payments, or
deliveries. 94 These five clauses were treated sepiarately in the draft amendment
to section 29(b). 195 Previously, section 29(b) had made no reference at all to
193. Senate Hearings on S. 3255, supra note 97, at 26, 41-42 (statements of Commissioner
Mathews and Senator Maloney); House Hearings on S. 3255, supra note 186, at 38 (statement of
Mr. Lothrop Withington).
194. The text of one of the early drafts of the 1938 amendment to § 15(c) provided:
(c) No broker or dealer shall make use of the mails or of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce to effect any transaction in, or to induce the
purchase or sale of, any security (other than commercial paper, bankers' acceptances,
or commercial bills) otherwise than on a national securities exchange, in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors (1) to prevent
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices; (2) to prevent fictitious
quotations; (3) to provide safeguards with respect to the financial responsibility of
brokers and dealers; (4) to regulate the manner, method, and place of soliciting
business; and (5) to regulate the time and method of making settlements, payments,
or deliveries: Provided, That nothing in clause (3), (4), or (5) of this subsection shall
be construed to apply with respect to any transaction by a broker or dealer in any
exempted security.
H.R. REP. No. 2307, supra note 95, af 13 (emphasis shows draft changes to § 15(c)).
195. The text of an early draft of the 1938 amendment to § 29(b) provided:
(b) Every contract made in violation of any provision of this title or of any rule
or regulation thereunder, and every contract (including any contract for listing a
security on an exchange) heretofore or hereafter made the performance of which
involves the violation of, or the continuance of any relationship or practice in
violation of, any provision of this title or any rule or regulation thereunder, shall
be void (1) as regards the rights of any person who, in violation of any such
provision, rule, or regulation, shall have made or engaged in the performance of
any such contract, and (2) as regards the rights of any person who, not being a
party to such contract, shall have acquired any right thereunder with actual knowledge
of the facts by reason of which the making or performance of such contract was
in violation of any such provision, rule or [regulation.] regulation: Provided, That
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section 15, but rather had declared all contracts made in violation of any
provision of the Act "void."'9 The draft amendment to section 29(b) declared
that contracts made in violation of clauses (3), (4) and (5) of section 15(c)
would not be void unless the SEC by rule permitted them to be.
The reasoning for the distinction among the five draft clauses of section
15(c) is worth quoting in full, because it demonstrates an intent to allow civil
lawsuits for certain kinds of broker-dealer abuses, but not for others:
Clauses (1) and (2) of the proposed new subsection (c) substantially
reenact, but clarify and broaden, the substance of this subsection in its
present form. Under the present form of this subsection, the Commission
has adopted rules and regulations which have withstood the test of expe-
rience and have met with the approval of representative groups of brokers
and dealers subject thereto. It is contemplated that rules of similar character
and additional appropriate rules will be adopted under clauses (1) and (2)
of the proposed new subsection (c).
Clauses (3), (4), and (5) empower the Commission by rule and regulation
to take action against certain other abuses and to promote orderly and
efficient business practices in connection with specified subjects. The need
of these additional powers have been demonstrated by the administrative
experience of the Commission. These clauses thus represent a necessary
step forward toward realizing the original objectives and implementing the
original standards of regulation set forth in section 15 of the Exchange
Act in its original form.
Reference has been made hereinabove to the two types of rules and
regulations which it is contemplated the Commission will adopt under
clauses (3), (4) and (5) of the proposed new subsection (c) of section 15:
First, rules and regulations striking at abuses in the form of dishonest or
overreaching conduct within the scope of the standards set forth in clauses(3), (4) and (5); second, rules and regulations designed to promote orderly
and efficient business practices in connection with matters falling within
the scope of these standards. Clearly, contracts entered into by brokers
and dealers with customers in violation of any rule or regulation of thefirst type should be void in accordance with subsection (b) of section 29
of the Exchange Act, so that the innocent customer may rescind the
contract and recover such payment as he may have made. On the other
hand, there appears to be no sound reason why contracts entered into in
violation of the second type of rule or regulation should be void under
subsection (b) of section 29. Accordingly, section 3 of the bill amends
subsection (b) of section 29 to provide that contracts entered into in
violation of any rule or regulation under clauses (3), (4), or (5) shall not
no contract shall be void by reason of this subsection because of any violation of
any rule or regulation prescribed pursuant to clause (3), (4), or (5) of subsection (c)
of section 15 of this title, except insofar as the Commission, having determined that
such action is necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors, shall have
expressly provided in such rule or regulation that the provisions of this subsection
shall apply in the case of any violation thereof.
H.R. REP. No. 2307, supra note 95, at 18 (emphasis shows draft changes to § 29(b)).
196. See supra note 156.
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be void by reason of subsection (b) of section 29, unless the Conuission
has determined that it is necessary or appropriate for the protection of
those persons within the purposes of such subsection that the subsection
apply. The Commission must, moreover, upon making such a determina-
tion, expressly provide in the particular rule or regulation that the provisions
of subsection (b) of section 29 apply. It is contemplated that the Com-
mission will take such action only with respect to rules and regulations of
the first type above described."1
These draft amendments to section 15(c) thus distinguish between two types
of rules under section 15(c): rules aimed at "dishonest or overreaching con-
duct" on the one hand, and rules aimed at promoting "orderly and efficient
business practices" on the other. The intent, as demonstrated in the above
passage, was to allow a private investor to sue for violation of the first type
of rule, but not for violation of the second type of rule, unless the Commission
deemed it "necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors."' 98
The reason for making this distinction is found in the House hearings,
which further demonstrated that civil lawsuits were contemplated under these
amendments to sections 15(c) and 29(b). The securities brokerage industry
protested strenuously over the threat of civil liability posed by these amend-
ments. As one witness representing broker-dealer interests stated: "The chief
objection, however, which our committee has to this bill is directed to the
civil liabilities that arise or are apt to arise under it."' 99 Broker-dealer witnesses
at the House hearings raised three principal objections to these drafts: (1) civil
liability could result for violation of "technical" rules; (2) there was no statute
of limitations for civil lawsuits involving violations of section 15(c); and (3)
rescission was thought too severe a remedy for such violations. 0
As to the first issue, broker-dealers opposed any kind of civil liability for
violations of clauses (3), (4), and (5), which were perceived to be "technical"
rules rather than rules designed to check forms of dishonest or overreaching
conduct.20' In addition, it was pointed out that in allowing the SEC discretion
197. S. REP. No. 1455, supra note 95, at 10-11 (emphasis added).
198. See supra note 194.
199. House Hearings on S. 3255, supra note 186, at 38 (statement of Mr. Lothrop Withington,
representing a group of dealers and brokers in New England).
200. Id. at 34-35, 37-48. These were the principal remaining objections identified by SEC
Commissioner Mathews during the House committee's consideration of the bill. Id. at 6-9.
201. The testimony of Mr. John K. Starkweather, on behalf of the Investment Bankers
Association, expressed this viewpoint:
But in general this situation has to do with the civil liabilities which may be incurred
for violations of items 3, 4, and 5 of section 2 [of the draft bill ( referring to clauses
(3), (4) and (5) of the draft of § 15(c)-see supra note 194)].
I do not know what type of regulation the Commission has in mind under those
sections. It is obvious for the most part they will have to do with routine and highly
technical subjects. For instance, time and method of making settlement: I cannot
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to determine when suit may be brought under clauses (3), (4), and (5), "it
puts the Commission in the position of creating a civil liability." Both the
SEC20 and the Senate committee2 agreed that violation of "technical" rules
involving business practices should not give rise to liability under section 29(b)
to avoid a contract. However, there appeared to be no objection to civil
liability for "dishonest or overreaching" (that is, fraudulent) conduct. 5
In the final version of section 15(c)(1), Congress accommodated the objectors
on this first issue. SEC rule-making authority under clauses (4) and (5) was
eliminated altogether. The SEC was not given discretion to determine whether
to permit civil actions for any violations under section 15(c), and section 29(b)
expressly disallowed civil actions to avoid a contract made in violation of
clauses (2) and (3) of section 15(c). 6 By eliminating civil liability (at least for
rescission) under these other clauses, Congress must have intended to retain
civil liability for violations of clause (1) of section 15(c), to which no objection
had been raised."
imagine why such a section as that should require power on the part of the
Commission to put into effect a penalty which may involve recession [sic] at some
date later which is always after the market has gone substantially down ....
Now, I have no objection, of course, to any man asking for his money back if
I have done something which was improper. If, for instance, I have given him
improper information, if I have misled him, or deceived him in any way, obviously
there is no objection ....
Now, if it is a question of fraud; if it is a question of fraudulent manipulation,
I have no objection at all; but when it comes to a question of a violation of a
highly technical rule, I see no reason why the Commission should have the power
to say to me that this particular rule for reasons that seem to us desirable, shall
make you subject to the voiding of that contract.
Id. at 34-35. See also id. at 7 (statement of Commissioner Mathews), 38-39 (statement of Mr.
Withington).
202. Id. at 41 (statement of Mr. Washington).
203. Id. at 7-9 (statement of Commissioner Mathews).
204. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
205. On the contrary, the witnesses openly acknowledged the propriety of a civil lawsuit where
the broker-dealer had committed fraud. See House Hearings on S. 3255, supra note 186, at 35,
42.
206. See supra note 181.
207. If the thrust of the objections was that broker-dealers should be held civilly liable only
for "manipulative, deceptive, or otherwise fraudulent" conduct, and not for violation of so-called
"technical" rules, then it is not immediately clear from the language of these provisions why
liability under clause (c)(2) should be treated differently from civil liability under clause (c)(1), for
the language of these two clauses is very similar. See supra note 4. The debates at the hearings
help to give an insight into this different treatment. The House committee report indicated that
the proposed amendments to § 15(c) would "clarify and strengthen" the SEC's regulatory powers
over the OTC market. H.R. REP. No. 2307, supra note 95, at 2. Since clause (c)(1) was ultimately
a re-enactment of the 1936 version of § 15(c), the broadening of SEC powers is contained in
clauses (c)(2) and (c)(3). Id. at 10-11. See also S. REP. No. 1455, supra note 95, at 1, 10. It is
understandable from the language of clause (c)(3) why rules "to provide safeguards with respect
to the financial responsibility of brokers and dealers" would strike the witnesses and congressional
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As to the second issue, broker-dealers objected that the drafters of the
amendments "have created this civil liability without realizing there is no
general statute of limitation in the act." An objection was raised that under
the express liability provisions of sections 9(e)2r and 18(c)210 there was a
limitations period, and it was urged that a comparable provision be adopted
for violations of section 15(c). 211 Congress satisfied this objection in the final
version of section 29(b) by adopting the provision that suits to avoid a contract
in violation of section 15(c)(1) be brought within 1 year of discovery of the
violation of the statute and within 3 years of the violation itself.22 This
limitations period is identical to those of the express liability provisions of
sections 9(e) and 18(c).
The third major objection to the 1938 amendment was that, in a civil
lawsuit for violation of section 15(c), it could be argued that the investor need
not show actual damages, but rather he could get rescission of the contract
under section 29(b) in the absence of proof of causation of injury for a
violation of section 15(c). 213 The objectors urged that Congress limit recovery
committees as "technical." It is not immediately clear from the language of clause (c)(2), however,
why SEC rules defining "acts or practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative" or
"fictitious quotations" would be considered any more "technical" than SEC rules under clause
(c)(l), which refers to "any manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance."
The explanation lies largely in the empowering of the SEC, under (c)(2), by rule to "prescribe
means reasonably designed to prevent" the proscribed fraudulent conduct. The draft amendment
to § 15(c) first introduced this "prevent" language, see supra note 194, and it was strenuously
objected to. The witnesses at the hearings distinguished rules defining fraudulent conduct from
rules designed to prevent fraudulent conduct. The latter rules were considered potentially "tech-
nical," and the power to make them was considered an extension of SEC power which threatened
to open up a broader range of business activity to civil liability. House Hearings on S. 3255,
supra note 186, at 3841. See also id. at 13-14, 32, 48-50, 54-55, 57-58, 60-68. Similar "prevent"
language had been introduced into § 15(c) in 1936 and was ultimately discarded after similar
protests from the brokerage industry. See id. at 57; Hearings on S. 4023, supra note 177, at 12-
14, 23. Significantly, although such "prevent" language likewise re-appeared in the early draft of
clauses (c)(l) and (c)(2) in 1938, it also was ultimately discarded from clause (c)(1). Compare supra
note 194 with supra note 181. Cf. infra note 248 (discussing "attempt to induce" language as a
backdoor way to effect "prevent" language). Another difference to which some witnesses attached
considerable significance was the inversion of the 1936 phrase "manipulative, deceptive, or otherwise
fraudulent" in § 15(c) to "fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative" in the draft amendment to
§ 15(c) (supra note 194). House Hearings on S. 3255, supra note 186, at 74, 83-86. The former
phrase was retained in clause (c)(1), but the latter phrase (which the witnesses and the SEC
considered broader) was enacted into clause (c)(2).
208. House Hearings on S. 3255, supra note 186, at 40 (statement of Mr. Withington).
209. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e).
210. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(c).
211. House Hearings on S. 3255, supra note 186, at 40.
212. See supra note 181.
213. House Hearings on S. 3255, supra note 186, at 39-42. As one witness stated:
It seems to me that with regard to sections 1 and 2 [of the draft bill], that there
should be an entire elimination of any recession [sic] and that damages for violation
should be actual damages; and it seems to me that is all the investor is entitled to,
and that is all the limit that the broker or dealer should be subjected to.
Id. at 41 (statement of Mr. Withington).
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in a civil lawsuit under section 15(c) to actual damages-as was done in the
express liability provision of section 9(e)-and not permit rescission. Rescission
was viewed as too drastic a remedy.2 14 Congress did not accommodate the
objectors on this ground, however. No amendment was made in either section
29(b) or section 15(c) limiting a civil lawsuit under section 15(c) to damages.
Why did Congress choose to address these objections to civil liability under
section 15(c)(1), not in that section, but rather in section 29(b)? The reports
and hearings do not directly answer this question. By its language, section
29(b) addresses only the voiding of contracts made or performed in violation
of the Act. Literally, it thus applies only to suits for rescission, not to suits
for money damages. One possible explanation for Congress's answering these
1938 objectors in section 29(b), rather than in section 15(c)(1), is that Congress
deliberately chose to make the limitations on civil liability applicable only to
private actions for rescission, but not to private actions for damages.21 5
In addition to the literal language of section 29(b), support for this inter-
pretation can be found in the testimony of the witnesses and in the reports
at the time the Maloney Act was under consideration. As already noted, the
witnesses did not urge the elimination of all civil liability under section 15(c)(1).
On the contrary, they urged that three specific restrictions be placed on that
civil liability.2 6 Their objections were repeatedly framed in terms of the threat
which rescission actions in particular were thought to pose.21 7 Rather than
oppose civil liability for damages as well as rescission, the witnesses thus
concentrated their opposition on civil liability for rescission. It would not be
unreasonable to conclude, therefore, that by amending section 29(b), Congress
deliberately addressed the witnesses' objections only with respect to civil actions
for rescission.
By the 1938 amendment, Congress placed two express restrictions on civil
lawsuits for violation of section 15(c): first, a 1 year/3 year limitations period
was set for such actions,218 and second, civil lawsuits to avoid contracts in
214. Id. For a fuller discussion of the brokerage opposition to rescission as a remedy for
violation of § 15(c), see infra notes 434-41 and accompanying text.
215. Another possible explanation is that Congress intended only to permit private actions for
rescission for violation of § 15(c)(1) and to exclude altogether private actions for damages. The
problems with this interpretation are discussed infra at notes 406-29 and accompanying text. Yet
another possible interpretation is that Congress was indifferent to legislative draftsmanship, and
that it intended the same interpretive result whether the restrictions on civil liability were placed
in § 15(c)(1) or in § 29(b). Such an interpretation would seem ipso facto unsatisfactory.
216. See supra notes 200-14 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 434-41 and accom-
panying text.
218. Along this line, a literal reading of the § 29(b) proviso suggests that the I year/3 year
limitations period applies only to actions for rescission, not to actions for damages. By this
proviso, a suit to avoid a contract which, in its making or performance, violates § 15(c)(1) is
permitted, but only if brought within the prescribed time limits. The proviso expressly creates a
limitations period only for an action "maintained in reliance upon this subsection [§ 29(b)]." Since
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violation of sections 15(c)(2) and 15(c)(3) were disallowed. 2 9 Regardless of
whether these restrictions are interpreted to apply to all private civil actions
for violation of section 15(c), or only to private actions for rescission, from
the fact that Congress imposed these limitations on civil lawsuits in response
to the urgings of representatives of the broker-dealer industry who wanted
civil liability to be so limited, one may logically conclude that Congress
intended to permit civil litigation under section 15(c), subject to those limita-
tions.
e. 1964 Amendments
Ferdinand Pecora, counsel to the Senate committee during the 1934 hearings,
proved an accurate forecaster when in 1934 he predicted: "Perhaps 20 years
from now there will be persons coming to Congress, if this bill becomes law,
who will think that its provisions ought to be strengthened and the powers of
the Federal Trade Commission [later to be the SEC] increased." 20 Congress
substantially amended the Exchange Act in 1964, after many years of study
and investigation.22'
The 1964 amendments represent a continuation of congressional efforts to
put regulation of the OTC market on a parity with that of the exchange
§ 29(b) itself is limited to rendering contracts "void" which are made or performed in violation
of some other provision of the Act, an action "in reliance" on § 29(b) would be one to avoid a
contract-i.e., an action for rescission. Under this reading, an action for damages would not be
"in reliance" on § 29(b), and thus the limitations period would not apply to it. Arguably, if
Congress had wanted to prescribe a time limit for suits for damages as well, it would have done
so by placing the proviso directly in § 15(c) itself, as it did in the express liability provisions of
§ 9(e) and § 18(c). See infra note 367. For a case applying the limitations period of § 29(b) only
to suits for rescission, see Douglass v. Glenn E. Hinton Inv., Inc., 440 F.2d 912, 914 (9th Cir.
1971). See also Gruenbaum & Steinberg, supra note 6, at 47-48 (arguing that the limitations period
should apply only to suits for rescission). For cases applying the limitations period of § 29(b) to
both actions for rescission and actions for damages, see Valley Bank of Nevada v. Foster &
Marshall, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 1351, 1352 (D. Utah 1984); Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 365
F. Supp. 1364, 1372 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Maher v. J.R. Williston & Beane, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 133,
138-39 (S.D.N.Y 1967).
219. Similarly, does the proviso of § 29(b) bar all private actions for violations of §§ 15(c)(2)
and 15(cX3), or only actions for rescission? The language literally seems to bar only actions for
rescission, for it states "[t]hat no contract shall be void by reason of [§ 29(b)] because of any
violation of any rule or regulation prescribed pursuant to [§ 15(c)(2) or § 15(c)(3)]." Only private
actions to "void" a contact are thus proscribed, not private actions for damages. As discussed
above, the focus of the witnesses' objections was specifically the threat of a rescission action for
violation of "technical rules," which clauses (c)(2) and (q)(3) were thought to be addressed to.
See supra notes 201-05 and accompanying text. A congressional report similarly distinguished
rescission actions based on "dishonest or overreaching conduct" and rescission actions for violation
of "technical rules." See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text. That Congress addressed this
concern about civil liability for "technical rules" in § 29(b)-and prohibited the voiding of a
contract in violation of clauses (cX2) and (c)(3)-suggests that Congress was deliberately leaving
intact private actions for monetary damages under these sections. See infra notes 418-24 and
accompanying text.
220. Senate Hearings on S. Res. 84, supra note 85, at 6972.
221. Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565.
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markets. None of the 1964 amendments affected section 15(c)(1), however,
and therefore the legislative history to these amendments does not change the
congressional attitude toward permitting civil lawsuits that was demonstrated
by the Maloney Act. A brief discussion of these 1964 amendments is none-
theless useful to an understanding of how section 15(c)(1) fits into the scheme
of regulation of brokers and dealers generally.
The amendments grew out of a voluminous Special Study of Securities
Markets,' which provided the most comprehensive review of securities markets
in twenty-five years. The 1964 amendments were aimed at improved regulation
of two different groups: first, the companies whose securities were traded in
the OTC market; and second, the broker-dealers and associated persons who
traded securities, particularly in the OTC market.m The overall goal of the
amendments was to raise the standards in the OTC market by a combination
of better information and fuller disclosure about the securities on the one
hand, and better qualified people to sell them on the other2 4
As with the prior amendments already discussed, Congress recognized a
serious disparity between the amount and effectiveness of regulation in the
exchange markets and that in the OTC market, and also recognized the need
to eliminate this disparity.22 To this end, the amendments extended to those
companies whose securities were traded in the OTC market the coverage of
sections 12' (registration), 13 (reporting), 14 (proxy), and 16 (insider trading).
These sections had previously applied primarily or exclusively to companies
listed on an exchange?26
To provide the SEC with enforcement powers over this new extension of
applicability of the 1934 Act to companies whose securities were traded in the
OTC market, section 15(c) was amended to add subsection (c)(4). Section
15(c)(4) basically provides that if any person subject to the disclosure require-
ments of sections 12, 13, or 15(d) failed to comply with them, the SEC could
order compliance.? Likewise, section 15(c)(5) was added to grant the SEC
the power to suspend trading temporarily in an OTC security if necessary
222. REPORT oF SpECAL STuDY oF Siacu-nias MAKm OF TM SECURITMES ANoD EXCHAIGE
CoMMs=ON, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., Ist Sess., pts. 1-5 (1963) [hereinafter SPECIAL STUDY].
The purpose of the amendments was to carry out the legislative recommendations made by the
SEC in the Special Study. H.R. RaP. No. 1418, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1964).
223. H.R. RaP. No. 1418, supra note 222, at 1-2; S. RP. No. 379, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1963). See also 110 CONG. Rac. 17,916-17 (1964) (statement of Rep. Harris) (passages from the
congressional debates on the amendments); id. at 17,921-22 (statement of Rep. Springer); id. at
17,925 (statement of Rep. Keith); id. at 18,383 (statement of Sen. Javits); 109 CoNG. RPc. 13,725-
26 (1963) (statement of Sen. Williams).
224. S. REP. No. 379, supra note 223, at 5. As to regulation of brokers and dealers, "the
Report of the Special Study concludes that the minimal controls furnished by existing regulation
are inadequate." SPEcLAL STUDY, supra note 222, pt. 5, at 3.
225. S. REP. No. 379, supra note 223, at 9-12, 14, 18-19.
226. Id. at 1, 9; H.R. RaP. No. 1418, supra note 222, at 2, 15-19, 29-30.
227. S. REP. No. 379, supra note 223, at 25-26; H.R. RaP. No. 1418, supra note 222, at 24,
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because of fraud or manipulative practices-a power it already had with
respect to securities traded on the exchanges under section 19(a)(4). M
The second major objective of the 1964 amendments was "to strengthen
the standards of entrance into the securities business, enlarge the scope of
self-regulation, and strengthen Commission disciplinary controls over brokers,
dealers, and their employees."22 In large part, Congress designed the amend-
ments to give the SEC similar powers to discipline broker-dealers as it had
for the exchanges. This objective was achieved by numerous amendments
which, among other things, required the NASD to establish standards of
training, experience, competence, and other qualifications for its broker-dealer
members and persons associated with its members; empowered the SEC to
228. Id.
229. S. REP. No. 379, supra note 223, at 1. See also H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 222, at
2. The Special Study summarized some of the problems it found in the brokerage industry as
follows:
The ease with which almost anyone can start his own securities firm and deal
with the public has permitted many an amateur to embark on the deep waters of
broker-dealer entrepreneurship. The statistics and cases reviewed in this chapter
indicate a surprisingly high incidence of inexperience in the securities business on
the part of principals of new firms, and concurrently a lack of awareness of and
respect for a broker-dealer's obligations to the investing public.... Many of these
[new] firms quickly become sources of concern to the Commission and the NASD;
the Special Study's analyses and observations revealed a distinct tendency on the
part of newcomers to become involved in the more serious securities violations more
often than experienced fms.... Many new firms include among their salesmen
"boiler-room" veterans or totally inexperienced newcomers, or both. The training
which such firms give their inexperienced salesmen rarely goes beyond a modicum
of orientation to the firm and a brief introduction to its merchandise.
The qualifications of salesmen, who more than any other group represent the
securities industry to the investing public, require particular attention. Out of the
recent rapid growth and heavy turnover of salesmen have arisen two types of
problems for the industry: the large number of inexperienced salesmen it has
attempted to absorb, and the reservoir of "boiler-room floaters" who circulate from
firm to firm."
... Among firms specializing in mutual fund sales, inexperience is often preferred.
This mass of inexperienced salesmen encompasses the broadest range of educational
achievement, from those with graduate degrees to those without high school diplomas,
and the greatest diversity of backgrounds, from a number with business, supervisory,
selling, or professional histories to persons with such occupations as machinist, chef,
or baseball player....
The "floater" represents a problem of an entirely different kind. Because of the
brief lifespan of most "boiler-rooms" and the large numbers of salesmen they
typically use, there exists a fairly sizable group of alumni of these organizations,
forming a reservoir of high-pressure salesmen available for employment.... These
floaters carry the virus of high-pressure salesmanship from firm to firn, and find
inexperienced proprietors and salesmen-often well intentioned-particularly vulner-
able to infection with their irresponsible selling practices.
S EcL Sruriy, supra note 222, pt. 5, at 39-41 (footnotes omitted). See also id. at 49-54. The
Special Study also found serious deficiencies in the qualification, training, and competence among
supervisors and persons providing investment advice, and detailed objectionable or often illegal
practices by the brokerage segment of the securities industry. Id. at pt. 5, at 44-45, 51-52, 56-59.
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proceed directly against an individual associated with a broker-dealer in lieu
of proceeding against the entire brokerage firn; permitted the SEC to impose
sanctions, such as suspension, short of revoking registration; empowered the
SEC to impose on the NASD rules relating to its organization, discipline, and
eligibility for membership; and empowered the SEC directly to regulate brokers
and dealers who chose not to join the NASD. 210 In this respect, the 1964
amendments extensively revised sections 15(a) and (b) and section 15A, but
left section 15(c)(1) unchanged.
f. 1970 Amendments
During the years 1967-1970, the securities industry suffered an enormous
crisis as a result of a so-called "Paper Crunch."' 3 In late 1967 and in 1968,
trading volume increased dramatically on a rapidly rising market, and bro-
kerage firms found themselves clogged with paper work. In 1969-1970, the
stock market took an equally dramatic decline, and brokerage firms which
had earlier expanded during the rise faced the prospect of financing increased
overhead with declining revenues. As a result of these financial pressures, a
large number of broker-dealer firms collapsed.232
230. S. REP. No. 379, supra note 22j, at 41, 74-88; H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 222, at
2-3, 20-29.
231. STUDy OF UNSAFE AND UNsoUND PRACTICES oF BRoKERs AND DEALERS, REPORT AN
RECOmmENDATONS oF THE SECURTIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (PURSUAr TO SECTON 11(h)
OF THE SEcuRrms INbEsToR PROTECION ACT op 1970), H.R. Doc. No. 231, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
27-28 (1971) [hereinafter STUoy oF UNSAFE AND UNsoUND PRACTICES oF BRorms AND DEALERS].
232. Id. at 28-29. The SEC described the period 1967-1970 as follows:
The years 1967-1970 were a period of great turmoil and upheaval for the economy
in general and the securities industry in particular. During this short period more
than a dozen NYSE member firms failed, and another seventy or more were merged
into or aquired [sic] by other firms. Further, numerous smaller brokerage firms,
members of regional stock exchanges and the NASD, were also merged or liquidated.
The losses of these firms, which have not been fully tabulated, already exceed $130
million....
... mhe primary cause of the industry's problems was its inability to accurately,
promptly and inexpensively record and process the substantially increased trading
volume of the late 1960's. This inability resulted in what has been termed the "Paper
Crunch." Brokerage firms were literally inundated with pieces of paper of all types,
sizes, quality, descriptions and values which had to be received, processed, recorded
and delivered, all within a short time span....
... The "Paper Crunch" became so severe that the exchanges reduced trading
hours and even closed one day per week in an effort to resolve these problems.
However, these measures were at best only partially effective.
As a result of the "Paper Crunch" many brokerage firms soon became unable to
accurately and promptly record and process securities transactions and were unable
to properly maintain their books and records. This operational chaos brought to
light and exacerbated other structural problems inherent in the securities industry at
that time.
Unfortunately the downturn in trading volume [in 1969-70] was not a cure to the
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In late 1970, Congress responded to this crisis by enacting the Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970 (SIPA),233 which established the Securities
Investor Protection Corporation.3 The primary purpose of SIPA was to
afford financial protection for investors if the broker-dealer with whom they
were doing business encountered financial troubles. In addition, the SIPA
amendments mandated a general upgrading and strengthening of financial
responsibility requirements of broker-dealers. 235
SIPA did not affect section 15(c)(1), though it did amend section 15(c)(3).2 6
Section 15(c)(3) governs the SEC's power to provide safeguards with respect
to the financial responsibility of broker-dealers, and the amendment was
operational problems of the "Paper Crunch." The downturn in trading volume and
securities prices during the 1969-70 "Bear Market" which was supposed to allow
firms to "catch up" on their paperwork processing resulted in a financial crisis
which ultimately caused many firms to fail. Many firms which undertook substantial
expansion during the Bull Market and contracted for additional personnel and
equipment to solve the "Paper Crunch" had substantial on-going overhead expenses,
but with the decreased trading volume revenues were not sufficient to meet their
costs.... Thus, the lack of adequate permanent capital coupled with the shrinking
capital provided by securities whose values were declining rendered many firms
unable to survive the financial problems caused by decreasing revenues and increasing
expenses during the Bear Market.
The major self-regulatory organizations which have responsibility for supervising
the financial and operational conditions of their members were equally unpre-
pared.....
Further, in many instances, the self-regulatory organizations were reluctant to take
decisive action such as suspending a firm.
Id. at 27-29. These factual findings by the SEC are supported by those of congressional committees
which investigated this period. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1009, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1972); H.R.
REP. No. 1519, supra note 190, at 1-13; REPORT OF ran SENATE Comm. ox BAxno, HOUsING,
AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 92D CoNG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON SECuRrIEs INDUSTRY STUDY 7-11 (Comm.
Print 1972); S. REP. No. 1218, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1970); H.R. REP. No. 1613, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 2-3 (1970).
233. Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat. 1636 (1970), renumbered Security Investor Protection Act
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-283, 92 Stat. 260 (1978) [hereinafter SIPA]. As amended,
§ 15(c)(3) provided (emphasis shows new language):
(3) No broker or dealer shall make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality
of interstate commerce to effect any transaction in, or to induce or attempt to
induce the purchase or sale of, any security (other than an exempted securit3, or
commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, or commercial bills) in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission shall prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors to provide
safeguards with respect to the financial responsibility and related practices of brokers
and dealers including, but not limited to, the acceptance of custody and use of
customers' securities, and the carrying and use of customers' deposits or credit
balances. Such rules and regulations shall require the maintenance of reserves with
respect to customers' deposits or credit balances, as determined by such rules and
regulations.
84 Stat. 1653.
234. 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc (1982).
235. S. REP. No. 1218, supra note 232, at 1, 4; H.R. Rm'. No. 1613, supra note 232, at 1, 3-
4.
236. SIPA, supra note 233, 84 Stat. 1653.
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designed to clarify the applicability of that section to broker-dealers who do
business only on an exchange as well as to broker-dealers who transact business
in the OTC market.237 "By amending section 15(c)(3) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, Congress made it clear that more effective direct regulation by
the Commission was called for concerning the custody and use of customers'
securities and establishing reserves for the protection of customers' credit
balances."21s
g. 1975 and Later Amendments
In light of the financial failure of brokerage firms in the late 1960s, SIPA
directed the SEC to compile a list of unsafe or unsound practices by brokers
and dealers and to make recommendations concerning additional legislation
which might be needed to eliminate such practices in the futureY 9 In 1971,
pursuant to this directive, the SEC submitted a report which identified fourteen
industry practices by brokers and dealers contributing to the crisis, includ-
ing: inadequate capital; over-expanded budgets; inaccurate record-keeping; in-
adequate delivery, clearing and transfer facilities to keep pace with a high
volume of trading activity; and insufficient talent and training effort among
"back office" personnelY' °
The SEC report concluded that, while the scheme of self-regulation adopted
by Congress through the Maloney Act in 1938 had been reasonably effective
prior to 1967, by the late 1960s it was clear that these self-regulatory organi-
zations had not, and could not, adequately regulate the broker-dealer industry
without greater government involvement and supervision.241 In its report the
237. S. REP. No. 1218, supra note 232, at 16; H.R. REP. No. 1613, supra note 232, at 14.
238. H.R. REP. No. 1519, supra note 190, at 13 (citation omitted).
239. SIPA, supra note 233, § 11(h), 84 Stat. 1656.
240. STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNsouND PRaccss oF BRoKERS AND DEAms, supra note 231,
at 2-3. "Apart from the inability of broker-dealers to keep their records current, the number of
errors in the handling and recording of transactions multiplied. The back offices of many a
broker-dealer resembled a trackless forest." Id. at 13.
241. Id. at 22-23, 214-17.
Self-regulation has worked, but not well enough. The events of the past three
years have demonstrated this. Self-regulation should not be replaced, but it should
be improved.
After considering the alternatives of more pervasive government regulation or self-
regulation, Congress [in 1938] recognized that self-regulation was a desirable recourse
because the sheer magnitude of the job of securities regulation precluded direct,
governmental controls in all aspects. Congress also recognized that self-regulatory
agencies might act with less diligence than would the Government. Its solution was
self-regulation supervised by the Government.
In the Commission's opinion, nothing has happened that demands that self-
regulation be replaced by Government regulation. It is more true now than in 1934
that the sheer magnitude of the task of regulation necessitates self-regulation. It is
obvious that for the Government to undertake complete, direct regulation of the
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SEC recommended, among other things, that Congress authorize it to perform
additional and closer oversight in four critical areas: (1) the processing of
securities transactions; (2) the rulemaking authority of self-regulatory organi-
zations; (3) the enforcement of the rules of the self-regulatory organizations,
and (4) the administration of disciplinary proceedings conducted by the self-
regulatory organizations. 2
Some of these recommendations were ultimately to come to fruition in the
Securities Acts Amendments of 1975,2 3 after four years of congressional
hearings, debates, and committee reports. A good portion of this legislative
history is devoted to congressional criticism of the SEC's role in the regulation
of brokers and dealers. Reviewing the history of the 1967-1970 crisis, a House
report observed that, while the failings of the self-regulatory organizations had
certainly contributed in a major way to the operational and financial break-
downs, the SEC itself was not without blame and had failed adequately to
regulate the brokerage industry.2" A Senate report agreed with this assessment,
finding that throughout the 1960s the SEC had adopted a passive approach
toward regulation of broker-dealers.245
securities markets would require drastic increases in money and manpower.
On the other hand it is manifest that more effective governmental action is
necessary, whether it be called governmental oversight or more governmental regu-
lation.
Id. at 214-15 (footnotes omitted).
242. Id. at 5.
243. Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975). See also generally Rowen, The Securities Acts
Amendments of 1975: A Legislative History, 3 SEc. REG. L.J. 329 (1976).
244. A House report observed:
Nor is the Commission without responsibility for the 1967-70 debacle: instead of
regulating or supervising the self-regulators, the Commission has usually negotiated
with them as if they were coordinate bodies. Losing sight of Congress' intention,
the Commission's role became much more "reserved" than "control." Since the
Commission has the ultimate responsibility for regulating the securities industry,
subject to Congressional oversight, with the exchanges and the National Association
of Securities Dealers charged with cooperating with the SEC in its regulatory
responsibility, the phrase "self-regulation" must be consigned to the past; a more
appropriate term for the relationship Congress intended is "cooperative regulation."
H.R. REP. No. 1519, supra note 190, at viii-ix. See also id. at 80-85, 91, 110, 116.
245. A Senate subcommittee observed:
However, the Subcommittee has found in its case studies that the major regulatory
problems in the securities industry have not by and large been the result of the
SEC's lack of authority but rather of its apparent lack of the will to use the powers
it already has....
The Subcommittee's case studies... indicate that in overseeing the self-regulatory
agencies the SEC has relied primarily on informal cajoling under the threat of its
"big stick," and that it has not utilized the flexible regulatory techniques available
to it under the Exchange Act. The obvious limitation of the SEC's approach is that
if a self-regulatory agency balks at the Commission's recommendations, it is faced
with the choice of using the "big stick" or doing nothing. Confronted with such a
choice, the SEC has generally done nothing.
Sacurmas Imusmy STUDY, supra note 169, at 188. See also id. at 17.
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The majority of the 1975 amendments were aimed at improving operational
and financial systems of the securities industry, and an entirely new section
15B was enacted which provides for the establishment of a self-regulatory
organization for the municipal securities industry designated the Municipal
Securities Rulemaking Board. 246 Section 15(c)(1) was amended in three respects:
(1) a proscription against an "attempt to induce" the purchase or sale of a
security through fraud was added; (2) the new phrase "otherwise than on a
national security exchange of which it is a member" was substituted for the
prior phrase "otherwise than on a national security exchange"; and (3) the
SEC's authority to define fraudulent practices under that section was expanded
to cover municipal securities dealers. 247 All three changes broaden the appli-
cability of section 15(c)(1).2m The legislative history of this particular amend-
246. Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 132 (1975); 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4 (1982 and Supp. III 1985).
247. The 1975 amendment to § 15(c) provided:
(c)(1) No broker or dealer shall make use of the mails or any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce to effect any transaction in, or to induce or
attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any security (other than commercial
paper, bankers' acceptances, or commercial bills) otherwise than on a national
securities exchange of which it is a member by means of any manipulative, deceptive,
or other fraudulent device or contrivance, and no municipal securities dealer shall
make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce to
effect any transaction in, or to induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of,
any municipal security by means of any manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent
device or contrivance. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this paragraph,
by rules and regulations define such devices or contrivances as are manipulative,
deceptive, or otherwise fraudulent.
Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 125 (1975) (emphasis shows amended language). See also S. REP.
No. 75, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 197 (1975). This has remained the text of § 15(c)(1) to date.
248. There is no direct reference in the congressional reports to Congress's intent behind the
first change in section 15(c)(1), although the addition of the phrase "attempt to induce" now
makes the section parallel to § 15(c)(2) and § 15(c)(3). See supra note 4. While there appears to
have been no controversy over this first change to § 15(c)(1), when such a change was proposed
in 1959 for § 10(b), it engendered a storm of broker-dealer protest. See discussion infra notes 387-
89 and accompanying text. As a result, the second change, § 15(c)(1) now applies to brokers and
dealers who effect transactions on exchanges of which they are not members. S. REP. No. 75,
supra note 247, at 110. The third change brought municipal securities dealers into the federal
regulatory scheme along with all other brokers and dealers, which was thought to be justified by
the SEC's exposure of a pattern of misconduct by municipal securities professionals in recent
years. Id. at 3-4, 43, 111. The last two changes were also made to § 15(c)(2) in the 1975
amendments. 89 Stat. 125-26. Very little is reported in the legislative history concerning these
amendments to § 15(c)(1). Indeed, the most comprehensive gloss on this section is contained in a
single paragraph of a Senate report:
In contrast to the expansive rulemaking functions of the Board, the SEC's direct
rulemaking with respect to transactions in municipal securities would be limited to
the control of fraudulent, manipulative, and decepive [sic] acts and practices. (Sections
15(c)(1) and (2)). This power, which the SEC arguably already has under Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act, is included in the bill to make clear that the Commission's
responsibility extends beyond sanctioning those who have engaged in manipulative
or decepive [sic] practices with respect to municipal securities and includes the
promulgation of prophylactic rules.
S. REP. No. 75, supra note 247, at 50. See also id. at 111, 197. Was the amendment introducing
the phrase "attempt to induce" a back-door way to effect the "prevent" (i.e., "prophylactic")
language which had in previous amendments been rejected? See supra note 207.
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ment of section 15(c)(1) is silent, however, on any further congressional intent
concerning civil liability under it.
Even if Congress did not speak to private liability under section 15(c)(1),
Congress was openly aware in 1975 that private civil litigation was being
brought under the 1934 Act, and was concerned about its potential impact on
SEC enforcement efforts. Specifically, Congress was concerned that when SEC
enforcement actions were consolidated in multidistrict litigation with private
actions, delay might ensue:
which is potentially damaging to the public interest in securing prompt
relief from illegal practices and preventing such practices in the future.
Private plaintiffs seeking only money damages lack the same incentive to
hasten pretrial proceedings which the Commission is required to have. The
countervailing factors-conservation of work and expense by the courts
and the litigants, their counsel, and witnesses-would be well served by
combining related private suits whenever appropriate and allowing the
Commission's public action to proceed unfettered by them.Y9
Congress's solution was to amend section 21 of the Exchange Act by adding
a new subsection (g) prohibiting consolidation of SEC injunctive actions with
private actions absent the SEC's consent.m While certainly this amendment
to section 21 does not constitute direct evidence of congressional intent
concerning section 15(c)(1), it seems to suggest a favorable congressional
attitude in 1975 toward private litigation in general under the Exchange Act.
Rather than restrict or limit such private litigation, Congress chose simply to
prohibit its consolidation with public (SEC) actions, absent SEC consent.2'
h. Conclusions from the Legislative History
The history of the amendments to section 15 evidences a continual con-
gressional effort to create a securities market in which the public can have
confidence. In particular, many of these amendments have been designed to
raise the standards of professional conduct by brokers and dealers through
249. S. REP. No. 75, supra note 247, at 77. See also H.R. REP. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
102 (1975); 121 CoNG. REc. 11,766-67, 15,849 (1975).
250. Subsection (g) to § 21 provided that:
no action for equitable relief instituted by the Commission pursuant to the securities
laws shall be consolidated or coordinated with other actions not brought by the
Commission, even though such other actions may involve common questions of fact,
unless such consolidation is consented to by the Commission.
Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 155 (1975); 15 U.S.C. § 78u(g) (1982).
251. The only other amendments to § 15(c) after 1975 are not directly relevant to this Article.
For the sake of completeness, however, the reader is advised that § 15(c)(4) was amended in 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984), and that § 15(c)(3) was amended in 1986 to exclude
government securities brokers and dealers, Pub. L. No. 99-571, 100 Stat. 3218 (1986). By the 1986
amendment, an entirely new § 15C governing government securities brokers and dealers was
enacted. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78o-5 (West Supp. 1987).
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"cooperative regulation" by the SEC and the NASD.2 Enumeration of a
multitude of broker-dealer practices which are injurious to the public interest
is a constant theme throughout the legislative history.
Only once during the legislative history did the question of a broker-dealer's
civil liability to investors under section 15(c) arise directly. The hearings on
the Maloney Act in 1938 evidence the concern of broker-dealers over the
nature and extent of their civil liability under section 15(c), and the amendments
enacted in 1938 illustrate the congressional response to those concerns. In
particular, Congress limited civil liability under section 15(c)(1) by enacting a
limitations period for the bringing of lawsuits under that section, which
limitations period is identical to the express liability provisions of sections 9(e)
and 18(c). In addition, Congress expressly disallowed private lawsuits to void
a contract in violation of sections 15(c)(2) and 15(c)(3). Enacting these limi-
tations on civil liability surely must imply an intent to permit civil liability,
subject to those limitations.
Neither section 15(c) nor section 29(b) expressly states that a civil lawsuit is
permitted, but certainly the witnesses in 1938 assumed that civil liability existed
under these provisions. Moreover, not a single congressional witness or rep-
resentative, nor anything in the reports, contradicted the witnesses' assumption
that civil liability for a violation of section 15(c) was permissible under the
Act. As the Supreme Court observed in another case involving the interpre-
tation of legislative history: "Although the transcript of the House Committee
hearings does not indicate that any Committee member voiced explicit affir-
mative agreement with this interpretation, it is surely most unlikely that the
members of the Committee would have stood mute if they had disagreed with
it.,,2S3
Since 1938, Congress has not again addressed the issue of civil liability
under section 15(c)(1), although it has extensively revised section 15 and
enacted new sections 15A, 15B, and 15C governing broker-dealer conduct.
These revisions are largely aimed at improving the qualifications and compe-
tence of brokers and dealers, ensuring their financial responsibility, providing
safeguards in the event of financial disaster, and generally improving the way
brokers and dealers do business both on the exchanges and in the OTC market.
These amendments unquestionably extend the authority of the SEC and the
self-regulatory organizations over brokers and dealers. These extensions of
power to the SEC and the self-regulatory organizations are in no way incon-
252. For a fuller discussion of the evolution of the concept of "cooperative regulation" than
can be provided by this Article, see, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 123, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 48-49 (1975);
H.R. REP. No. 1519, supra note 190, at 79-116; SEcurrr=s INDusTRY STUDY, supra note 169, at
137-48.
253. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 460
(1974).
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sistent with an intent to continue to allow private enforcement through civil
litigation. Indeed, from the congressional silence since 1938 on the issue of
civil liability amidst all these extensive new regulatory measures, one may
conclude that the role of private litigation as it was contemplated in 1938
remains intact.
This conclusion is supported by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Curran.2-4 In that case the Court stated that it must examine the
"contemporary legal context"' 55 of a given statute in determining congressional
intent to allow (or disallow) a private right of action under it.26 At issue in
Curran was the existence of implied private rights under the Commodity
Exchange Act (CEA).3 The CEA had been extensively amended in 1974.
Prior to these amendments, the lower federal courts had "routinely and
consistently"2 18 implied private rights under the CEA. In the context of such
federal judicial interpretation of the CEA, said the Court, when Congress re-
enacted without amendment those provisions under which a private remedy
had been implied, Congress must have intended to "preserve that remedy."2 9
The logic of Curran applies directly to the discernment of congressional
intent concerning section 15(c)(1). Although recent cases have tended to refuse
to imply a private remedym certainly at the time of the enactment of the
Exchange Act and the amendments of 1936 and 1938, the accepted approach
among federal courts was generally to imply private remedies from federal
statutes upon the relatively minimal showing that the statute was intended to
protect persons like the plaintiff.261 Specifically, until the post-Cort era, the
lower federal courts "routinely and consistently" either assumed without
deciding, or actually decided, that there was an implied private remedy under
section 15(c)(1).2 As the foregoing discussion of the legislative history dem-
onstrates, Congress had several significant opportunities-particularly in 1964
254. 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
255. Id. at 379, 381.
256. Id. at 378-79. The Court explained:
[We must examine Congress' perception of the law that it was shaping or reshaping.
When Congress enacts new legislation, the question is whether Congress intended to
create a private remedy as a supplement to the express enforcement provisions of
the statute. When Congress acts in a statutory context in which an implied private
remedy has already been recognized by the courts, however, the inquiry is logically
different. Congress need not have intended to create a new remedy since one already
existed; the question is whether Congress intended to preserve the pre-existing remedy.
Id.
257. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982).
258. Curran, 456 U.S. at 379.
259. Id. at 381-82.
260. See supra note 5, paragraph (b).
261. See supra notes 69-82 and accompanying text.
262. See supra note 5, paragraph (a).
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and 19752 -to overturn legislatively the lower federal courts' interpretation
of section 15(c)(1). Despite these opportunities, Congress did not disturb these
judicial interpretations of section 15(c)(1). Indeed, the 1975 amendments
evidenced a clear congressional awareness that private suits were being brought
under the securities acts, and effected a legislative solution to allow such suits
to complement, and not to hinder, SEC injunctive actions.2 Under the Curran
Court's reasoning, "the fact that a comprehensive reexamination and signifi-
cant amendment of the [federal securities laws] left intact the statutory
provisions under which the federal courts had implied a cause of action is
itself evidence that Congress affirmatively intended to preserve that remedy."'
t
D. Effectuation of Congressional Purpose: Would the Private
Remedy Support the Substantive Right?
The third Cort factor inquires into whether it is "consistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the
plaintiff. '"2 6 J. I. Case Co. v. Borak26 is a leading case using analysis along
this line.m The issue in Borak was whether to imply a private right of action
for violation of section 14(a) of the 1934 Act. The Supreme Court swiftly
disposed of that issue by stating that it was "clear that private parties have a
right under § 27 to bring suit for violation of § 14(a) of the Act." Having
summarily concluded that a private right of action existed, the Court spent
the remainder of its unanimous opinion on ascertaining the scope of that
right: whether it was limited to direct (and not derivative) causes of action,
and whether the remedy the Court may afford was limited to declaratory
relief. In deciding against these limitations on the private right of action, the
Court looked to the purpose of section 14(a), and asked whether the requested
263. The Supreme Court has called the 1975 amendments "the most substantial and significant
revision of this country's Federal securities laws since the passage of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934." Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1983) (quoting from the
congressional hearings on the amendments).
264. See supra notes 249-51 and accompanying text.
265. Curran, 456 U.S. at 381-82. In Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, the Supreme Court
upheld the Curran analysis in the context of an implied remedy under § 10(b) of the Exchange
Act. 459 U.S. 375 (1983). The Court stated:
When Congress acted [in the 1975 amendments to the Exchange Act], federal courts
had consistently and routinely permitted a plaintiff to proceed under § 10(b) even
where express remedies under § 11 or other provisions were available. In light of
this well-established judicial interpretation, Congress' decision to leave § 10(b) intact
suggests that Congress ratified the cumulative nature of the § 10(b) action.
Id. at 385-86 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). See also Thompson v. Thompson, 108 S. Ct.
513, 516-17 (1988) (reaffirming the appropriateness of Curran's analysis of the "context" of
Congress's legislative enactments).
266. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
267. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
268. Cort, 422 U.S. at 84.
269. Borak, 377 U.S. at 430-31. But see supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
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forms of relief would further the broad remedial purposes of that section.
The Court concluded that disallowance of derivative actions would "be
tantamount to a denial of the private relief," and that "the possibility of civil
damages or injunctive relief serves as a most effective weapon in the enforce-
ment of the proxy requirements." 270 The Court thus declared it was the "duty"
of courts to provide those remedies (necessarily including private rights of
action) that would further congressional purposes in enacting the statute.21
Justice Powell called Borak "unprecedented," "incomprehensible," and
"aberrant."m72 Although Borak has never been overruled, the Supreme Court
has on occasion said that under its more recent lines of analysis, it now applies
a "stricter standard" 2 3 than the one applied in Borak. These attempts to
discredit Borak are curious, for Borak was not without precedent,274 nor has
its congressional-purposes approach been abandoned by the Supreme Court
in later cases decided before and after Cort.275 Moreover, the suggestion that
270. Id. at 432. The Court said:
To hold that derivative actions are not within the sweep of the section would
therefore be tantamount to a denial of private relief. Private enforcement of the
proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to Commission action. As in antitrust
treble damage litigation, the possibility of civil damages or injunctive relief serves
as a most effective weapon in the enforcement of the proxy requirements....
We, therefore, believe that under the circumstances here it is the duty of the
courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the
congressional purpose.
Id. at 432-33.
271. Id. at 433.
272. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 735-36 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
273. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979).
274. See, e.g., Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, 371 U.S. 84, 88 (1962) ("Moreover,
the allowance of misrouting actions would have a healthy deterrent effect upon the utilization of
misrouting practices in the motor carrier field, which, in turn, would minimize 'cease and desist'
proceedings before the Commission."). The Borak approach seems squarely in accord with
traditional principles of statutory construction which mandate construing a statute in light of
overall congressional purposes. See SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51
(1943) (see supra note 119).
275. For cases after Borak and before Cort which use, at least in part, the Borak congressional-
purposes approach to determine whether to imply a federal private right of action by ascertaining
whether a private civil suit would or would not advance Congress's overall goals in enacting a
statute, see, e.g., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 421, 423 (1975);
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 463 (1974);
Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1969); Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United
States, 389 U.S. 191, 204 (1967); Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 138-40 (1964). For example,
in Barbour, the Court stated:
[Ilt is clear that the overall structure and purpose of the SIPC scheme are incom-
patible with such an implied right.
Congress' primary purpose in enacting the SIPA and creating the SIPC was, of
course, the protection of investors. It does not follow, however, that an implied
right of action by investors who deem themselves to be in need of the Act's
protection, is either necessary to or indeed capable of furthering that purpose....
... These consequences [of allowing a private lawsuit] are too grave, and when
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the Borak approach is not "strict"-that it somehow inappropriately invites
the conclusion to imply a private remedy-is unwarranted in light of numerous
later cases (including Cort itself) in which the Court, adopting the Borak
approach, held that an implied remedy would not further congressional
purposes.
276
unnecessary, too inimical to the purposes of the Act, for the Court to impute to
Congress an intent to grant every member of the investing public control over their
occurrence.
421 U.S. at 412-23. Similarly, in National R.R. Passenger Corp., the Court stated:
Since suits could be brought in any district through which Amtrak trains pass and
since there would be a myriad of possible plaintiffs, the potential would exist for a
barrage of lawsuits that, either individually or collectively, could frustrate or severely
delay any proposed passenger train discontinuance.... This would completely
undercut the efficient apparatus that Congress sought to provide for Amtrak to use
in the "paring of uneconomic routes."
414 U.S. at 463. Likewise, in Allen, the Court said:
The achievement of the [Voting Rights] Act's laudable goal could be severely
hampered, however, if each citizen were required to depend solely on litigation
instituted at the discretion of the Attorney General.... It is consistent with the
broad purpose of the Act to allow the individual citizen standing to insure that his
city or county government complies with the § 5 approval requirements.
393 U.S. at 556-57 (footnotes omitted). Finally, in Wyandotte, the Supreme Court stated:
Denial of such a remedy [civil action for damages] to the United States would
permit the result, extraordinary in our jurisprudence, of a wrong-doer shifting
responsibility for the consequences of his negligence onto his victim.... We do not
believe that Congress intended to withhold from the Government a remedy that
ensures the full effectiveness of the Act.
389 U.S. at 204.
For such cases after Cort, see Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299,
310-11 (1985) (in pari deliclo defense narrowly construed in securities litigation involving implied
causes of action); Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 539-41 (1984); Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386-87 (1983); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S.
677, 703 (1979) (under third Cort factor, when a private "remedy is necessary or at least helpful
to the accomplishment of the statutory purpose, the Court is decidedly receptive to its implication
under the statute"); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 26, 39-42 (1977) ("Once we identify
the legislative purpose, we must then determine whether the creation by judicial interpretation of
the implied cause of action ... is necessary to effectuate Congress' goals."). See also cases cited
infra note 276.
276. Cort, 422 U.S. at 81, 84 ("[Plrotection of ordinary stockholders was at best a secondary
concern.... [I]n this instance the remedy sought would not aid the primary congressional goal."
(footnote omitted)). See also Thompson v. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. 513, 518 (1988) ("It thus is not
compatible with the purpose and context of the [Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980] to
infer a private cause of action."); U1 niversities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 782-83
(1981) ("To imply a private right of action ... would destroy this careful balance [of the interests
of parties affected by the Davis-Bacon Act .... and] would undercut as well the elaborate
administrative scheme ... ."); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 317 (1979) ("Most
importantly, a private right of action under § 1905 [of the Trade Secrets Act] is not 'necessary to
make effective the congressional purpose .... ' " (citing Borak, 377 U.S. at 433)); Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 64 (1978) ("Creation of a federal cause of action for the
enforcement of rights created in Title I, however useful it might be in securing compliance with
§ 1302, plainly would be at odds with the congressional goal of protecting tribal self-government.");
Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478 (1977) ("As in Cort v. Ash, ... we are reluctant
to recognize a cause of action here to serve what is 'at best a subsidiary purpose' of the federal
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Far from novel, Borak in some respects can be viewed simply as a refinement
of the Rigsby approachYm In both Rigsby and Borak, the focus of judicial
inquiry is on general congressional intent in enacting any given piece of
legislation, rather than on the specific congressional intent to allow private
lawsuits. Under the Rigsby approach, the Court would ask whether Congress
intended to protect a certain class of individuals of which the injured plaintiff
was a member. If the answer were yes, then the Court could automatically
allow appropriate redress in a private lawsuit, absent some clear evidence of
congressional intent to disallow such private lawsuits. In Borak, the Court
asked whether a private lawsuit would further congressional purposes in
enacting the legislation, and of necessity inquired as to what those purposes
were. The Borak Court concluded, in effect, that the congressional purpose
in enacting the legislation was to protect a certain class of individuals of which
the injured plaintiff was a member, and that allowance of a private lawsuit
would further that protective purpose.278
Thus, the third Cort factor-the Borak approach-can be seen as a corollary
to the first Cort factor, the Rigsby approach. Under Rigsby, upon a finding
that Congress intended to protect the plaintiff, the Court would allow a private
remedy unless it discerned a contrary legislative intent. Borak suggests the way
in which such contrary intent may be discerned: namely, when the allowance
of a private remedy would be inconsistent in the overall legislative scheme.
legislation."); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 41 (1977) ("What we have said thus far
suggests that, unlike J. L Case Co. v. Borak, supra, judicially creating a damages action in favor
of Chris-Craft is unnecessary to ensure the fulfillment of Congress' purposes in adopting the
Williams Act."); Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 421-23 (1975);
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 461-64 (1974).
277. For a discussion of Rigsby, see supra notes 69-82 and accompanying text. The common-
law merger of the Rigsby approach (with its inquiry into whether plaintiff was a member of the
class for whose "especial benefit" the statute was enacted) with the Borak approach is aptly
illustrated in § 874A of the Second Restatement of Torts:
When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by proscribing or requiring
certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the violation, the court
may, if it determines that the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of the purpose
of the legislation and needed to assure the effectiveness of the provision, accord to
an injured member of the class a right of action, using a suitable existing tort action
or a new cause of action analogous to an existing tort action.
REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 874A (1979). Even pre-Cort commentators observed the
interrelationship between an inquiry into congressional purposes of the legislation and an inquiry
into the class of beneficiaries the legislation was intended to protect. See, e.g., Note, The
Phenomenon of Implied Private Actions Under Federal Statutes: Judicial Insight, Legislative
Oversight or Legislation by the Judiciary?, 43 FoRDHTA L. Ray. 441, 446-47 (1974). Cf. Stem v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 603 F.2d 1073, 1075-80 (4th Cir. 1979); Serzysko v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74, 85-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969).
278. Reminiscent of the Rigsby maxim, Ubi jus, ibi remedium, the Borak Court declared:
"While this language [of § 14(a)] makes no specific reference to a private right of action, among
its chief purposes is 'the protection of investors,' which certainly implies the availability of judicial
relief where necessary to achieve that result." 377 U.S. at 432.
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Obviously, whether an implied remedy would further or be consistent with
congressional purposes depends upon what those congressional purposes are.
When the Court under the first Cort factor finds a congressional intent or
purpose to benefit or protect the class of which the plaintiff was a member,
it often may be a reasonable conclusion that allowance of private lawsuits to
enforce the rights created by the legislation will further that intent or purpose
by more completely offering such protection than the agency charged with
enforcement alone can offer.v79 It is not, however, a necessary conclusion.?
Properly interpreted, Borak, or the third Cort factor, does not swing open
the courthouse doors in an invitation for all potential plaintiffs to litigate their
injuries under every federal statute. The third Cort factor adopts the Borak
approach of determining underlying congressional purposes. Until either Cort
or Borak is overruled or discarded, a prudent observer must still ask whether
the third factor is met in any case considering the implication of a private
right of action. In this regard one may now ask: Is it consistent with the
overall scheme of the 1934 Act to imply a private right of action under section
15(c)(1)? Will such an implied remedy further the goals of the 1934 Act or
of that particular section?
This Article has already established that the overall goal of the 1934 Act
was to protect all securities investors, and that the specific goal of section
15(c)(1) was to protect investors from fraud by broker-dealers. 2 ' Are these
goals furthered by allowing the defrauded customers to sue? Certainly the
Borak Court, in light of its finding that civil litigation provided a "most
effective weapon in the enforcement- of the proxy requirements"' M under
section 14(a) of the 1934 Act, would have readily concluded that a private
remedy under section 15(c)(1) would further that section's purpose of protecting
investors from fraud. Indeed, in cases since Cort involving implied remedies
for securities laws violations, the Court has expressly and unanimously con-
cluded that implication of private rights of action (at least under section 10(b))
does further the "broad remedial purposes" of the Exchange Act.m The
279. See, e.g., Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 804 (5th Cir. 1970) ("Moreover, the
Commission has neither the manpower nor the time that completely effective enforcement of the
securities laws by it alone would require."); Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 244-45 (2d Cir.)
(Clark, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944); Moholt v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
478 F. Supp. 451, 453 (D.D.C. 1979).
280. For numerous cases in which the Supreme Court found that a private right of action
would frustrate or otherwise be incompatible with the overall congressional goals of the legislation,
see supra note 276. For an argument that implied private rights of action under the securities acts
do not further the congressional goals of those acts, see Frankel, supra note 64, at 570-85. See
also Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1147-48 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J.,
dissenting) (implication of private right under § 7(c) of 1934 Act would not further purpose of
that section, whereas implication of private rights under antifraud provisions is appropriate), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971).
281. See supra notes 83-99 and accompanying text.
282. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
283. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386-87 (1983).
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Court has also viewed private enforcement actions favorably as a way to
maximize deterrence of violations of the securities laws.2m Citing Borak, the
Supreme Court in Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp. 5  observed: "[We] have
not hesitated to recognize the power of federal courts to fashion private
remedies for securities laws violations when to do so is consistent with the
legislative scheme and necessary for the protection of investors as a supplement
to enforcement by the Securities and Exchange Commission."'- 6 Again citing
Borak, the Supreme Court more recently observed in Bateman Eichler, Hill
Richards, Inc. v. Berner.28 "Moreover, we repeatedly have emphasized that
implied private actions provide 'a most effective weapon in the enforcement'
of the securities laws and are 'a necessary supplement to Commission ac-
tion.' ,28
Explicit in Borak is the recognition that the SEC *ould not possibly prosecute
all proxy violations under the 1934 Act. 9 More recently, the SEC has
acknowledged that it cannot prosecute all violations of the insider-trading laws
involving false tipping under the 1934 Act, and it has openly acknowledged
that private actions are a very useful adjunct to SEC enforcement actions29g
There is certainly no reason to suppose that the SEC has more time and
resources to handle every instance of broker-dealer fraud; indeed, there is
evidence that it has even less inclination to do so.29' Given the inability of the
agency charged with the overall enforcement of the Exchange Act to police
every violation of its antifraud provisions, as well as its inability to compensate
investors for their losses in any event, m it seems that private suits by investors
284. See Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 315-19 (1985). See also
Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422, 427 (2d Cir.) ("[W]e think a denial of a private right of
action to those for whose ultimate protection the legislation is intended leaves legislation highly
publicized as in the public interest in fact sadly wanting, and even delusive, to that end."), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944); Moholt v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 451, 453
(D.D.C. 1979) ("Only through private enforcement actions can the rules requiring disclosure or
abstention become the controlling standard of the securities market place.").
285. 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
286. Id. at 62.
287. 472 U.S. 299 (1985).
288. Id. at 310.
289. 377 U.S. at 432-33.
290. One of the reasons the Court in Bateman Eichler denied the in pari delicto defense in
false tipping litigation was the inability of the SEC alone to discover and prosecute all such
offenses and the consequent assistance that private litigation served to give the SEC. 472 U.S.
at 315-16.
291. TWinnmm CmrTuxy Fun REPoRT, ABusE ON WALL SaRT: CoNFucTs oF INTES IN
TnE SECuRT M xmrs 477 (1980) ("William J. Casey, while chairman of the SEC observed,
'The inside information thing is a lot more important than conflicts [of interest in broker-dealer
activities]. Conflicts is mostly nickels and dimes; information is ten, twenty, thirty percent [of the
work of the Commission].' ").
292. See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 438
F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970). In Dolgow, the district court stated:
[rihe Commission does not seek to make investors whole; it seeks merely to deter
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under section 15(c)(1) would afford a "necessary supplement" to SEC en-
forcement efforts.293 Certainly Congress has contemplated that private suits
under the 1934 Act continue to provide effective enforcement. To the extent
such private litigation could possibly hinder the effectiveness of SEC enforce-
ment efforts, Congress in 1975 acted solely to forbid the consolidation of
private actions with SEC actions absent SEC consent to the consolidation.
Significantly, in 1975 Congress did not otherwise restrict private actions under
the 1934 Act.
E. A Remedy Under State Law or Federal Law?
The fourth Cort factor used to determine whether a federal court should
imply a private right of action under a federal statute is whether such a right
is one "traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern
of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action
based solely on federal law." 295 Meeting this Cort factor is relatively easy
under the federal securities acts. However, one must question whether the
Supreme Court will continue to acknowledge the viability of this factor.
Borak is cited in Cort as precedent for this fourth factor, 296 and indeed the
Borak Court did suggest that the possible inadequacy of state securities law
remedies supported the appropriateness of finding a federal cause of action
for violation of the federal proxy regulations. 297 Since Cort, the Supreme
Court has acknowledged that the federal securities laws were intended, in large
part, to correct inadequacies in traditional state law remedies, especially for
cases involving fraud. 298 Moreover, the Supreme Court has expressly refused
to apply state common-law concepts to implied causes of action under the
violations by making violations unprofitable.... [None of the measures available
to the Commission under the Securities Act or the Securities Exchange Act is
designed to provide compensation to injured investors for the damages they have
suffered ....
43 F.R.D. at 483 (emphasis omitted).
293. The inability of the agency charged with the enforcement of the statute in question to
reach all the violations of the statute has been given weight by the Supreme Court in determining
to permit a private remedy to supplement the agency's enforcement actions. See, e.g., Bateman
Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Bemer, 472 U.S. 299, 315-16 (1985); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections,
393 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1969).
294. See supra notes 249-50 and accompanying text.
295. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
296. Id.
297. Borak, 377 U.S. at 434-35.
298. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 388-89 (1983). In Huddleston, the
Supreme Court stated: "Moreover, the antifraud provisions of the securities laws are not coextensive
with common law doctrines of fraud. Indeed, an important purpose of the federal securities
statutes was to rectify perceived deficiencies in the available common law protections by establishing
higher standards of conduct in the securities industry." Id. (citation omitted).
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federal securities acts where to do so would " 'seriously hinder rather than
aid the real purpose' of the securities laws." 2"
The legislative history of the 1934 Act demonstrates that the antifraud
provisions of the Act were designed to displace the state common-law actions
for fraud. As one senator pointed out to a witness who urged that fraud was
best left to the common law: "You do know that there have been a great
many frauds and impositions practiced upon the investor ... ? And the
common law has not protected against those things?" 3® The legislative reports
also recognized the failure of the stock exchanges to control fraud and abuses
by their members, as well as the failure of state laws to provide adequate
remedies to investors who were victims of such activities. 30 1 Indeed, the entire
1934 Act is testimony to the lack of adequate securities regulation as performed
by the states and the stock exchanges before that date.
In light of the Supreme Court's acknowledgement of the inadequacies of
state law in combatting securities fraud, and the evidence of congressional
dissatisfaction with state common-law remedies for fraud at the time of the
1934 Act's enactment, application of the fourth Cort factor strongly supports
the implication of a private remedy under section 15(c)(1). Securities fraud is
manifestly not an area of law "traditionally relegated to state law," but rather
is one in which the federal courts have accumulated considerable experience
and expertise.
The significance or effect of demonstrating the federal nature of the right,
and thereby satisfying the fourth Cort factor, is questionable under recent
cases, however. In some cases, the Court has just ignored this fourth Cort
factor. 2 In others, the Court has given little weight to, or even squarely
refused to reach, this factor, having found the implication issue disposed of
after consideration of the other factors. 03 About the most that can be said
about the fourth factor is that the Court has not abandoned it altogether, but
continues, in a rather nominal way, to apply it both in cases implying0 4 and
in cases refusing to imply 05 private rights of action. In no case does consid-
eration of the fourth factor seem to be given decisive weight.
299. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985) (quoting A. C.
Frost & Co. v. Coeur d'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38, 43 (1941)).
300. Senate Hearings on S. Res. 84, supra note 85, at 7229.
301. S. REP. No. 792, supra note 87, at 4-5, 12-13; H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 87, at 3-
5 (1934).
302. E.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13-
18 (1981); Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639-40 (1981); Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-25 (1979).
303. E.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth., 453 U.S. at 13-18; Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at
639-40; Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc., 444 U.S. at 15-25. See also, e.g., Massachusetts
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 145 (1985); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287,
298 (1981); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979).
304. E.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 708-09 (1979).
305. Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 541 (1984); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
430 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1977); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478 (1977).
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II. A COMPARISON OF SECTION 10(b) AND SECTION 15(c)(1)
Assuming, in light of the discussion so far, that a private cause of action
may be implied under section 15(c)(1), what would it look like? An exhaustive
analysis of the possible contours of a section 15(c)(1) claim is beyond the
scope of this Article. Nonetheless, it is appropriate at this point to indicate
some directions that such an analysis might take in the future. This author
does not believe, unlike some courts, that the elements of a section 15(c)(1)
claim would be coextensive with those of a section 10(b) claim?.6 What follows
are a few open questions for distinguishing a claim for fraud under section
15(c)(1) from one under section 10(b).
A. General Comparison
First and foremost, how should "manipulative, deceptive, or other fraud-
ulent device or contrivance ' 307 be interpreted under section 15(c)(1)? Should
these terms have the same definitions as they seem to have under the Supreme
Court's recent restrictive interpretations of section 10(b)?1 Or should "fraud"' 9
be a more flexible, broader concept when applied to brokers and dealers?
This author believes that as a general proposition, "fraud" should be more
liberally interpreted when applied to the conduct of brokers and dealers. This
liberal interpretation is justified by three considerations. First, the legislative
history of the securities acts in general, and of section 15(c)(1) in particular,
supports a broader interpretation. 310 Second, the common law itself recognizes
a more liberal interpretation of fraud concepts as they are applied to fiduci-
aries. " ' Third, the Supreme Court has recognized the appropriateness of
306. See, e.g., Roberts v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 653 F. Supp. 406, 414 (D.
Mass. 1986); Prestera v. Shearson Lehman Bros., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 92,884, at 94,290 (D. Mass. 1986);'Bosio v. Norbay Sec., Inc., 599 F. Supp. 1563, 1567
(E.D.N.Y. 1985); Speck v. Oppenheimer & Co., [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 91,461, at 98,311 n.6 (W.D. Mo. 1984); Amunrud v. Taurus Drilling Ltd., [1983-1984
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,649, at 97,596 (D. Mont. 1983); Pierson v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 497, 503 (C.D. II1. 1982); Darvin v. Bache Halsey Stuart
Shields, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 460, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394
F. Supp. 946, 956 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
307. See supra note 4.
308. See supra text accompanying notes 12-16.
309. Interestingly, "fraud" itself is not expressly proscribed under § 10(b). Section 10(b) makes
it unlawful to employ any "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in contravention of
SEC rules and regulations. It is only in Rule lOb-5(a) and (c) that the direct proscription against
fraud appears. See supra note 3. In contrast, § 15(c)(1) itself flatly prohibits brokers and dealers
from effecting securities transactions by means of "any manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent
device or contrivance" (emphasis added). See supra note 4. Nevertheless, the Court has described
§ 10(b) as a "catchall clause to prevent fraudulent practices." Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 226 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202, 206 (1976).
310. See infra text accompanying notes 313-16.
311. See infra text accompanying notes 317-22. See generally Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CA~ln.
L. R-v. 795 (1983); Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CAuw. L. R-v. 539 (1949).
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relaxing the requirements of a fraud claim against fiduciaries in other securities
contexts.
312
The legislative history from 1934 amply demonstrates a major congressional
concern with fraud committed specifically by broker-dealers: "The manipula-
tive practices that have so stigmatized the stock market in recent years revolve
largely around the broker and the dealer."3 13 In enacting section 15, Congress
was well aware that brokers stood in a fiduciary relationship to their cus-
tomers.1 4 Indeed, a very large portion of the 1934 hearings was devoted to
congressional concern and debate over the conflicts of interest inherent in the
combination of the roles of broker (as agent acting for others' accounts) and
dealer (as principal acting for his or her own account) in a single person or
firm, and over the proposal to enforce a segregation of the roles." 5 In amending
312. See infra text accompanying notes 323-28.
313. 78 CoNG. REC. 7862 (1934) (statement of Rep. Lea).
314. During the congressional hearings, numerous witnesses acknowledged the fiduciary nature
of the broker-customer relationship. See, e.g., House Hearings on H.R. 7852, supra note 85, at
123, 313, 337-38, 419-20, 443, 466-67; Senate Hearings on S. Res. 84, supra note 85, at 6772.
The 1934 Act can be viewed as a deliberate effort to "federalize" the concept of fiduciary duty
in the context of the securities industry:
If investor confidence is to come back to the benefit of exchanges and corporations
alike, the law must advance. As a complex society so diffuses and differentiates the
financial interests of the ordinary citizen that he has to trust others and cannot
personally watch the managers of all his interests as one horse trader watches
another, it becomes a condition of the very stability of that society that its rules of
law and of business practice recognize and protect that ordinary citizen's dependent
position. Unless constant extension of the legal conception of a fiduciary relation-
ship-a guarantee of "straight shooting"-supports the constant extension of mutual
confidence which is the foundation of a maturing and complicated economic system,
easy liquidity of the resources in which wealth is invested is a danger rather than a
prop to the stability of that system. When everything everyone owns can be sold at
once, there must be confidence not to sell. Just in proportion as it becomes more
liquid and complicated, an economic system must become more moderate, more
honest, and more justifiably self-trusting....
Speculation, manipulation, faulty credit control, investors' ignorance, and disregard
of trust relationships by those whom the law should regard as fiduciaries, are all a
single seamless web. No one of these evils can be isolated for cure of itself alone.
H.R. Rm. No. 1383, supra note 87, at 5-6.
315. As Duncan U. Fletcher, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency,
observed during the hearings: "That seems to be the question here, whether one man can act for
others in 1 minute and then act for himself at the same time or in the next minute." Senate
Hearings on S. Res. 84, supra note 85, at 6793. As Ferdinand Pecora, counsel to the Senate
Committee, phrased the question to one witness: "Don't you recognize that in such a situation a
broker who is also a dealer is placed under the temptation of recommending transactions in
securities in which that broker as dealer is also primarily interested?" Id. at 6923. As originally
drafted, § 11 made it unlawful for a broker to act as a dealer in any securities transaction. This
proposed segregation of functions caused a storm of protest from the broker-dealer industry. As
a principal drafter, Mr. Thomas Corcoran, observed: "Now this bill provides for the kind of
segregation [of broker and dealer functions] against which the stock exchange will put up the
strongest argument, from their point of view, that you will hear down here [at the congressional
hearings]." House Hearings on H.R. 7852, supra note 85, at 123. See also infra notes 372-78 and
accompanying text.
19881
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
section 15, Congress recognized that constant policing was required to ensure
adherence by broker-dealers to their fiduciary obligations. 31 6
In addition, the common-law courts have long construed the scope of fraud
more broadly with respect to fiduciaries than with respect to parties otherwise
dealing at arm's length.3 17 Such a relationship of trust and confidence has
given rise to legal rules of conduct requiring high ethical conduct and "any
breach of this higher standard was sometimes called constructive fraud or
equitable fraud. 318 Constructive fraud "has been defined as an act which the
law declares fraudulent without inquiry into its motive."3 19 This common-law
doctrine has long been applied by equity courts to condemn conduct that
constituted a breach of fiduciary duty, but not an actual or intentional fraud.32
The doctrine allows (and even requires) courts to set aside as fraudulent those
transactions which would otherwise have not been actionable in the absence
of a fiduciary or confidential relationship.3 2 That all the elements of actual
316. In 1936 at the direction of Congress, the SEC submitted a lengthy report discussing, inter
alia, the fiduciary obligations of broker-dealers to their customers and the actual potential and
abuses of this relationship. Sactrrrs AND EXCHANGE CommissIoN, REPORT ON Tim FAsmur
AND AnvLIsAmn OF Tm CoMPLTmE SEGmEaATION OF THE FUNcTONS oF DEALER AND BROKER
PURSUANT TO SECTION ll(E) OF ma SEcurmEs ExcHArN; AcT oF 1934 at XIV-XV, 4-5, 8-10,
75-77, 109, 113-14 (1936) [hereinafter SEC REPORT ON BRoI -DEAiER SEGREGATIoN]. The Report
stated that the rules promulgated by the SEC under § 15 "constituted an attempt to render more
specific some of the fiduciary obligations which a broker owes to his customer," id. at 79, and
that the SEC regarded itself as having a "continuing duty" to find means to reduce "the conflict
of interest between the broker-dealer and his customer and the attending opportunities provocative
of abuse of the fiduciary relationship," id. at 113. That conflicts of interest in the brokerage
industry have continued to be a troublesome issue to Congress was evidenced in the legislative
history to the 1975 amendments. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 75, supra note 247, at 63-65.
317. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMmrs 679-85 (1973).
318. Id. at 679 (characterizing the term "constructive fraud" as misleading). See also 1 J.
STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 350 (14th ed. 1918). Story states:
The use of the phrase "constructive fraud" has been severely criticized by the courts
and law-writers as being misleading and unscientific, but it has become so fixed in
the literature and terminology of the law that any attempt to substitute a more
fitting name to the thing to which it is applied would result in confusion.
Id.
319. 1 J. STORY, supra note 318, at 350.
320. 3 J. PoamaoY, A TREATISE ON EQUrYJtrISPRUDENcE 625-26, 788-92 (5th ed. 1941); 1 J.
STORY, supra note 318, at 349-51, 404-06.
321. 3 J. PomERoy, supra note 320, at 792; 1 J. STORY, supra note 318, at 405. The Supreme
Court long ago and in the common-law tradition acknowledged the necessity for the law's
intervention in and different treatment of fiduciary relationships. In the context of the proscription
of an agent's purchasing on his own account property which he is required to sell for his principal,
the Supreme Court observed:
The general rule stands upon our great moral obligation to refrain from placing
ourselves in relations which ordinarily excite a conflict between self-interest and
integrity. It restrains all agents, public and private; but the value of the prohibition
is most felt, and its application is more frequent, in the private relations in which
the vendor and purchaser may stand towards each other.... In this conflict of
interest, the law wisely interposes. It acts not on the possibility, that, in some cases,
the sense of that duty may prevail over the motives of self-interest, but it provides
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fraud are not necessary to prove a claim of constructive fraud for breach of
fiduciary duty is well established under the common law.3"
In the context of the securities laws, the Supreme Court has in effect
incorporated this common-law distinction between actual fraud and construc-
tive fraud in its interpretation of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. The
issue in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.323 was whether Congress
intended "fraud" under the 1940 Act to be interpreted in a "technical sense"
requiring the SEC to prove both the defendant investment advisers' intent to
injure, as well as actual injury to, their clients, or whether Congress intended
a "broad remedial construction of the Act." 324 In adopting the latter inter-
pretation, the Court considered the Act's legislative history as it related both
to the Act's overall purpose to raise the standard of business ethics in the
securities industry,32 as well as to Congress's specific recognition of the
fiduciary nature of the investment advisory relationship.326 The Court then
concluded that the common-law distinctions between fraud at law and fraud
in equity were applicable to its interpretation of the antifraud provisions of
the 1940 Act, and used these distinctions to interpret the fraud proscriptions
"remedially" rather than "technically": 3v
Nor is it necessary in a suit against a fiduciary, which Congress recognized
the investment adviser to be, to establish all the elements required in a
suit against a party to an arm's-length transaction. Courts have imposed
against the probability in many cases, and the danger in all cases, that the dictates
of self-interest will exercise a predominant influence, and supersede that of duty.
Michoud v. Girod, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 503, 555 (1846).
322. For example, proof of intent to deceive is not required to make out a case of constructive
fraud. Homaday v. First Nat'l Bank of Birmingham, 259 Ala. 26, 38, 65 So. 2d 678, 687 (1952);
Lane v. Rachel, 239 Ark. 400, 405, 389 S.W.2d 621, 624 (1965); Obermaier v. Obermaier, 128
Ill. App. 3d 602, 470 N.E.2d 1047, 1051 (1984); Loucks v. McCormick, 198 Kan. 351, 424 P.2d
555, 559 (1967). The concept of "constructive fraud" has been adopted by the federal courts in
securities litigation involving broker-dealers, particularly churning cases. See, e.g., Dzenits v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168, 170-71 (10th Cir. 1974); Roche v. E.F. Hutton
& Co., 603 F. Supp. 1411, 1414-15 (M.D. Pa. 1984) (see cases cited therein). See also Langevoort,
Fraud and Deception by Securities Professionals, 61 TEx. L. REv. 1247 (1983) (discussing, inter
alia, the role of constructive fraud in assessing breaches of fiduciary duty by securities professionals).
323. 375 U.S. 180 (1963). The provision of the Investment Advisers Act at issue in the case
was § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6, which was also at issue in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc.
v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979), and is set out supra at note 137.
324. 375 U.S. at 185-86.
325. "A fundamental purpose, common to these [securities] statutes was to substitute a
philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high
standard of business ethics in the securities industry." Id. at 186.
326. The Court observed:
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 thus reflects a congressional recognition "of
the delicate fiduciary nature of an investment advisory relationship," as well as a
congressional intent to eliminate, or at least to expose, all conflicts of interest which
might incline an investment adviser--consciously or unconsciously-to render advice
which was not disinterested.
Id. at 191-92 (footnote omitted).
327. Id. at 194-95.
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on a fiduciary an affirmative duty of "utmost good faith, and full and
fair disclosure of all material facts," as well as an affirmative obligation
"to employ reasonable care to avoid misleading" his clients....
The foregoing analysis of the judicial treatment of common-law fraud
reinforces our conclusion that Congress, in empowering the courts to enjoin
any practice which operates "as a fraud or deceit" upon a client, did not
intend to require proof of intent to injure and actual injury to the client.-
Although the Court has since refused to turn every breach of fiduciary duty
into fraud in violation of section 10(b), 29 given the fact that there has been
long and consistent recognition by Congress, the courts, and the SEC of the
fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary status of brokers and dealers, 3 °10 and given the fact
that one of the principal goals of the 1934 Act was specifically to regulate
the conduct of broker-dealers, 3 ' there is good reason to interpret the proscrip-
tion against the use of "manipulative, deceptive, and other fraudulent devices
or contrivances" by broker-dealers more broadly than the similar proscription
against such conduct by "any person" under section 10(b). The Supreme
Court has repeatedly observed that the securities acts were "enacted for the
purpose of avoiding frauds," and as such are to be construed "not technically
and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate [their] remedial purposes. 332 That
the Exchange Act is "remedial legislation" and as such is to be construed
broadly is an old yet recurrent and still valid theme.3 3
B. Defendant's State of Mind
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court requires proof that the defendant acted
with scienter in both private civil actions for damages and SEC enforcement
328. Id. (footnotes omitted).
329. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479-80 (1977) (refusing to extend § 10(b) to all
transactions involving corporate mismanagement and breach of corporate fiduciary duty). In light
of the continuous and specific focus on regulating broker-dealer conduct throughout the legislative
history of the 1934 Act, see supra notes 156-248 and accompanying text, the legal position of
brokers-dealers to their customers under the 1934 Act is akin to the legal position of investment
advisers to their clients under the 1940 Act. Thus, Capital Gains would seem more generally
relevant to interpreting the legal obligations of broker-dealers under the 1934 Act than Santa Fe,
which was a shareholder suit alleging corporate mismanagement by majority shareholders "in
which the essence of the complaint [was] that shareholders were treated unfairly by a fiduciary,"
430 U.S. at 477.
330. See supra text accompanying notes 23-40.
331. See supra notes 85-96 and accompanying text.
332. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963) (quoting 3
SuTmi.LND, STATUTORY CoNsnTucTnoN (3d ed. 1943)); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459
U.S. 375, 386-87 (1983). See supra note 298.
333. In addition to the cases supra note 332, see also Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,
406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S.
6, 12 (1971); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) ("[We are guided by the familiar
canon of statutory construction that remedial legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate
its purposes. The Securities Exchange Act quite clearly falls into the category of remedial
legislation." (footnote omitted)).
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actions under section 10(b).3 34 The Court has defined scienter for section 10(b)
purposes to mean a "mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate,
or defraud. '35 In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,33 the Court supported its
holding that proof of scienter was required in a private action under section
10(b) on several grounds: the language of section 10(b), the section's legislative
history, and its relationship to the overall structure of the 1934 Act. Regardless
of their possible merits under section 10(b), these grounds do not apply with
the same force under section 15(c)(1).
To begin with, in what one commentator has called the "dictionary ap-
proach" to statutory construction, 337 the Court in Hochfelder found that the
terms "manipulative," "device," and "contrivance" in section 10(b) "make
unmistakable a congressional intent to proscribe a type of conduct quite
different from negligence. ' 38 The use of these same terms in section 15(c)(1)339
seems to auger a similar interpretive fate. However, the SEC's rules inter-
preting section 15(c), which were adopted shortly after the 1934 Act's enactment
and have been expressly approved by Congress,141 point to a different inter-
pretive conclusion.
Rule 15cl-2-42 defines the terms "manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent
device or contrivance" under section 15(c)(1). The first notable aspect of Rule
334. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
335. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 686 n.5 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,
194 n.12 (1976). The Supreme Court has left open the question of whether recklessness constitutes
scienter. Id. The courts and commentators actively continue to debate this question, and even
those that respond in the affirmative disagree on the meaning of the term "recklessness." See M.
SaEiNBqEo, Scumrs REGULAnToN: Lmu-rnms AND RuMamis § 7.02 (rev. 1987).
336. 425 U.S. at 185-86.
337. 3A H. BruoomEra'T , supra note 6, at 8-13, 8-16. See L. Loss, FtrmExNrars op Sncutrrms
REGU iAToN (1983 & Supp. 1986) at Supp. 183 (criticizing meaning given to scienter in Hochfelder
as "antediluvian"); cf. L. Loss (1988), supra note 6, at 780 (modifying his criticism, or at least
his time frame, by asking why the Hochfelder majority opinion reached "back into history to the
strictest common law definition").
338. 425 U.S. at 199.
339. Section 15(c)(1) adds the phrase "or other fraudulent" device or contrivance (emphasis
added). See supra notes 4, 309.
340. See, e.g., 3A H. BaoomENTrAL, supra note 6, at 8-16 to -17 (suggesting that under this
Hochfelder "dictionary approach," scienter might be required under § 15(c)(1)). Cf. id. at 9-161
(suggesting that the rules under § 15(c)(2), in contrast to § 15(c)(1), may impose liability for
negligent or even innocent misrepresentations).
341. See infra notes 355-56 and accompanying text.
342. Rule 15cl-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-2 (1987), provides:
(a) The term "manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance,"
as used in section 15(c)(1) of the Act (section 2, 52 Stat. 1075; 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1)
[sic], is hereby defined to include any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
(b) The term "manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance,"
as used in section 15(c)(1) of the Act, is hereby defined to include any untrue
statement of a material fact and any omission to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they are made, not misleading, which statement or omission is made with knowledge
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15cl-2 is its resemblance to section 17(a) of the 1933 Act.43 Clauses (a) and
(b) in Rule 15cl-2 are patterned after Clauses (3) and (2), respectively, of
section 17(a).3" Under both clauses (2) and (3) of section 17(a), the Supreme
Court held in Aaron v. SECUM that scienter need not be established in an SEC
enforcement action against representatives of a broker-dealer frn. Likewise,
in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,3 7 the Court found no
requirement of proof of an actual intent to defraud in an SEC enforcement
action under a similar provision of section 206(2) of the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940.34
or reasonable grounds to believe that it is untrue or misleading.
(c) The scope of this section shall not be limited by any specific definitions of
the term "manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance"
contained in other rules adopted pursuant to section 15(c)(1) of the act.
343. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982), provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by
the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
344. 3 A. BRolmmaa & L. Lowm*-Eis, supra note 6, § 8.4(451); L. Loss (1988), supra note 6,
at 704 (noting that Rule 15cl-2 is modeled on clauses (2) and (3) of § 17(a) of the 1933 Act,
"except that the portion comparable to Clause (2) applies only when the 'statement or omission
is made with knowledge or reasonable grounds to believe that it is untrue or misleading' " (footnote
omitted)).
345. 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
346. Id. at 702.
347. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
348. Id. at 195. Section 206(2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(2)
(1981), provides that it shall be unlawful for an investment adviser "to engage in any transaction,
practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective
client .... " The Court in Capital Gains refused to find that this language required a "showing
[of] deliberate dishonesty as a condition precedent to protecting investors." Id. at 200. See also
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 697 (1980). In Aaron, the Court based its interpretation of clause
(3) of § 17(a) on the above-quoted conclusion in Capital Gains:
Finally, the language of § 17(a)(3), under which it is unlawful for any person "to
engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit," (emphasis added) quite plainly focuses upon the effect
of particular conduct on members of the investing public, rather than upon the
culpability of the person responsible. This reading follows directly from Capital
Gains ....
446 U.S. 680, 696-97. Clause (a) of Rule 15cl-2 contains language identical to that in § 17(a)(3)
of the 1933 Act and similar to that in § 206(2) of the 1940 Act, both of which have expressly
been held to require no proof of actual intent to defraud. Thus, if Rule 15cl-2 is a valid
interpretation of § 15(c)(1), see infra text accompanying notes 354-62, the conclusion follows under
the Supreme Court's holdings in Aaron and Capital Gains that no proof of actual intent to
defraud is necessary under § 15(c)(1).
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A second notable aspect of Rule 15cl-2 is contained in clause (b), which is
identical in relevant part to clause (b) of Rule l0b-5M9 and to clause (2) of
section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, with the exception of the final
phrase: "which statement or omission is made with the knowledge or reason-
able grounds to believe that it is untrue or misleading. 3" The SEC's reference
in clause (b) of the Rule to the requirement of "reasonable grounds to believe"
that a statement is untrue or misleading suggests a negligence standard in the
definition of "fraud" under section 15(c)(1). As has been observed of clause
(b): "The belief language makes it clear that constructive knowledge, as well
as actual knowledge, will sustain a violation. To this extent, negligence is a
violation." 35' In Aaron v. SEC,352 Justice Blackmun acknowledged that under
Rule 15cl-2, section 15(c)(1) "has been interpreted with congressional approval
to apply to negligent acts and practices." 353
The relevance of the Court's analysis in Capital Gains (of section 206 of
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940) and in Aaron (of section 17(a) of the
1933 Act) to section 15(c)(1) seems to depend on the weight that the Court
will give to Rule 15cl-2. Certainly, the scope of Rule 15cl-2 cannot exceed
the power granted the SEC under section 15(c)(1). 3- However, in 1938 Congress
expressly approved the SEC's interpretation of section 15(c)(1) under this Rule
15cl-2 (as well as under the other eight rules which had been adopted by the
349. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987). See also supra note 3.
350. See supra note 342 (emphasis added).
351. 3 A. BRomBrG & L. LowEnms, supra note 6, § 8.4(451). These authors have argued
that negligent conduct is probably covered under both Rule 15cl-2(a) and Rule 15cl-2(b), even
though the knowledge-belief combination is contained only in the latter rule. These authors have
also posited the following syllogism:
The syllogism suggested by these cases might not satisfy Aristotle. But it does
produce results: SEA Rule 15c1-2(b) is violated by a broker-dealer who makes a
statement or omission with reasonable grounds to believe it is untrue or misleading.
A broker-dealer must have reasonable grounds (basis) for his statements. Therefore
any statement made or transmitted by a broker-dealer, if untrue or misleading, is
with reasonable grounds to believe that it is untrue or misleading; it is, consequently,
a violation.
Id. §§ 204.84 to .85, quoted in S. JArs, supra note 32, at 128.
352. 446 U.S. 680 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
353. Id. at 708. This additional language of clause (b) of Rule 15cl-2 would seem to negative
a requirement of scienter. In his earlier treatise, Professor Loss appears to have suggested that
"simple negligence" is sufficient under Rule 15cl-2. 6 L. Loss (1961), supra note 6, at 3885.
However, he appears later to have suggested that scienter may be required. L. Loss (1988), supra
note 6, at 814 (stating that "the scienter requirement of Rule lOb-5 presumably extends to the
shingle theory whether the plaintiff relies on that rule or Rule 15c-2"). Presumably Professor
Loss's shift derives from the Court's holdings in Hochfelder and Aaron concerning § 10(b)
requirements. However, more to the point in interpreting § 15(c)(1) would seem to be the Court's
holdings in Aaron concerning § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, and in SEC v. Capital Gains concerning
§ 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.
354. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472-73 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 213-14 (1976) (scope of Rule 10b-5 cannot exceed power granted the Commission
by Congress under § 10(b)).
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SEC). 35  During the enactment of the 1938 amendments to section 15(c), a
congressional report noted that these nine rules and regulations adopted by
the SEC under section 15(c)(1) (formerly section 15(c)):
have withstood the test of experience and have met with the approval of
representative groups of brokers and dealers subject thereto. It is contem-
plated that rules of similar character and additional appropriate rules will
be adopted under clauses (1) and (2) of the proposed new subsection (c).3 m
While the Supreme Court has deemed it inappropriate to grant "adminis-
trative deference" to the SEC's position on the issue of implied causes of
action, the Court has stated that the "administrative deference" rule is "more
appropriately applicable in instances where ... an agency has rendered
binding, consistent, official interpretations of its statute over a long period of
time. 35 7 Not only did Rule 15cl-2 receive express congressional approval in
1938, the SEC has consistently applied a standard of "reasonableness" to the
conduct of brokers and dealers under the antifraud proscription of section
15(c)(1). For example, a broker-dealer is required to have a "reasonable basis"
for his recommendations concerning a security, and is required to undertake
a "reasonable investigation" before making any such recommendation.5 8 A
dealer must charge a price bearing a "reasonable" relationship to the prevailing
price of the security.5 9 Generally, the courts have followed the SEC's posi-
tion.6o
Because Rule 15cl-2 has been given congressional approval and the SEC
has consistently applied a "reasonableness" standard under it in enforcement
355. 3 L. Loss (1961), supra note 6, at 1426 ("Congress in 1938 reenacted the present § 15(c)(1),
which had previously been numbered 15(c), and in the process gave its specific approval to the
nine rules adopted by the Commission under that provision.").
356. S. REP. No. 1455, supra note 95, at 10; H.R. RaP. No. 2307, supra note 95, at 10.
357. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 41 n.27 (1977).
358. The SEC has:
repeatedly held that it is a violation of the anti-fraud provisions for a broker-dealer
to recommend a security unless there is an adequate and reasonable basis for the
recommendations and, further, that such recommendations should not be made
without disclosure of facts known or reasonably ascertainable, bearing upon the
justification for the recommendation. As indicated, the making of recommendations
for the purchase of a security implies that the dealer has a reasonable basis for such
recommendations which, in turn, requires that, as a prerequisite, he shall have made
a reasonable investigation. In addition, if such a dealer lacks essential information
about the issuer, such as knowledge of its financial condition, he must disclose this
lack of knowledge and caution customers as to the risk involved in purchasing the
securities without it.
Distribution by Broker-Dealers of Unregistered Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 6721, [1961-
1964 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,820, at 81,065-68 (Feb. 2, 1962). See generally
5B A. JAcoBs, supra note 32, § 211.01; L. Loss (1988), supra note 6, at 829-37.
359. In re Duker & Duker, 6 S.E.C. 386 (1939). See also cases cited supra note 36.
360. A. BRomBERG & L. LowaNus, supra note 6, § 8.4(454) ("The courts seem to be in
agreement that no intent to defraud is necessary in an enforcement proceeding for violation of
§ 15(c)(1) or Rule 15cl-2."); 5B A. JAcoBs, supra note 32, § 211.01[a]; S. JAFE, supra note 32,
at 131.
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actions against broker-dealers, the Rule should be given great weight. "A
contemporaneous and consistent construction of a statute by those charged
with its enforcement combined with congressional acquiescence 'creates a
presumption in favor of the administrative interpretation, to which we should
give great weight, even if we doubted the correctness of the ruling of the
Department ... . "1,361 Thus, while the Supreme Court's interpretation in
Aaron and Hochfelder of the language of section 10(b) would seem to suggest
a scienter requirement under section 15(c)(1), the language of Rule 15cl-2,
and the Supreme Court's interpretation of the language of section 17(a) of
the 1933 Act in Aaron, and of section 206(2) of the 1940 Act in Capital
Gains, seems more directly to suggest the opposite: that no proof of scienter
is required under section 15(c)(1).22
The Supreme Court in Hochfelder found further support for its scienter
requirement under section 10(b) in the overall structure of the 1934 Act. 63
Specifically, the Court believed that failure to require scienter in an implied
private right of action under section 10(b) would undercut the procedural
limitations of the express civil remedies of the 1933 Act. The Court noted
that a claim of negligence under sections 11, 12(2) or 15 of the 1933 Act,
providing express civil remedies, was subject to, among other things, a statute
of limitations of only one year after discovery of the violation and no more
than three years after the violation occurred.3 64 The Court emphasized that
extending section 10(b) to cover negligent conduct would allow a plaintiff to
avoid this limitations period specified in section 13 of the 1933 Act by bringing
the same action instead under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, "thereby
nullify[ing] the effectiveness of the carefully drawn procedural restrictions on
these express actions. '365
This rationale does not apply to section 15(c)(1). Like the express civil
remedies provisions in the securities acts, section 15(c)(1) is subject to one of
the principal "carefully drawn procedural restrictions" identified by the Court,
361. Guardians Ass'n of N.Y. City Police Dep't, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 463
U.S. 582, 621 (1983) (emphasis in original) (quoting Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U.S. 341, 345
(1932)).
362. Both Capital Gains and Aaron involved civil injunctive actions brought by the SEC.
Whether the Supreme Court would distinguish private actions from public enforcement actions in
the interpretation of § 15(c)(1) is unclear. In Capital Gains, the Supreme Court appeared to suggest
that the "prophylactic" nature of SEC injunctive action supported the Court's holding that proof
of scienter was not required in such an action. 375 U.S. 180, 193 (1963). On the other hand, in
Aaron v. SEC, despite the SEC's urgings to follow Capital Gains, the Supreme Court refused to
limit its Hochfelder decision to private damages action and held that proof of scienter was required
in both types of proceedings. 446 U.S. 680, 691-95 (1980).
363. 425 U.S. 185, 208-11 (1976).
364. Id. at 209-10.
365. Id. at 210. Another procedural restriction was found in § 11(e) of the 1933 Act, providing
for payment of costs. Id.
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namely, a relatively short statute of limitations. 36 Thus, extending section
15(c)(1) to cover negligent conduct would not allow plaintiffs to circumvent
one of the most significant procedural restrictions of the express civil liability
provisions in the 1933 or 1934 Acts.3 67
But perhaps even more than the language and legislative history of section
15(c)(1) and Rule 15cl-2, and their relation to the overall structure of the
1934 Act, the very nature of the civil action itself under these provisions
points to the conclusion that proof of scienter should not be required. By
definition, such a suit is against a broker or dealer who, from the earliest
cases, has been held to act as a fiduciary under agency law or as a quasi-
fiduciary under the shingle theory.3as That Congress had recognized "the
delicate fiduciary nature of an investment advisory relationship"' ' was the
Court's principal reason in Capital Gains for holding that no intent to defraud
was required under section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. In
light of this fiduciary relationship, "as well as a congressional intent to
eliminate, or at least to expose, all conflicts of interest which might incline
an investment adviser-consciously or unconsciously-to render advice which
was not disinterested, T" 3 7 0 the Court flatly refused to require proof of intent
to defraud in an SEC enforcement action under the 1940 Act. Instead, the
Court wrote: "It would defeat the manifest purpose of the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 for us to hold, therefore, that Congress, in empowering the courts
to enjoin any practice which operates 'as a fraud or deceit,' intended to
require proof of intent to injure and actual injury to clients. 37'
In enacting the 1934 Act, Congress recognized just as clearly that the broker-
dealer's relationship to his customer was fraught with the same inherent
potential for conflicts of interest. A large portion of the 1934 congressional
hearings was devoted to debate over whether to resolve such conflicts statutorily
by forcing the segregation of the roles of broker and dealer.3 7 As originally
366. Section 29(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1982), provides that any suit for
violation of § 15(c)(1) must be "brought within one year after the discovery that such sale or
purchase involves such violation and within three years after such violation." See supra note 134.
367. The express civil liability provisions of the 1934 Act do not necessarily cover the same
conduct as § 15(c)(1), but do provide similarly short limitations periods. See § 9(e) of the 1934
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1982) (1 year/3 year limitations period for willful market manipulations
of securities listed on a national securities exchange); § 16(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)
(1982) (2-year limitations period for certain insider trading violations); § 18(c) of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78r(c) (1982) (1 year/3 year limitations period for filing false documents with SEC).
Whether the limitations period would apply to private actions for damages as well as to private
actions for rescission is not clear. See supra note 218.
368. See supra text accompanying notes 23-40.
369. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963) (quoting 2 L. Loss
(1961), supra note 6, at 1412).
370. Id. at 191-92.
371. Id. at 192.
372. The proposal to segregate completely the functions of broker and dealer "evoked very
considerable opposition on the part of the exchanges all over the country. That is, perhaps, next
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drafted, section 11 provided for the separation of the functions of brokers
and dealers.37 One of the principal drafters of the 1934 Act, Mr. Thomas G.
Corcoran, described these "conscious or unconscious" conflicts of interest
inherent in the broker-dealer relationship to his customers as the principal
reason for recommending the segregation of these functions:
In the first place, as recognized by the Glass-Steagall Act, you cannot
expect disinterested service from a man on both sides of the fence. If a
man is going to act as your broker and thus as your investment counsellor-
for that is what your broker practically is, you go to him for advice on
securities as you go to your lawyer for advice on the law, he should not
have something of his own to sell.
And every underwriter and every dealer has securities of his own to sell,
or some interest somewhere that he is watching....
If you go to your own broker, who is also an underwriter and dealer,
and announce to him that you want to buy something, you cannot expect
an unbiased answer because he will either consciously push his own
securities or will be so interested in them that he will unconsciously tend
to advise you in favor of his own securities, although he seriously believes
he is giving you the most disinterested advice in the world. That is just
human natureY4
to [§ 7 of the Act], the section which has become the most controversial section of this bill."
Senate Hearings on S. Res. 84, supra note 85, at 7738 (statement of Ferdinand Pecora). For
additional discussion, debate, and protest over this proposal, see, e.g., Senate Hearings on S. Res.
84, supra note 85, at 6465, 6520-28, 6634, 6660-61, 6737, 6739, 6741-44, 6749-51, 6792-93, 6835,
6861-67, 6885-86, 6889-90, 6911, 6918, 6921-24, 6954, 6988, 7033-34, 7040-42, 7054, 7072-73, 7174-
75, 7456-58, 7460-61, 7482, 7528, 7533, 7738-39, 7748; House Hearings on H.R. 8720, supra note
88, at 725-26, 739-40, 783-85, 883-85; House Hearings on H.R. 7852, supra note 85, at 115-17,
122-29, 209-10, 214, 258-59, 278, 283, 289, 334-35, 337-38, 363, 399-402, 403-04, 406-07, 413-16,
420-23, 449-51, 537-38, 548, 593-94, 616-17, 661-62, 666.
373. An early draft of § 11 (§ 10 in the draft bill) provided, inter alia:
It shall be unlawful for any member of a national securities exchange or any person
who as a broker transacts a business in securities through the medium of any such
member to act as a dealer in or underwriter of securities, whether or not registered
on any national securities exchange.
H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d. Sess., reprinted in House Hearings on H.R. 7852, supra note 85, at
7. The Twentieth Century Fund Report, supra note 88, had recommended the complete segregation
of broker and dealer functions. TaE TwiNm CENTy FuND REPoRT, supra note 88, at 176.
See also Hearings on S. Res. 84, supra note 85, at 6525; House Hearings on H.R. 7852, supra
note 85, at 117. The Twentieth Century Fund Report had further observed in connection with
brokerage commissions and solicitation of business: "That a conflict of interest between the
brokerage firm and the customer is thus likely to arise is to put it mildly." THE TwEanrmn
CErtmY FutND REPORT, supra note 85, at 177. The Roper Report found that such segregation
of broker-dealer functions "[a]s an abstract matter ... has much to commend it," but proposed
no action on it "before we are in a position to calculate its cost and foresee its repercussions."
RorEn REP RT, supra note 93, at 20. See also House Hearings on H.R. 7852, supra note 85, at
26, 116.
374. House Hearings on H.R. 7852, supra note 85, at 123. Mr. Corcoran reiterated the
drafters' concern over the "evils" that the combination of the broker-dealer functions was thought
to pose at other points throughout the hearings. See, e.g., Senate Hearings on S. Res. 84, supra
note 85, at 6465, 6521, 6522-24.
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The congressional reports375 and congressional hearings376 echo this concern
over the fiduciary dilemmas facing the broker-dealer.
Ultimately, in the face of strenuous protest from brokers-dealers and from
the exchanges predicting severe economic hardship on broker-dealers if their
roles were separated,37 Congress withdrew the draft segregation provision and
in section 11(e) directed the Commission to make a study of and report on
375. As a House report noted:
Another perplexing problem in regard to the working of the exchanges has been
that centering about the dealer-broker relationship. There is an inherent inconsistency
in a man's acting both as a broker and a dealer. It is difficult to serve two masters.
And it is particularly difficult to give impartial advice to a client if the dealer-broker
has his own securities to sell, particularly when they are new securities for which
there is no ready market.
H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 87, at 15. See also id. at 22. A Senate report observed:
Many critics of the stockbrokerage business as now conducted assert that a
fundamental evil is the commingling of the functions of broker and dealer by the
same person or firm. The contention has been advanced, and evidence before the
committee has tended to prove, that a broker who deals in securities for his own
account finds it difficult to give disinterested advice to a customer with regard to
the securities the customer seeks to buy. However honest the broker's intentions
may be, it is argued that he should be placed beyond temptation, by a complete
segregation of the broker and dealer functions.
S. REP. No. 792, supra note 87, at II.
376. As Evans Clark, executive director of the Twentieth Century Fund, Inc., observed:
It is hardly necessary to elaborate the reasons for this proposal [to segregate
broker and dealer functions]. It is self-evident that anyone who is actively trading
in the market for himself cannot possibly-with human nature as it is-be expected
to act with complete detachment in handling the accounts of others.
House Hearings on H.R. 8720, supra note 88, at 783 (statement of Evans Clark, executive director
of the Twentieth Century Fund, Inc.).
As Ferdinand Pecora, counsel to the Senate Committee and active participant in the hearings
on the draft bills, observed:
The evidence which has been introduced before this committee will show that when
dealers have in their inventories such securities they may and some have passed them
on to unsuspecing [sic] clients who face a loss on them. It is only natural to assume
that where an individual is called upon to serve two interests, the one his own and
the other his customer's, there is a strong temptation that the advice he will give to
his customer will be that advice which will best serve the dealer's own interest.
Senate Hearings on S. Res. 84, supra note 85, at 7458. See also id. at 7041 (In response to a
broker-dealer witness remarking that "if I own bonds it is particularly exasperating to have a man
pass over every bond I would like to sell him to buy a bond that someone else owned ...
Mr. Pecora observed that "[e]vidence before this committee shows that one of the biggest bond
houses [in] the country ... pushed on their customers their own securities, particularly at times
when they knew those securities were souring."). As Thomas G. Corcoran, a principal drafter of
the bill, remarked:
There are certainly difficulties about having those first two functions [underwriter
and dealer] combined with that of a broker. It is very hard for a man to sit on 3
sides of the fence at the same time, or even on 2 sides of the fence, particularly
when as matter of practice your broker acts not only as an agent who executes your
own orders, but also as your investment lawyer to give you advice as to what
securities to buy and sell.
House Hearings on H.R. 7852, supra note 85, at 116.
377. See supra note 372.
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"the feasibility and advisability of the complete segregation of the functions
of dealer and broker ... ."378 While this draft provision and the debate over
it was specifically directed to the position of brokers who were members of
the stock exchanges, the controversy reflects an overall congressional recog-
nition of the fiduciary problems of broker-dealers applicable equally to those
in the OTC market.319
Thus, in enacting both the 1934 Act governing broker-dealers and the 1940
Act governing investment advisers, Congress was equally concerned with
conflicts of interests that might incline such securities professionals "-con-
sciously or unconsciously-to render advice which was not disinterested. ' 310
Equally applicable to the 1934 Act, therefore, is the Supreme Court's conclu-
sion in Capital Gains that it "would defeat the manifest purpose" of the 1934
Act for the Court to hold that Congress "intended to require proof of intent
to injure and actual injury to clients." ''
For all of these reasons-the language and legislative history of section
15(c)(1) (including express congressional approval of the SEC's interpretive
Rule 15cl-2), its relationship to section 29(b) which gives an express limitations
period of the same character as that found in the express civil liability
provisions of the 1934 Act, and in light of the special fiduciary or quasi-
fiduciary status of brokers and dealers-a plaintiff should not be required to
prove scienter in a private civil action under section 15(c)(1). 1 2
378. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 291, § 11(e), 48 Stat. 881, 892 (1934). See
also S. REP. No. 792, supra note 87, at 11 (concluding that "for the present any such action [to
segregate the broker-dealer functions] would be unwise").
The combination of the functions of dealer and broker has persisted over a long
period of time in American investment banking and it was found difficult to break
up this relationship at a time when the dealer business was in the doldrums and
when it was feared that the bulk of the dealer-brokers would, if compelled to
choose, give up their dealer business and leave, temporarily at least, an impaired
mechanism for the distribution of new securities. Consequently it was deemed
impracticable at this time to do more than require the dealer-broker to disclose to
his customer the capacity in which he was acting and to refrain from taking into
margin accounts new securities in the distribution of which he had participated
during the preceding 6 months.
H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 87, at 15. See also 78 CoNG. REc. 7713 (1934) (statement of
Rep. Wadsworth). In its subsequent 1936 report to Congress, the SEC stressed the inherent
conflicts of interest in the combination of broker and dealer functions, but nevertheless recom-
mended against enacting legislation requiring complete segregation. SEC REPORT ON BRoKan-
DEMA SEGREGATiON, supra note 316, at 109, 113-14.
379. Congress viewed the primary function of § 15 as originally enacted to serve as the "basis
for such regulation of [the OTC] markets as the commission may find appropriate to insure to
investors protection comparable to that which is accorded in the case of registered exchanges
under the act." S. REP. No. 792, supra note 87, at 20. See also H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note
87, at 24.
380. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191-92 (1963).
381. Id. at 192.
382. That the scienter requirement is properly lowered when the defendant owes a fiduciary
duty to plaintiff is currently recognized by the Second Circuit for private actions under § 10(b).
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C. Plaintiff's Standing to Sue
Who should be allowed to sue for a violation of section 15(c)(1)? The
language and legislative history of the section suggest that the standing
requirement for a private lawsuit under section 15(c)(1) is different, and
broader, than that under section 10(b).
Section 10(b) requires that the violation have occurred "in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security. ' 383 In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores,3s4 the Supreme Court interpreted this phrase to require that the plaintiff
have actually purchased or sold a security as a prerequisite to bringing a
private civil action under section 10(b), in accordance with the so-called
Birnbaum rule.385 The Supreme Court drew support for this narrow interpre-
tation of the "in connection with" requirement under section 10(b) from,
among other things, the legislative history, specifically Congress's failure to
adopt amendments proposed by the SEC that would have broadened that
section's scope.3 6 In 1957 and 1959, the SEC sought to have Congress change
the wording of section 10(b) from "in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security" to "in connection with the purchase or sale of, or any
attempt to purchase or sell, any security. ' '3a 7 The SEC's purpose in seeking
this amendment was to make clear that section 10(b) "reaches manipulative
and deceptive activities in connection with attempts to buy or sell securities
as well as in connection with consummated transactions. ' 38 As the Supreme
Court noted: "Opposition to the amendment was based on fears of the
extension of civil liability under § 10(b) that it would cause .... Neither
change was adopted by Congress." 389
By contrast, in 1975 Congress amended section 15(c)(1) to adopt language
very similar to that which was not adopted in section 10(b)2° By virtue of
The Second Circuit has adopted a "sliding scale" scienter requirement in aider and abettor cases,
and has held that recklessness constitutes scienter if the parties stand in a fiduciary relationship.
See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 91 (2d Cir. 1983); IIT, An Int'l Inv. Trust v. Cornfield,
619 F.2d 909, 923 (2d Cir. 1980). See also Johnson v. Chilcott, 658 F. Supp. 1213, 1222 (D.
Colo. 1987). However, for cases finding the same scienter requirement under § 10(b) and § 15(c)(1),
see Amunrud v. Taurus Drilling, Ltd., [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
99,649, at 97,596 (D. Mont. 1983); Darvin v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 479 F. Supp.
460, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946, 956 n.12
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
383. See supra note 3.
384. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
385. Id. at 731-49 (relying on Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952)).
386. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 732-33.
387. Id. (emphasis in original). See also 103 CoNo. REc. 11,636 (1957); SEC Legislation:
Hearings on S. 1178-1182 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,
86th Cong., 1st Sess., 331, 367-68 (1959) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 1178-1182].
388. Hearings on S. 1178-1182, supra note 387, at 331.
389. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 732.
390. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 125.
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the 1975 amendment, section 15(c)(1) makes it unlawful for any broker or
dealer "to effect any transaction in, or to induce or attempt to induce the
purchase or sale of, any security" by fraudulent means. 91
The 1975 legislative history is silent on Congress's intent concerning this
phrase "attempt to induce the purchase or sale," although it does make
parallel the construction with section 15(c)(2) and 15(c)(3). 39 At a minimum,
the language "attempt to induce the purchase or sale" would seem to include
offers to sell or purchase. Professor Loss has suggested that similar language
in section 15(a) covered advertising.319 Going further, by its phrasing in the
alternative, section 15(c)(1) proscribes the effectuation by a broker or dealer
of "any transaction in ... any security" by fraudulent means, without the
apparent necessity of either a completed or even an attempted purchase or
sale of a security. Moreover, contractual privity may be required only to the
extent that a private investor sought under section 29(b) to rescind a contract
made or performed in violation of section 15(c)(1). 3 4
Just how broadly the phrases "attempt to induce" and "any transaction in
... any security" will or should be interpreted is left to the courts and other
commentators, although this language does pose some interesting questions.
If under section 15(c)(1) the plaintiff need not be an actual purchaser or seller
of a security, does the investor who holds on to a security because of "an
unduly rosy representation""39 as to its value, or an investor who decides not
to purchase because of "an unduly gloomy representation," 3 9 have standing
391. See supra note 4 (emphasis added). See also S. REP'. No. 75, supra note 247, at 197.
392. See supra note 248. However, the SEC explained the purpose of the similar proposal to
amend § 10(b) as follows:
One of the purposes of this change is to make it entirely clear that the section
covers the so-called "front money racket," that is, obtaining money from an issuer
for alleged services in arranging an underwriting or financing for the issuer, without
actually intending to or being in a position to arrange the proposed underwriting or
financing. It would also reach manipulative and deceptive activities in connection
with attempts to buy or sell securities as well as in connection with consummated
transactions.
103 CONG. REc. 11,636 (1957). See also Hearings on S. 1178-1182, supra note 387, at 331.
393. 2 L. Loss (1961), supra note 6, at 1289. Professor Loss's reference was to the phrases
"effect any transaction" and "induce [a] purchase or sale" in § 15(a) as amended in 1936. The
1975 amendment to § 15(c)(1) adding the "attempt" language would, if anything, seem to expand
the reach of the section.
394. Section 29(b) provides that no contract made or performed in violation of § 15(c)(1) "shall
be void ... in any action... by any person to or for whom any broker or dealer sells, or from
or for whom any broker or dealer purchases" a security unless brought within the specified
limitations period. See supra note 134. Such language suggests that Congress contemplated
contractual privity in suits invoking § 29(b). See 2 A. BRomHERG & L. LowEats, supra note 6,
§ 8.5(450); Gruenbaum & Steinberg, supra note 6, at 32-36, 45 (authors argue that privity should
be required only when to do so is consistent with the underlying purposes of the Exchange Act).
On the other hand, the express language of § 15(c)(1) would seem to negative any requirement of
contractual privity under that section, thus suggesting that Congress contemplated suits for damages
as well as rescission under § 15(c)(1). See infra note 425 and accompanying text.
395. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737-38 (1975).
396. Id. at 737.
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to sue when the representations ultimately appear to have been unfounded?39
In other words, does an attempt to discourage a sale or purchase amount to
an "attempt to induce a sale or purchase," or does the broad phrase "any
transaction in ... any security" cover such a situation? More far-reaching,
is it even necessary that the private investor be a customer of the broker-
dealer in relation to a particular security, or may any investor sue a broker-
dealer for fraudulent activities (such as scalping or insider trading in a security)?
If the term "fraudulent device or contrivance" is broadly construed, as
suggested above,39 to include negligence and breaches of fiduciary duty by
broker-dealers, then a real potential exists that section 15(c)(1) could, with
respect to broker-dealers, develop into a true "catchall" provision to combat
securities "misbehavior that all too often makes investment in securities a
needlessly risky business for the uninitiated investor." 399 What seems clear at
this point, however, is that the literal language of section 15(c)(1) justifies a
broader standing interpretation than has been accorded section 10(b) under
Blue Chip Stamps.4w
D. The Nature of the Relief
Although infrequently litigated in the past, section 29(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act is an appropriate starting point to discuss the nature of the
relief which might be afforded in a private action under section 15(c)(1).
Section 29(b) provides that contracts made or performed in violation of any
provision of the Act or a rule thereunder "shall be void."4'' Having observed
that this language "does not compel the conclusion that the contract is a
nullity," and that lower courts have interpreted section 29(b) as "rendering
the contract merely voidable at the option of the innocent party,"' ' the
397. In Blue Chip Stamps, the Supreme Court determined that under § 10(b), such investors
do not have standing to sue. Id. at 746-49. Whether they would have standing to sue under
§ 15(c)(1) would seem to depend on whether unduly "rosy" or "gloomy" representations constituted
an "attempt to induce the purchase or sale of" a security. Arguably, the even broader phrase,
"any transaction in... any security," would seem to bring such a plaintiff within the proscriptions
of § 15(c)(1).
398. See supra text accompanying notes 342-82.
399. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 246 (1980).
400. But cf. Bosio v. Norbay See., Inc., 599 F. Supp. 1563, 1566-67 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (plaintiff's
claims under § 10(b) and § 15(c)(1) failed because alleged fraud by broker was not in connection
with a purchase or sale of securities); Gilbert v. Bagley, 492 F. Supp. 714, 733 (M.D.N.C. 1980)
(Birnbaum rule applies to § 15(c)(1) in private action).
401. See supra note 134.
402. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 387-88 (1970) (calling the lower courts'
interpretation "eminently sensible"). See also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 735 (1975). For lower court cases both before and after Mills interpreting § 29(b) as rendering
contracts voidable rather than void, see Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 499
F.2d 715, 726 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat
Ryan & Assocs., Inc., 496 F.2d 1255, 1265-67 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1023 (1974);
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Supreme Court has recognized that section 29(b) "confers a 'right to rescind'
a contract void under the criteria of the [1934 Act]." As discussed earlier,,
Congress deliberately omitted contracts made or performed in violation of
sections 15(c)(2) and 15(c)(3) from the voiding provisions of section 29(b).
Congress's intentional exclusion of clauses (c)(2) and (c)(3) inevitably suggests
that Congress intended that the voiding provisions of section 29(b) would
apply to clause (1) of section 15(c), and that it "intended that the customary
legal incidents of voidness would follow, including the availability of a suit
for rescission . .. and for restitution. " 401
Even if it is assumed that Congress did intend to make available the remedy
of rescission for a contract made or performed in violation of section 15(c)(1),
does this also mean that Congress contemplated it would be the exclusive
remedy under the Act? Lower courts have permitted recovery of damages
under section 29(b) as well as rescission,4 and the Supreme Court in dicta
has suggested that damages are an appropriate alternative remedy in suits
under the 1934 Act. Under the majority's reasoning in Transamerica Mort-
gage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,40a however, section 29(b) might be deemed to
Daley v. Capitol Bank & Trust Co., 506 F.2d 1375, 1376 (1st Cir. 1974); Bache Halsey Stuart,
Inc. v. Killop, 509 F. Supp. 256, 262 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Gannett Co. v. Register Publishing Co.,
428 F. Supp. 818, 830-31 (D. Conn. 1977); Freeman v. Marine Midland Bank, 419 F. Supp. 440,
453 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). Cf. Myzel v. Fields, 386 F,2d 718, 742 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 951 (1968) (contract "void as a matter of law"). See also 6 L. Loss (1961), supra note 6,
at 3784.
403. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979). See also Jackson
Transit Auth. v. Local Div. 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15, 22 (1982).
404. See supra notes 201-07, 219 and accompanying text.
405. Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 19.
406. See, e.g., Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 741-42 (8th Cir. 1967) (where rescission impossible,
rescissiona damages permitted), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); American Gen. Ins. Co. v.
Equitable Gen. Corp., 493 F. Supp. 721, 758-59 (E.D. Va. 1980) (where specific restitution of
shares not possible, court possesses broad remedial power to award monetary equivalent of
rescission as rescissional damages); Freeman v. Marine Midland Bank, 419 F. Supp. 440, 453
(E.D.N,Y. 1976); Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 365 F. Supp. 1364, 1371 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
("A reading of the limitation provision of § 29(b) to exclude actions for damages places a narrow,
strained interpretation on the statute which the courts have not accepted."); Maher v. J.R.
Williston & Beane, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 133, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co,, 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946); Geismar v. Bond & Goodwin, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 876,
878 (S.D.N,Y. 1941). See also 5C A. JAcoBs, supra note 32, § 260.03[c][vi]; L. Loss (1988), supra
note 6, at 941 ("[I]t is arguable even in the face of Transamerica that § 29(b) of the 1934 Act
makes the whole loaf available--damages as well as rescission ... ." (emphasis in original)).
While approving the result of the cases which would permit alternative recovery of damages or
rescission in implied private civil actions under the 1934 Act, this author believes the better
reasoning would find that, whenever a private right of action is implied under a section of the
1934 Act, the remedy of damages arises under the same section, while the remedy of rescission
arises under § 29(b) and is limited by the terms thereof. See infra notes 417-29 and accompanying
text,
407. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 388-89 (1970) (With reference to a private
action under § 14(a), the court said: "Monetary relief will, of course, also be a possibility....
In short, damages should be recoverable only to the extent that they can be shown.").
408. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
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provide an exclusive rescission remedy for all violations of section 15(c)(1). In
analyzing a similar provision of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,4 the
Court concluded that under the provision comparable to section 29(b), relief
in a civil lawsuit would be limited to rescission and restitution, and that a
damages remedy was not available. 410 However, the Court's reasoning to
support this conclusion with respect to the Investment Advisers Act is not
applicable to the Exchange Act, and Transamerica is readily distinguishable.
The Transamerica majority construed the language of the jurisdictional
provision of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, section 214, 4  to limit the
courts to granting equitable, but not legal (monetary), relief.412 The Court
noted that the final version of section 214 granted the federal courts jurisdiction
"of all suits in equity to enjoin any violation" of the Act and rules thereunder,
but omitted the references found in earlier bills to "actions at law" or to
"liability" created by the statute. 413 In part because of this language in the
1940 Act that appeared to grant equitable jurisdiction alone, the Transamerica
Court felt constrained to permit only equitable relief.
By contrast, the comparable jurisdictional statute under the Exchange Act,
section 27,'4 14 specifically grants jurisdiction to the federal courts "of all suits
in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created
by this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder." When civil remedies
have been implied under sections 10(b) and 14(a), the Supreme Court has
assumed the availability of a damages remedy. 45 Based on this jurisdictional
distinction between the Exchange Act and the Investment Advisers Act, "the
right to monetary relief under section 29(b) may be amply supported. ' '41 6
409. See supra notes 136-42 and accompanying text.
410. Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 19-24.
411. Section 214 of the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (1982), provides in
pertinent part:
The district courts of the United States and the United States courts of any
Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
jurisdiction of violations of this subchapter or the rules, regulations, or orders
thereunder, and, concurrently with State and Territorial courts, of all suits in equity
to enjoin any violation of this subchapter or the rules, regulations, or orders
thereunder.
Id.
412. Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 21-22.
413. Id.
414. Section 27 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982), provides in pertinent part:
The district courts of the United States and the United States courts of any
Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations
thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any
liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder.
Id.
415. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983) (§ 10(b)); Mills v. Electric Auto-
Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 388 (in a private lawsuit under § 14(a) of the Exchange Act, the Court
observed that "[m]onetary relief will, of course, also be a possibility.").
416. Gruenbaum & Steinberg, supra note 6, at 26.
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An interpretation limiting recovery in a private action under section 15(c)(1)
to rescission and restitution would strain both the language and the spirit of
the Act. On its face, section 29(b) contemplates only equitable relief. Section
29(b) authorizes this form of relief (the voiding of a contract) under certain
conditions (when a contract was made or performed in violation of the Act).
It forbids such relief under other conditions (when the contract was made or
performed in violation of section 15(c)(2) or section 15(c)(3) or when an action
to void a contract is brought under section 15(c)(1) after the 1 year/3 year
limitations period).4 17 On its face, section 29(b) does not create a private cause
of action for money damages, nor does it bar such an action under other
provisions of the Act; it simply does not address these issues. This interpretation
of section 29(b)-which separates the issue of equitable relief from the issues
of the availability of legal relief and the implication of private actions in
general-comports with the literal language of the statute and with the
understanding Congress would have had of the law in the 1930s.
An interpretation consistent with the structure and purposes of the 1934
Act would construe section 29(b) as giving an additional remedy in the form
of rescission and restitution for private actions alleging violation of section
15(c)(1), not as providing a sole remedy.48 When the 1934 Act and the 1938
amendments were enacted, Congress would have understood the state of the
common law to favor implication of private rights of action, unless Congress
had expressly denied them.41 9 Theoretically, under the common-law approach,
Congress need not have enacted section 29(b) at all, for once a private action
was implied under a statute, the courts had broad powers to provide both
legal and equitable relief to redress the injury.420 By enacting section 29(b),
Congress made explicit its intention to permit equitable relief from "every"
contract made or performed in violation of "any" of the provisions of the
1934 Act, but subject to the various limitations contained in that section. 42'
417. See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text. For the text of § 29(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b)
(1982), see supra note 134.
418. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan & Assocs., Inc., 496 F.2d 1255, 1266 (4th Cir.)
("Section 29(b) is more properly viewed as an adjunct to the other remedies provided by the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 .... "), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1023 (1974); Gruenbaum &
Steinberg, supra note 6, at 48-50.
419. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
420. That this view of the law prevailed at the time of the enactment of the 1934 Act and the
1938 amendment is supported by the Supreme Court's decision in Deckert v. Independence Shares
Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 288 (1940), which upheld the right of purchasers of securities to maintain a
suit in equity to rescind a fraudulent sale and secure restitution of the consideration paid under
the Securities Act of 1933, even though that Act contains no provision comparable to § 29(b) of
the 1934 Act. The Deckert Court relied on § 22 of the 1933 Act, which finds its analogy in § 27
of the 1934 Act. Cf. A.C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38, 41-44 (1941).
421. That Congress understood it was restricting the right to rescission under the Exchange Act
when it enacted § 29(b) in 1934 is illustrated by H.R. CoNF. Rm. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
37-38 (1934).
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However, suits for damages were left to the common-law approach of the
judiciary which would take the Act section by section, and would imply private
rights of action under those provisions that were intended to benefit a class
of persons of which the plaintiff was a member.422
It would be inconsistent with the history of implied rights under the securities
acts to suggest, with respect to section 29(b), that expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, 4 1 and that rescission is the sole remedy with respect to section 15(c)(1)
violations. While the equitable remedy of rescission may be expressly provided
for under-and limited by-section 29(b), the remedy of damages implicitly
arises under section 15(c)(1) itself once a court implies the private right of
action under that section. This interpretation is consistent with the approach
the Supreme Court has taken in allowing recovery of damages in implied
rights of action under other sections of the 1934 Act.42
Moreover, section 29(b) refers only to the voiding of contracts made or
performed in violation of some other provision of the 1934 Act. Section
15(c)(1) makes unlawful a wide range of broker-dealer conduct independent
of a contract: any "transaction in" and "attempt to induce the purchase or
sale of" a security by fraudulent means. A narrow construction permitting
private suits only for conduct involving a "contract" allegedly in violation of
section 15(c)(1) rather than a "transaction in" 425 or an "attempt to induce the
purchase or sale of" a security in violation of section 15(c)(1) would run afoul
of the Supreme Court's repeated admonitions that the securities laws combat-
ting fraud "should be construed 'not technically and restrictively, but flexibly
to effectuate [their] remedial purposes.' "42
422. See supra notes 69-82 and accompanying text. This approach would not necessarily entail
a finding of an implied right under every section of the 1934 Act, because the predominant
purpose of every provision is not necessarily the protection of individual investors; another principal
purpose of the Act was to achieve general stability of the economy as a whole. See United States
v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 775-76 (1979). See also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S.
560, 568-79 (1979) (no implied right under § 17(a) of the 1934 Act).
423. See supra notes 116-19.
424. See supra note 415.
425. Some courts have strictly construed § 29(b) as applying only to unlawful "contracts," and
not to unlaWful "transactions." See, e.g., Slomiak v. Bear Stearns & Co., 597 F. Supp. 676, 681-
82 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Zerman v. Jacobs, 510 F. Supp. 132, 135 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 672 F.2d 901
(2d Cir. 1981); Palmer v. Thomson & McKinnon Auchincloss, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 286, 291 (D.
Conn. 1979). To the extent that the relief sought in a private lawsuit is rescission, the requirement
of a "contract" is not an unreasonable interpretation of § 29(b), which expressly refers to contracts.
Accordingly, in a private suit for rescission under § 29(b) alleging a violation of § 15(c)(l), the
requirement of a contract arguably may be appropriate. However, there is no logical reason to
extend § 29(b)'s requirement of a contract to all private actions alleging violation of § 15(c)(l),
including actions for damages, for § 15(c)(1) by its terms plainly proscribes a broader range of
misconduct than that in connection with contract formation or performance.
426. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386-87 (1983) (quoting SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963)).
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The Supreme Court has favored a cumulative construction of the provisions
of the securities acts.4 7 Moreover, a limited interpretation of the remedies
available under section 15(c)(1) seems to conflict with the savings clause of
section 28(a)42 of the Act, which provides that the "rights and remedies
provided by this chapter shall be in addition to any and all other rights and
remedies that may exist at law or in equity." The Supreme Court has recently
observed that this savings clause and the comparable one in the 1933 Act
"confirm that the remedies in each Act were to be supplemented by 'any and
all' additional remedies." 429
E. Proof of Causation and Injury
In a private action for damages under section 10(b), the plaintiff must show
that the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff some injury.410 However,
some lower courts have held that rescission is available in a private action
against a broker-dealer under section 29(b), even in the absence of proof that
the securities violation caused the investor's loss.41 Acknowledging that per-
mitting rescission without requiring proof of causation of injury might seem
"harsh," from the standpoint of the broker, the Fifth Circuit has nevertheless
stated that this "seems to be what Congress intended." 432
While the 1934 legislative history is largely silent on section 29(b),433 later
legislative history does seem to support this interpretation. As discussed
427. See Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 383-87; United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 778 (1979)
("But '[t]he fact that there may well be some overlap is neither unusual nor unfortunate.'
(quoting SEC v. National Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 468 (1969))).
428. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982).
429. Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 383.
430. For a discussion of proof of causation under § 10(b) and under the proxy rules, see L.
Loss (1988), supra note 6, at 945-48, 955-65. The measure of damages used by courts in private
civil actions under § 10(b) varies by jurisdiction and depending on the nature of the case. See
Comment, The Measure of Damages Under Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5, 46 MD. L. Rnv. 1266
(1987).
431. Eastside Church of Christ v. National Plan, Inc., 391 F.2d 357, 362 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 913 (1968); accord Regional Properties, Inc. v. Financial & Real Estate Consulting
Co., 678 F.2d 552, 558-62 (5th Cir. 1982). Cf. Moody v. Bache & Co., 570 F.2d 523, 527 n.6
(5th Cir. 1978). At least one commentator supports an interpretation of § 29(b) that eliminates
the element of proof of proximate causation. Gruenbaum & Steinberg, supra note 6, at 29-30.
See also L. Loss (1988), supra note 6, at 941, 959.
432. Regional Properties, 678 F.2d at 561; Eastside Church of Christ, 391 F.2d at 362. Cf.
Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan & Assocs., Inc., 496 F.2d 1255, 1265-67 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1023 (1974) (characterizing a literal interpretation of § 29(b) as "devastating"
and "harsh"); Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1149 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 1013 (1971) (Friendly, J., dissenting) (characterizing the language of § 29(b) as "Draco-
nian").
433. See, e.g., S. RE'. No. 792, supra note 87, at 23; H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 87, at
28; H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1838, supra note 421, at 37-38. The debate, such as it was, over § 29(b)
seems to be have been largely concerned with the possibility that the section would be applied
retroactively to contracts entered into prior to enactment of the 1934 Act. See, e.g., Senate
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earlier,4M during the hearings on the Maloney Act in 1938, representatives of
the brokerage industry urged Congress to limit civil suits under section 15(c)
to actual damages, as Congress had arguably done for civil suits under section
9(e).4 s One witness strenuously opposed the availability of a rescission remedy
in the absence of proof of damages as follows:
If a man violates a regulation and does no damage to the person who
purchases the security, we fail to see why the penalty of revision [sic]
should be placed upon the dealer, because after all, the penalty is so severe
that in the long run it is going to come out of the public, because the
dealer having that liability and he having to make a consequent charge to
make up that liability-it may be so serious in recessions such as we are
going through now, that inadvertently you will find a dealer is submerged
with suits for revision [sic] because when one suit is brought everybody
else knows about the situation and will say, "We can get back our money,"
because there is a technical violation and the result will be that the dealer
will not only face serious financial difficulties, but the customers who deal
with him are imperiled and we say that is not necessary for the enforcement
of this act. It is a criminal offense.
Hearings on S. Res. 84, supra note 85, at 6724-25, 6995; 78 CONG. REc. 8600-01 (1934).
Interestingly, at least one Representative understood the broad implications of § 29(b), and presented
them to Congress during floor debate:
The far-reaching consequence of this subsection is little comprehended. This
provision, coupled with the use throughout the act of the words "it shall be
unlawful," [sic] opens the door to a vast amount of litigation which may involve
many of the daily commercial and banking transactions of our country. If, perchance,
through the error of a clerk, or even of a partner, a miscalculation has been made
as to the amount that could be legally loaned or borrowed, it could not be corrected,
for if a transaction be void, neither party can seek redress in a court of law. The
infinite number of questions which arise from an examination of this section makes
it clear that it should be carefully considered by the House.
78 CoNG. REc. 7929-30 (1934) (statement of Rep. Cooper). However, no change was ever made
generally to limit the potential breadth of applicability of § 29(b) or specifically to require causation
of injury in a claim under that section.
434. See supra text accompanying notes 213-14.
435. One of these witnesses, Lothrop Withington, in fact introduced a proposal to amend § 15
by adding a subparagraph (d) along the lines of § 9(e):
(d) Any broker or dealer who willfully violates any rule or regulation prescribed
pursuant to clauses (1) and (2) of subsection (c) of section 15 of this title shall be
liable to any person who shall purchase from or sell to such broker or dealer any
security at a price which was affected by such violation, and the person so injured
may sue in law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction to recover the
damages sustained as a result of any such violation. No action shall be maintained
to enforce any liability created under this section unless brought within 1 year after
the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within 3 years after such
violation.
(Compare with subsec. (e) of sec. 9 of the Securities and Exchange Act [sic].)
Subsection (d) of section 15 of the present act would then become subsection (e).
House Hearings on S. 3255, supra note 186, at 43. Like § 9(e), this proposed amendment would
have specified: (1) liability only for "willful" violations; (2) a limitation to actual damages; and
(3) a limitations period. Only the third of these proposals was ultimately adopted by Congress in
the 1938 amendment to § 29(b). See supra notes 208-14 and accompanying text.
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It seems to me that with regard to sections 1 and 2 [of the bill], that
there should be an entire elimination of any recession [sic] and that damages
for violation should be actual damages; and it seems to me that is all the
investor is entitled to, and that is all the limit that the broker or dealer
should be subjected to.43'
This witness explained that, although the term "rescission" was not in the
Act and therefore arguably no right of rescission existed, he understood
Senator Maloney to have intended a right of rescission to exist.4 7 Further, in
light of the experience of some Massachusetts dealers who had been sued for
rescission under a state securities statute, he urged an express limitation to
actual damages under section 15(c).438
His importunings, and those of other witnesses, 49 were not heeded. Senator
Maloney had flatly stated that inasmuch as a broker-dealer entered into a
contract in violation of rules under section 15(c) "striking at abuses in the
form of dishonest or overreaching conduct," such a contract "should be void
in accordance with subsection (b) of section 29 of the Securities Exchange
Act, so that the innocent customer may rescind the contract and recover such
payment as he may have made."' ' However, he saw no reason to permit
rescission for violation of rules aimed at "orderly and efficient business
practices." 441 While Congress was thus made aware by these broker-dealers of
the economic hardships that potentially could be created by the allowance of
a rescissory remedy in the absence of proof that the broker-dealer's violation
of section 15(c)(1) actually caused the investor's injury, Congress compromised
and only partially accommodated these objectors by expressly removing viol-
ations of section 15(c)(2) and (c)(3)-but not section 15()(1)-from the voiding
provisions of section 29(b).
It is not only the legislative history which supports the proposition that the
remedy of rescission would be available in a private action against a broker-
dealer even in the absence of proof that the broker-dealer's conduct in violation
of section 15(c)(1) caused the investor loss. This proposition is further sup-
ported by the Supreme Court's decision in SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc.4 2 This case arose under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
436. House Hearings on S. 3255, supra note 186, at 40-41. See also id. at 44-46.
437. Id. at 42. As Mr. Withington explained:
Senator Maloney in his report to the Senate states clearly this right of rescission
does exist. He says on page 10 [referring to S. REP. No. 1455, supra note 95] clearly
contracts entered into by brokers and dealers with customers in violation of any
rule, or regulation of the first type should be void in accordance with subsection
(b) of section 29 of the Exchange Act, so that the customer may rescind the contract
and recover such payment as he may have made.
Id.
438. Id. at 42-43.
439. Id. at 44-46.
440. S. REP. No. 1455, supra note 95, at 10.
441. Id. See supra notes 197-98, 201-07 and accompanying text.
442. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
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and involved an SEC injunctive action to compel a registered investment
adviser to make certain disclosures to clients. The Supreme Court first reviewed
the legislative history of the 1940 Act which reflected a congressional intent
to eliminate or at least minimize conflicts of interests by investment advisers.44
The Court then employed evolving common-law interpretations of "fraud" to
interpret that term in the 1940 Act "remedially" in the case of transactions
involving fiduciaries, rather than "technically" as traditionally interpreted in
arm's-length transactions.44 Based on the 1940 Act's legislative history and
the Court's flexible interpretation to "effectuate its remedial purposes,"" 5 the
Court held that neither proof of intent to defraud nor proof of injury to
clients was required. 46
While Capital Gains involved an SEC enforcement action, its reasoning
applies with equal force to private actions under section 15(c)(1). Certainly
the legislative history of the 1934 Act reflects an equally strong congressional
concern about conflicts of interest among broker-dealers as did the 1940 Act
with respect to investment advisers," 7 independent of the question of public
versus private enforcement. Certainly, the Capital Gains Court's discussion of
the common law's treatment of suits involving fiduciaries applies equally to
the intepretation of the 1934 Act. Indeed, the common-law distinctions
between fraud in equity and fraud at law which the Court emphasized had
nothing to do with a distinction between public actions and private lawsuits,
but rather arose but of the distinction between transactions involving fiduciaries
and ones involving non-fiduciaries."6 Thus, the Capital Gains conclusion
declining to require proof of causation and actual injury should apply to a
private action by investors under section 15(c)(1).
CONCLUSION
This Article has necessarily been introductory in nature. In light of the
dearth of scholarly attention to section 15(c)(1) to date, the Article is intended
to be the first, rather than the last, word on the issue of implying a private
right of action under that section. The legislative history of section 15(c)(1)
points clearly, to this author at least, to a congressional assumption that a
private litigant could sue a broker-dealer for violation of that section. In light
of the paucity of judicial interpretation of section 15(c)(1), however, the
manner in which the courts will define the contours of a private action under
it is a matter of some speculation. This Article was designed simply to lay a
443. Id. at 186-92.
444. Id. at 192-95.
445. Id. at 195.
446. Id. at 192, 195.
447. See supra notes 314-16, 372-81 and accompanying text.
448. 375 U.S. at 192-95. See also supra notes 317-22 and accompanying text.
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framework for analysis for this often-overlooked section of the Exchange Act,
and to suggest some open questions for further examination.

